























The following pages answer to a simple question. Why do we act in ways that are 
unfulfilling? This is not a question of religion. Fulfillment is not a special spiritual state 
promised by a religious doctrine. It is nothing more than the realization of those desires 
and capacities that, together, compose a human being. To eat, sleep, make love, enjoy 
friendship and companionship, sing, dance, think, experience beauty, participate in 
politics, laugh and make jokes, debate, create art and poetry and crafts, make music, dress 
up, act, barter, hunt, garden, have children, win honor and fame, even to fight. These are 
but a few of these capacities and desires. Not all may appeal to us; we do not all want the 
same thing, nor everything. But perhaps, if we are not entirely jaded, all of us can 
understand how these activities might be fulfilling to someone. Or, contrariwise; in what 
sense would we still be human if we are capable of none of these? 
 Our lives are unfulfilling when we spend most of our time doing things that don’t 
realize any of these human capacities or desires, or only realize them in a very 
fragmentary and limited way, or when we satisfy only a very small part of ourselves, or 
when we do things without being able to say why.  
 This problem is both personal and political; the personal and political cannot be 
separated, unless one is willing to believe either that people could not only exist, but live, 
outside of a community, or that communities and social organizations can exist without 
people. And it is urgent. We live in a world that produces ever more things and fulfills 
ever fewer needs, that breeds misery for the poor and depression for the affluent, that 
exploits finite resources at an ever greater rate, and celebrates its triumph over mental 
illness while medicates away the vacant lives that it has left in its wake.  
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 This is what we want to know: how have human beings created a world for 
themselves that is not only not in their best interest, but that may in the end lead to 
catastrophe? How is it that our world has become mad? 
* 
 Reading the papers these days and following what pass for political debates, one 
finds two pictures of human nature. Played off against each other, these are presented as 
irreconcilable opposites, and we are given to think that we have become “intellectuals” 
once we decide ourselves for one or the other. Each is rooted in scientific theories, but 
have a practical significance for political life, for each offers a very different explanation 
of how humans come to act in the way they do, and, in turn, of how we can act to change 
the actions of others. And politics, in germ, is exactly this; acting to change the actions of 
others. All action within a community of people is political. While the actions of some 
may carry vastly more influence than the actions of others, there is no one alive who does 
not, from moment of birth, act as a political agent. We do so whenever we convince, 
teach, guide, compel, rape, coerce, trick, murder, pity or seek to be pitied, cry to be fed, 
buy or sell. An owner of a multinational corporation, a community activist, a beggar on 
the street, or a mother, are no less responsible as political agents than Bill Clinton or New 
Gingrich.  
 The first of these pictures tells us that humans are “blank slates” at birth, and 
determined to be what they become almost entirely by outside forces. A child imitates the 
behavior of others and assumes their values, without any real freedom on its part. Even 
freedom, this picture suggests, is a social construct, and has no real bearing on human 
agency. We only think we are free.  
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 The second of these pictures tells us that humans are “rational agents” who are 
entirely free to determine who they are through their actions.  
 Both of these pictures make for stupid and silly science. 
 If our behavior is almost entirely determined by our environment, why is this 
environment itself always in flux. Why do people constantly invent new ways to act, 
reinventing themselves as political beings? Why do people so often feel the need to 
express themselves in ways that are not only not encouraged by their ostensive 
environment, but are actively censured? In short; if we were almost perfectly determined 
by our environment, how could we explain why there has never been a single society that 
has ever been perfectly, or even remotely, successful at molding all of its children into 
members who, without coercion, always act uniformly and to their mutual benefit. If such 
a social organization had ever existed, it would likely have survived into our own time. 
Being perfectly able to reproduce its forms of life, how could it not endure --- unless an 
arrangement of such a static nature were unable to compete with other, more adaptable 
cultures.  
 With just as little right can we think of ourselves as perfectly free rational agents. 
When we act, do indeed feel as though our actions are free, and this feeling of freedom is 
deeply interwoven into the way we act and speak about our actions. No one who is not 
completely jaded by book-learning and abstractions could deny this about human 
consciousness. We act as free agents, considering different possibilities and choosing 
between them. And we know ourselves to be responsible for the choices we have made. 
Yet even if all of our actions were perfectly free in this way, --- which is probably the 
case for most significant political actions committed by sane, sober, and mature 
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individuals --- and even if our decisions were also guided by reason, this would not yet 
make us into perfectly free moral agents. For we are perfectly free only in our ability to 
choose once choices have been given to us. A far more limited freedom presents itself in 
the choice of these choices, and in our ability, over the course of our lives, to present 
ourselves with possibilities for action. If these choices were constrained only by the rigid 
nature of physical reality and our body, this might be a trivial point. Yet this is not the 
case. The kinds of choices we have available at any given moment are determined by an 
extraordinarily complicated interaction between our social environment, our position 
within it, accidents and chance events, our genetic disposition, and the political actions of 
ourselves as well as others.  
 Political agency, as I suggested, is action directed towards the action of others. 
Politics is nothing else than the total environment created by people in their mutual 
interaction, and thus political action is nothing else than an action that transforms this 
environment. This suggests that the freedom of rational agency is in fact only the most 
limited, flat and impoverished kind of political action, since it acts within the possibilities 
of a world that has been created, but only in turn creates the world as a passive reflex of 
this action. In this way, we can distinguish genuinely free political agency from the 
vacant and impotent freedom of merely “rational agency.” True political freedom freely 
forms the world in which we live, and which guide our choices. It is informed, creative, 
and comprehensive. Informed, for unless we understand how it is possible to act in our 
environment, we cannot hope that our actions will be effective --- or we must even fear 
that they will work against our wishes. Creative, for we must conceive possibilities that 
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don’t yet exist. And comprehensive, for we can only act reliable in ways that will change 
the whole of our political environment if we have a view to this whole. 
 While people may vary in their ability to make good decisions, and some may be 
presented by a vastly greater variety of choices, others with almost none, everyone who is 
sane and sober, a prisoner no less than a business-man, can act as a free political agent. 
Yet while every who belongs to a human community and speaks a human tongue is a 
political being, and potentially free in their actions, this capacity is not always realized to 
the same degree. Becoming informed, creative, and comprehending takes effort; we are, 
by nature, political animals, but we are not so easily. 
 Birth, wealth, and talents bless some with a more influential station in life, while 
others it condemns to obscurity. Yet we should not think that, even in our society, those 
in so-called “positions of power” are more meaningfully politically free than the 
disenfranchised. For political freedom, as we have said, is an action which forms the 
environment in which action is possible. If it is to be effective in the long run, and not 
undermine itself, it most produce its very own possibility. We are only truly free as 
human agents when we create a world in which political freedom is possible. When the 
president of a multinational soft-drink firm decides to increase their market share by 
investing one hundred million dollars in advertising, he is merely making a “rational 
choice” in proxy for an entity whose choices have been dictated by market forces. When 
an ad-executive decides on a new, hip, innovative way to get Viewer X to choose 
tweedle-dee over tweedle-dum, he not acting creatively in any sincere and meaningful 
way, for his actions do not themselves create creativity. The politician who, at the 
pinnacle of power, is swayed hither and thither by special interest groups and voter 
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preferences like a lonely tree atop a mountain peak, is more slavish than the lowliest 
slave --- his is the rashness and inconstancy of our entire political life.  
The marketing expert who has surveyed the “soft-drink preferences” of 10,000 
individuals with rigorous statistical methods has neither a comprehensive view of social 
reality nor a informed understanding of human action; if he thinks of people as soft-drink 
drinkers, he knows less about human nature than the beggar on the street, who asks us for 
what he wants, rather than telling us what we need, and who is not granted a captive 
audience, but must summon our attention. A beggar is a free political agent; in asking us 
to give, he seeks nothing less than that we take something that has been destined by birth 
to serve a very limited role --- the free choice to purchase the labor of others form an 
endless array of objects and services --- transforming it into the lime of a political 
relationship. A political relationship, because to give implies the trust that him to whom it 
was given will use it wisely, and there can not be a true community without this trust. 
Free political action is possible only in the anticipation of a community where the 
freedom of mere rational choice --- the momentary form in which even true freedom must 
express itself --- will not be abused. 
 It is by no means easy for us to realize our capacity to act as free political beings, 
and it may even become more difficult the more power and privilege we possess. A 
homeless man or woman cannot walk on the sidewalk, stand on the corner, or sleep in 
open view without at least forcing those passing by to confront the possibility of entering 
into a political relationship through an act of charity. For those in control of the 
institutions and wealth that, to a large degree, determines the “rational choices” that are 
possible within our society, on the other hand, it requires an almost superhuman effort to 
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wield their power to any other end than the untiring production of the unpolitical, 
antipolitical, empty freedoms that these choices allow. Perhaps you have noticed; 
politicians speak the cant of politicians, corporate presidents of corporations, 
philanthropists of philanthropic institutions, and academics of the academy. Only 
mendicants, children, and madmen, it seems, still speak human.  
  The difficulty of becoming a free political agent is not that of learning a new 
scientific vocabulary and objective, abstract methods of analysis. The language of politics 
is human language, and to become political is nothing more than to address the reality 
that surrounds us as a human reality. To be informed, to understand what it means to act 
in a political environment, we must relearn the rich human language of agency. We know 
this still as a set of semantic possibilities; we do remember what it means to “convince,” 
or “give,” or “ask,” or “beg,” or even “murder,” “rape,” “steal” ---and beyond all 
legalistic subtleties. And there is even something reassuring in the thought that these 
capacities of “ordinary language” might be innate and ineradicable, a biology reserve of 
human freedom that no brutalizing of the human spirit could ever completely destroy. 
No, we have not forgotten the words of politics, nor their meanings; only that these might 
apply to the world around us.  
 What I hope to provide, in these pages, is nothing more than one possible 
perspective through which we might become informed in this way. This perspective is 
offered as an alternative to the “empty slate” and the “free agent.” By now, it should 
already be evident why these are not only silly and stupid as scientific theories, but 
useless and dangerous as a guides to political action. If politics is the building of 
environments of action through the interaction of agents, then both the all-powerful 
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environment of the former and the perfectly free rational agents of the latter obstruct 
every path to a true politics. The choice between them, like all merely free choices of pre-
chosen possibilities, is a non-choice. One may take you through the “Modern Language 
Association,” bring you into the company of the tenured so-called radicals, and get you 
laid in college. And the other may get you a job at a so-called conservative so-called 
think-tank, or an appearance on the Christian Broadcasting Network. But either way, 
you’ll end up in the same place; political impotence and feeble-mindedness, a purely 
passive attitude to all that happens. Whether you spill your ink admonishing the poor to 
be less lazy, or deconstructing “power relations” in convoluted prose, you won’t change 
anything --- and this, as we will see, is what it needs. 
* 
 This it is the problem that we have to address; what does it mean, and how do we 
deal with it in a theory of politics. Let me explain.  
 We all know that some things happen that are not caused by human agency. When 
an event takes place, and we neither can say who did it or why, nor believe that the search 
for a who and why could be fruitful, we just shrug and say “it happened.” “it thundered,” 
“it rained,” “there was an earthquake,” “there was a stock market crash,” “there was a 
war.” Sometimes, even our body becomes an “it”; “it hurts.”  
 Perhaps every language and culture have some capacity for “itness,” for purely 
impersonal expressions. Yet even if this is so, the “reach” of this “itness” varies 
tremendously from one culture to another. In archaic Greece, thunder and lightening were 
expressions of Zeus’s wrath, not mere facts of an impersonal nature. The forces of nature, 
heavenly bodies, and earth were personified as Gods and Goddesses. And when 
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Herodotus, the great story-teller and multiculturalist of the already enlightened 5th 
Century, narratated the incredibly complex and often gruesome events that led up to 
Persian War, he did not speak of “political tensions,” “casualties of war,” “imperialist 
expansion,” let alone “market forces,” or “depressions” and “recessions”; but told of the 
words, actions, feelings, and choices of men and woman.  
 Such cultures, we now say, are superstitious; it is almost impossible for them to 
explain anything but in terms of human agency. Nearly everything, for them, becomes 
political; the political community within which they act, and which they hope to 
transform through their actions, includes not only people, but divinities, and even what 
we think of as natural phenomenon. As a result they were ill-informed about political 
action; by extending their community so far into the inhuman, they blocked off view to 
the reciprocal relations between people. Since people believed they were dominated by 
superhuman personalities whose wills were obscure and who could not, in the end, be 
convinced to do anything, neither could they fully esteem political actions directed 
towards the actions of other humans, nor recognize the tremendous power that these 
could have to transform their environment. And thus, even if politics operated at every 
level of their political life, they were never able to appropriate it in an informed, creative, 
or comprehensive way. Athenian political life did have moments that were 
comprehensive (Herodotus), creative (Plato), and informative (Aristotle), yet these never 
coalesced into the possibility of truly free, transformative, action.  
 While there are still many, and even some in positions of power, who cling on to 
superstitious beliefs, our own age --- the age of multinational capitalism and consumer 
culture ---, is, on the whole, no longer superstitious. Rather, we tend too far in the 
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opposite direction. If earlier the political comprehended far too much of the inhuman, 
now the inhuman comprehends a great extent of the political. Every institutional 
language --- be it of the military, government, science, or even philanthropy --- translates 
political events into inhuman relations between theoretical abstractions. These are 
produced and consumed by specialists, and intended only for internal use. Such 
institutions have forgotten how to speak humanly of the events in which they are 
implicated, and if they must communicate their “motives” to an outside audience, they 
resort, without fail, to speechwriters and advertisers versed in the clichés which, 
following the latest and most scientific market research, they think will speak to our 
hearts.  
* 
 Homer’s Iliad begins with these famous lines;  
Rage --- Goddess, sing the rage of Peleus’ son Achilles, 
murderous, doomed, that cost the Acheans countless losses, 
hurling down to the House of Death so many sturdy souls,  
great fighters’ soles, but made their bodies carrion,  
feasts for the dogs and birds,  
and the will of Zeus was moving towards its end.  
 
Homer did not see the world with rosy spectacles. The world was brutal and precarious; 
the bodies of fighters, first among mortals, became carrion scattered through the 
elements. But he did not hesitate to call the wages of war murderous, and even when he 
conceived of war, in all the horror that no one since has described so well, as the 
fulfillment of Zeus’s will. Everything in world, and even its greatness savagery, was the 
political action of a superhuman agent. Their world was sane, and madness appeared only 
when, either through prophesy or in their actions, people expressed a divine will that 
could not comprehended by mortals.  
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Our world, on the other, is mad. We try to understand it in political terms, but find 
only impersonal forces that control our lives without rhyme or reason, without a purpose 
or will of their own. And the only people who appear sane are those scientists and 
technocrats --- the prophets and divine agents of our age --- who are able to speak of 
these events from the limited, inhuman, intra-institutional perspective from which alone 
they could make any sense.  
 How is it that our world has become mad?  
It is perhaps only as a response to the madness of world that people came to think 
of human agency as either a “blank slate” or “rational agency.” Both try to explain the 
power of an environment that acts on us without our reciprocation, and that no longer 
speaks a human tongue. The social determinist believes in many little things which all 
amount, if brought to their furthest consequence, to one incredibly silly idea. He knows 
all about all the forces that together form our environment --- an environment that 
comprehends all human agency, and where freedom no longer expresses itself through 
people in a community, but rather as a totality with the absolute power to determine the 
values and behavior of the individuals. We are all free to make ourselves slaves to our 
freedom. The advocate of human rationality and freedom, on the other hand, believing in 
only one single absurdity, take a less round-about path to ignorance. By attaching an 
absurd value to the freedom of choice, however desolate the array of these choices may 
be, however ill-suited to serve human fulfillment, the environment is neutralized and 
rendered politically insignificant. Those who would base politics on “free agency” want 
students at the Universities to read the “Great Books of Western Literature.” Have they 
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read these themselves? Where do they find the shadow of freedom they worship. Perhaps 
only in the receipt of purchase that they left as a bookmark on the first page. 
 Both perspectives render political action impossible; neither can conceive of how 
an environment for action can be reciprocally created by human action. With the latter, 
this leads pseudo-politics that celebrates our “human” freedom and rights without even 
trying to change a world which is, and ever more rapidly, spinning out of control. With 
the former, this leads either to an institutionalized radicalism that, from within the safe 
confines of the University, tries to comprehend all phenomenon in an essentially 
bureaucratic academese, or to totalitarian pseudo-revolutionary politics, that, no longer 
content on its academic fictions, transforms these into the facts of a totalitarian state, a 
system within which no one exists but as an operational variable. The totalitarian states of 
the Twentieth Century anticipate the new order being produced under all of those noses 
held up above the stink and decay of men turned to carrion and pointed resolutely 
towards the lofty ideal of human freedom. If you need prophesies for the “Next 
Millennium,” just look at the history books. 
* 
 How can we become free political agents in a world that no longer makes sense? 
How can we become informed about the nature of political action, comprehend this world 
in its totality, and creatively transform this world into a better world? How is it possible 
to conceive of our environment as a political world, that, even if it does not directly 
present the possibility of truly free political action, was nevertheless created from 
reciprocal human interrelations, and, if properly understood, is still open to 
transformation?  
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We must reject two kinds of approaches. On the one hand, we cannot hope to 
reanimate and re-enchant a human world that has become inhuman simply by forcing it 
back into the mold of human agency. If we have forgotten in so many places how to 
speak human, it is not because of some mental lapse. Human words no longer fit. If a 
bureaucrat tried to speak outside of bureaucratic cant, he would sound like a lunatic. 
Speechwriters, if you listen carefully --- much to ask when it is so hard to listen at all --- 
sound like prophets who have lost the gift of imagination and fallen upon a treasure-chest 
of hackneyed clichés.  
Nor, however, can we rely on a specialized scientific discourse. Because these are 
constrained by a limited set of precisely defined theoretical entities, they do not 
communicate with each other easily, nor without a great loss of meaning. Yet it is just 
this communication that is needed for a theory of political action, and not the descriptive 
or explanatory power of any given scientific theory. 
 Let me explain. Everything that I have said thus far drives at one single point; 
politics can no longer shy away from dealing with aspects of our environment which, 
while not immediately accessible through the terms of politics, are yet still political, since 
they arose through, bear upon, and can be transformed by human agency. Politics, in 
other words, concerns the interrelation of free political activity with an artificial 
environment that has been created through the convergence of political agency, the 
natural world, and human nature. Since almost the entire natural world, even into the 
heavens, has been transformed into our artificial environment, and since, moreover, 
practically every aspect of communal life has come to be mediated through institutions 
that are not directly responsive to any form of human agency, a valid politics --- a theory, 
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in other words, which gives us a synoptic view of our situation and allows us to create 
viable strategies for change --- must allow every science to communicate fluently with an 
informed account of political action. What is human action, what is inhuman action, and 
how do they interact? How does inhuman become human? This is a problem of natural 
history, which brings us from the first beginnings of the universe to human evolution. But 
it also concerns biology and ecology and the history of agriculture and the technologies 
that serve to transform the inhuman into the conditions of human existence. How does the 
human become inhuman? This is not only the concern of medicine and the study of 
mortality, but, as I have suggested and will argue, the central problem of history. How 
can human communities that have become inhuman institutions, and that nevertheless 
satisfy essential, or seemingly essential needs, be transformed into human institutions? 
The totality of inhuman institutions, at this point, have become entirely indispensable to 
our survival, and so closely intertwined that it would be impossible to remove some and 
have others survive. Even more disturbingly, the system as a whole is dependent, for its 
very survival, on a rate of growth that cannot be sustained. If either immediate or 
eventual catastrophe is to be avoided, it is perhaps only because we will have found a 
way to transform the very force of economic growth into a transformative and creative 
human activity. Merely economic growth must be transformed into a political labor. 
 Before continuing, it is necessary to stress that our appropriation of science is not 
satisfied merely be statistics and isolated facts. What we seek is a non-mathematical, non-
exact conceptual representation of the mode of activity expressed by the entities 
explained and described by a given scientific discipline. What we wish to know, in other 
words, is how the kinds of entities that science describes act as agents in a more common 
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political world. This mode of activity must not be described in terms of human agency, 
but, at the same time, it cannot stretch past the limits of common sense. To this end, the 
subtlety of philosophy will serve us well. Philosophy, as I have tried to show elsewhere, 
develops and elaborates the resources of ordinary language without ever departing from 
its domain. Whereas scientific concepts are bundled together into very discreet theoretical 
systems that have only a very limited ability to communicate beyond themselves, 
philosophical concepts are always in dialogue with each other, even if they are found in 
different systems, written in different ages, and in different tongues. Philosophy, in this 
way, replicates the action of language and articulates its possibilities, and thus will allow 
us to find conceptual representations of scientific systems that will fluidly communicate 
with the political categories of ordinary language. 
* 
 An informed account of political agency must begin with a scientifically 
motivated understanding of human nature. Human nature is the basis of an interactive 
relationship amongst humans, and between humans and their environment. This 
environment is to be understand in the broadest ecological sense, and consists neither in 
what we think of as the merely natural, rocks, rivers, tree, sunlight, nor in a world of 
perfectly free human agents with unlimited needs --- the environment of “free choice” as 
conceived by conventional economists. Rather, it is the totality of the available 
possibilities of fulfillment for human beings. These possibilities are not a naturally given, 
but have been produced, and are still being produced, through a political agency that 
brings together a community of humans with a merely natural environment. Each of these 
represents the potential for a certain degree and manner of human fulfillment, realizable 
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over certain circumstances and in the course of a certain period of time --- ranging from 
death, the zero degree, to divinity. With this, we do not wish to claim that divinity has 
ever been or could ever be realized, or favor any sort of religious conception, but only to 
reject the view that man is a monstrosity with infinite, insatiable needs. Man has a limit; 
divinity. Divinity, moreover, might be described as the highest degree of true political 
freedom --- but this only suggests that genuine freedom and fulfillment are intimately 
related. Absolute freedom is not absolute dominance and absence of constrain --- the 
ability to do whatever one wants --- but rather a human potential which can only be 
fulfilled within a community. Freedom is nothing less and nothing more than our 
fulfillment as humans.  
 Our environment thus is historical, and it is an artifact of human labor; it has been 
made by transforming mere nature into something that stands in a relation to human 
nature, something towards which we act, and which acts towards us. All “mere nature” 
has already been transformed in this way. A simple mountain path, for example, turns the 
mountain into something that provides the possibilities of humans expressing their 
natural capacity for certain manner of aesthetic enjoyment. By naming and identifying 
the celestial bodies, and examining the way they relate to each other and the passage of 
the seasons, we have transformed a part of the world that seems almost not to touch us at 
all, whose effects we can scarce feel through our senses, into something at once 
meaningful and useful. All science, however legitimate its pretensions of objectivity, 
transforms what is merely “out there” into something that can be manipulated by 
complex symbolic systems, providing both fulfillment for our inquisitiveness and aiding 
the development of the technologies that, through various mechanisms and procedures, 
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appropriate latent or inaccessible energy sources to our needs. But we may go even 
further; the most basic innate capacities of human nature, our ability to perceive the 
world in the ways that we do, to construct symbolic systems to communicate with others, 
to feel in certain ways, and have certain moods, and even to desire things --- all of these 
capacities build “mere nature” into an environment.  
 All environment-building may be thought of as a form of technology, and this, in 
turn, as political action in the broadest sense. Likewise, every development of a new 
political community or a new cultural form, every reorganization of the social relations 
that create the possibilities of human fulfillment, is a technological development. 
Technology, in the broadest sense, is the transformation of the action of nature such that 
it enters into a new kind of relation of agency to the action of humans. For example, the 
development of technologies that transform matter into energy has created the possibility 
of a new kind of relation between human and inhuman agency; actions of the natural 
world, which previously had effected all life on this planet (through the production of 
sunlight) but could not be effected or controlled, can now be forced to yield in a more or 
less predictable, controllable way to our command. While we do not ordinarily think of 
the capacities of the human mind and body for nourishment, respiration, perception, 
thought, and language as technologies, in just this same way they too represent 
transformative processes that bring the action of nature into relation with human nature. 
Likewise, the development of the human organism, indeed, the development of all life 
forms, is nothing less than a natural history of those technologies which have turned 
“mere nature” into an environment. It follows from this that there can be no essential 
opposition between the “natural” and “human” environment, between humankind and 
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other life forms, and that the development of human technologies, from fire to the 
hydrogen bomb, is simply an outgrowth of the evolution of species and their innate 
capacities.  
This may seem to lead to an absolute moral relativism, relieving us of any 
responsibility to act as anything more than selfish beasts. But this need not be. Properly 
grasped, this approach will not disburden us of our moral responsible, but instead will 
deepen this and extend it towards the entire ecosystem. No longer will we be able to deny 
that we are a part of this. For, as we will see, political action is such that it cannot be 
conceived logically otherwise than in relation to all life on the planet, indeed to the entire 
system of nature. Nor can we shirk the responsibility to political action, for it is rooted in 
human nature. What we will discover, taking this tact, is that the human species has 
evolved towards the need to express all of nature in its communal life. If we choose to be 
human, and we cannot choose otherwise without contradiction, we become responsible as 
political agents for all of nature. The only alternative is an inhuman passivity.  
 The technological forms that we have consciously developed in order to 
manipulate the world represent the furthest reach of our political agency. With these we 
our able to extract hidden potentials for energy, bring the reaches of the heavens into 
clearer view, or discern the subtle details of our world, venture into the ocean depths, or 
grasp our own earth’s construction. And through these, we are able to compel nature to 
work towards our own needs. Yet our relation to these technologies is not itself always 
freely political. Science fiction often depicts a world in which the things we produce have 
gotten out of control --- having wills of their own and no longer heeding human 
commands. Yet such doomsday scenarios in fact reassure in the face of the existing state 
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of affairs, for they only concern the absence of “rational freedom,” not “political 
freedom.” We have good reason to believe not only that with certain safeguards modern 
society could avoid producing unservile machines, but that, in fact, true freedom is not 
something that, within the foreseeable future, could be imitated mechanically. Yet even if 
we do succeed in maintaining rational freedom in our relation with our technologies --- 
even if our nuclear bombs do not drop themselves, but have to be dropped --- this does 
not yet imply political freedom. Rational freedom requires only that technologies, even in 
the automatic operation, serve the functions that have been assigned to them. Political 
freedom asks that, through them, human beings actually become more capable of free 
human agency, and thus ultimately more fulfilled as human beings; they must actually 
develop our environment towards greater possibilities of fulfillment. The implementation 
of a new technology can only be considered to be a free political action when, through it, 
the polis --- the entire community of human agents --- develops towards a deeper and 
more fulfilling freedom.  
  How is it that technology can make us less free? How can technologies that have 
emerged from the free intercourse of a community act against this very freedom --- not 
by failing to heed our control, but by directing our human potentials away from human 
ends? To answer this question is to begin to understand how our world has become mad. 
What is clear, to begin with, is that new technologies make us susceptible in new ways --- 
every technology involves a new mode of interaction. All of the technologies of human 
nature, from nourishment all the way to language and artistic creativity, as well as all 
those that have been consciously and creatively developed by humans, have made of us a 
being that is open to and capable of being acted on by our environment.  
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* 
 Human nature, simply put, is the sum of technologies that, instantiated in 
individual bodies, express themselves as forms of communal life which, taken together, 
comprise the potential of the human species to adaptively create an environment for 
itself. Human nature is not something universal to all human beings as individuals, if only 
as some sort of potential. Nor does it belong to individuals as such as some sort of innate 
faculty. While innate capacities of unique bodies are essential to the realization of the 
potential of a species, human nature, as a whole, expresses itself through the whole of a 
species and its communities, and not in any particular body.  
Thus grasped, it is the starting point for both human history --- the history of the 
development of the technologies which transform our environment --- as well as of each 
individual life. All of our learning, adapting, creating and destroying amounts to creating 
an environment and adapting to our environment in ways that express what it means to be 
human.  
 In trying to articulate a theory of human nature, my approach will be deductive 
rather than empirical, yet nevertheless informed by a scientific perspective. For our 
purposes, it is not necessary to catalog and systematize all that is biologically innate --- 
which could only result from empirical research so extensive that it is not even within the 
competence of today’s scientists. What we seek, instead, is an account of the most basic 
qualitative differences. 
 The deduction of human nature is a deduction of the biologically-innate 
technologies that have transformed our world into a human world. These technologies 
have been formed, and in turn they inform our world. How did this formation take place? 
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One answer is; we were created by God. Were this so, we would have to understand our 
own nature by asking what were God’s intentions in creating us. God, this approach 
dictates, created us to be in a certain relation both to himself and to the world --- a 
relation which is enabled by and reflected in our nature. Because He, for some reason, 
intended us to relate to the world as “created beings,” creating us as creations to live 
among other creations of his, he gave us the faculty of “sensibility”; this is our created 
nature, and enables an interaction with the created world. But He also wanted us to relate 
to Himself, and participate in the eternal --- and so he endowed us with the faculty of 
reason.  
 We must reject this approach, not because we are positive that God doesn’t exist, 
but because any approach that begins with our createdness cannot be scientifically 
informed; it cannot explain anything without recourse to teleology, and to the imposition 
of human forms of agency on nature. We wish to understand human nature not in 
opposition to, but in interaction with, our environment. If man and the world are 
juxtaposed as two different creations originating from a creator who stands outside of 
both, their interaction would be nothing more than a possibility to be realized after the 
fact of creation, and not something that informs --- contributes to the formation --- of 
both. Against this, the interaction of both must appear as essential to their mutual 
formation. We must be able to describe, and explain, the content of both as if it were 
constituted by their interaction. While this may not affect the content itself --- while we 
might be able to discover the same truths about man and the world from a “creationist” 
outlook --- it significantly changes the nature of their interpretation, and only in this way 
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does it become possible, as we will see, to assign a truly political significance to what 
would otherwise be mere facts. 
 This suggests the second, and proper approach; to consider man not as created by 
God, but as having evolved through an interaction with an environment. This evolution 
proceeds the appearance of human nature, --- it is its prehistory, --- but it invests it with 
its primary political significance in relation to its environment. The evolution of the 
human species is already a political fact. 
* 
 If we are to gain a concept of the most basic possibilities of human nature, we 
should begin by trying to understand the manner of our evolution. Evolution is the 
adaptation of an evolved nature to an evolved environment, the production of the 
technologies enabling interactions between the two. Human nature is to be found at the 
level of the species, and thus the evolution of human nature is the evolution of the human 
species. A species consists in the entire system of genetic material, distributed among 
individuals capable of sexual reproduction, which combine together to form new 
individuals with innate capacities to development technologies, which, over the course of 
their lifetime, adapt to their environment. Each of these is, as it were, an individual 
expression of possibilities contained in the whole.  
This adaptation is not directed towards a telos. For the most part, organisms do 
not possess the need to adapt themselves better to their environment and thereby become 
“fitter.” Nor does “life” as a whole “will” for higher forms of life to develop; and in fact, 
more highly developed life forms are only better in a very technical and specific sense. 
Rather, evolution is simply a way of explaining how the particular organizations of 
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matter that are found in nature at any given point of time have survived up till then. 
Complex organizations of matter do not, for the most part, if ever, fall together by 
chance; and since we have excluded the possibility that the entire universe was created by 
a deity standing outside of nature, we must suppose that a) forms are able to perpetuate 
themselves --- either simply by enduring, or by appearing through a confluence of 
regularly repeating circumstances, or by asexual or sexual reproduction, or, finally, by 
being reproduced or regularly produced through another medium. b) that there is a 
process through which more complex organisms can be seen to result from simpler 
processes, or , in other words, to develop from simpler forms. c) that the forms that exist 
now will reflect the forms that were able to develop and then survive to reproduce 
themselves.  
What we are interested in, then, is these conditions of survival; how is a species    
--- the total system of genetic material that is able to combine together and express itself 
in individuals with their own particular set of adaptive capacities relative to their 
environment --- able to survive in order to reproduce.  
 The answer to this question depends on our understanding of “environment.” 
Were the environment something stable and static, it stands to reason that these 
conditions for survival would consist in nothing more than a fixed set of routines for 
coping with a fixed set of situations. An organisms would be, in essence, a computer; a 
finite program designed to deal with a limited set of possible inputs. Evolution, then, 
would tend towards a, perhaps unreachable, ideal of “perfect fitness.”  Yet this 
cannot be the case.  
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On the one hand, the environment with which the evolution of all life begins, that 
which comes as close as possible to an unevolved and “bare” nature, is chaotic to an 
extraordinary degree. It contains none of the regularity that belongs to life, but at most 
certain recurrent strings of organic compounds. Since their surrounding are chaotic, and 
don’t in any way contain (by definition) the kind of regularity found within even the most 
primitive life, their survival would require a potential for adaptivity. In other words, 
instead of possessing merely a certain set of procedures for dealing with a limited set of 
phenomenon, they must possess the capacity to adapt themselves to a range of chaotic 
situations. This range can be extremely limited --- there might be only a very narrow field 
of situations in which the organism could survive; and yet within this range, it must be 
able to adapt itself to maintain an internal regularity. This adaptive potential should be 
thought of as a transformative, rather than merely computational operation. While a 
computation merely rearranges information that has been presented to it in an organized 
form, an adaptive potential enables the transformation from chaos to regularity. Or, 
simply put, the most basic organisms to develop enact, as it were, the most fundamental 
transformation from non-living to the living. We might compare these with the input and 
output devices of a computer, the keyboard and monitor, for example, which transform 
one form of action into another, translating the physical impact against a keyboard into 
digital signals, or digital signals into a visual experience.  
 On the other hand, as life evolves over time, the environment is no longer 
constituted merely by the not-yet-living of a nature “out there,” but rather by the 
organisms themselves. Living beings, interwoven with what was originally mere 
“nature,” create a world for each other. And thus we may ask: as evolution progresses, 
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does this environment itself become more or less chaotic? The answer to this question is 
complex. As we have seen, organisms are, from the beginning, of a two-fold character. 
They possess both an adaptive potential which relates to the world outside of them, but 
also an internal regularity produced through the transformation of the comparative chaos 
and disorganized. From this it follows that the shared environment which arise from their 
reciprocal interaction would evolve in two contradictory directions. Certainly, in some 
respects it would become less chaotic, ever more standardized through the internal 
regularity of organisms. Organisms, in this way, would adapt to that element of their 
environment which has become more predictable in the kind of “inputs” that it provided, 
or, conversely, transform their environment into one that is more predictable. Since the 
environment is itself constituted through the technologies of adaptation, these both 
amount to the same thing.  
 Yet to the extent that the adaptive mechanisms themselves represent an essentially 
unpredictable potential, expressing chaos in their very capacity to transform chaos, the 
environment would itself evolve to become more chaotic. And once the environment 
itself includes an adaptation towards a greater level of chaos expressed through this 
adaptive potential, even higher levels of chaos would be reached, and so to infinity. One 
might suppose, perhaps, that these two tendencies would cancel themselves out. It is easy 
to show why this is not the case. The development of regularity, I would suggests, is 
concentrated within the nutritive, sensorial, and perceptive capacities --- in short, what 
we might call receptivity. Or, in other words, the receptivity of an organism amounts to 
all of those potentials that transform an external chaos into an internal regularity; this is 
simply what it means to “receive” from the environment. While this receptivity itself 
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evolves an ever greater potential to adapt to the outside, turned inwards, it tends towards 
a limit of regularity and organization. Contrast this, now, with the so-called “active” 
faculties; the ways in which an organism pursues sources of nutrition and possibilities of 
reproduction, or evades appropriation through another. These must evolve as an 
adaptation towards the adaptive potential of other organisms within the environment, 
without tending towards any kind of limit, and at a higher level of organization than 
receptivity, and thus, the outcome must be a sort of exponential increase.  
 Each of these two modes of adaptation gives a very different explanation of how 
species capable of reproduction survive to reproduce themselves. Either they could be 
perfectly adapted to a “consistent” environment, or they could possess a high decree of 
adaptability. Since no absolute distinction can be drawn between the adaptive potential 
and the environment, and since, moreover, the stability of the environment is always 
relative to the potential to adapt, this distinction may seem to stand on shaky territory. In 
order to distinguish between the two, we must consider the evolutionary tendencies that 
follow from these different adaptive strategies. Whereas the former tends towards an ever 
more stable environment with a restricted range of adaptive potentials, the latter opens up 
to an exponential increase in adaptability.  
 With this criterion in place, we can now discern the basic texture --- the 
qualitative differentiation --- of human nature. Which of the environment-constituting 
technologies of human nature evolve towards a certain environmental stability, and which 
towards what we might call meta-adaptability --- an adaptability that anticipates 
adaptation? Under the first category, it seems likely, belongs all that is commonly spoken 
of as our “receptive” nature; all that receives the world into a regular form, either for our 
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nutritive, sensual, or perceptive faculties. Under the second, on the other hand, all those 
capacities which, because they have adapted to anticipate the possibility of adaptation, --- 
or moreover, because they have evolved in anticipation of an environment that itself 
anticipates an anticipatory evolution, are themselves capable of creating new strategies 
and systems for coping with the world, either in the coarse of an individual life, or in the 
life of a community, or over the whole of human history. This constitutes the highest 
expression of our adaptive potential. In this way, we can characterize all of the human 
capacities that are traditionally conceived as belonging to our “active,” “rational” or 
“spontaneous” nature. The capacity to think logically, for example, or to interpret the 
world teleologically, or to act freely and with a certain goal in mind, or even our phantasy 
and imagination and artistic creativity--- these are all part and parcel of an ability to 
develop evolving strategies for coping with world. That we can form abstractions, or 
generalize universals from particular traits, allows us to identify recurrent situations, and 
formulate ways of dealing with them. And even the ability of individuals to form a 
discrete culture may be understood in this way; a culture is like a depository for specific 
adaptive strategies that have evolved, and continue to evolve, towards a specific 
environment. And finally, holding cultures together, and intertwined with practically 
every form of meta-adaptive strategy, is human language. Human language is, in essence, 
free and creative; it is not to be defined by a specific medium, or even by certain hard-
wired grammatical structures. Rather, it is to be understood as the capacity to produce a 
potentially infinite number of context appropriate responses, and to respond, in like 
manner, to every response. Or in other words, the basic trait of human language, and thus 
of human freedom and fulfillment, is conversation. 
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 Because these free activities still tend towards some form of stability, they 
provide the basis of what we might call “derivative” philosophical interpretations. Such 
interpretations try to understand human language in terms of some more stable, less 
adaptable, structure, such as the principles of logic (language understood in terms of true 
or false propositions and rules of inference, or as derivative of the principle of non-
contradiction and sufficient reason), or the teleological projections of ordinary language 
(language is seen as something that is used by people in order to “do something”), or the 
idea of self-hood expressed in personal pronouns.  
 In thus conceiving of human nature, it may seem as though we have simply 
reproduces the “creationist” account of the opposition between sensibility and reason. Yet 
there is a crucial difference. Whereas before, our sensual nature was identified with that 
which tends towards disunity and disarray, and which is the source of strife and discord, 
and our rational nature, on the other hand, with what unifies us under a common 
humanity, now things are reversed. Our sensual natures are essentially similar, the source 
of great commonality, whereas language --- while bound within certain limits which may 
ultimately allow for a universal fluid communication --- contains an almost infinite 
potential for what we might call creative disagreement. Language-users, in their 
reciprocal anticipatory adaptation, create ever new formulations, ever new modes of 
expression; no one can ever have the last word. Language recreates the chaos of an 
environment formed by reciprocal interaction. It is the highest natural expression of 





 Evolution, we said earlier, is itself a form of political agency. To begin, at every 
level, evolution is the creation of a community; the environment produced through the 
reciprocal interactions of individual expressions of different species (an organism that 
reproduces purely asexually is, as it were, a species unto itself). This community, the 
ecosystem, involves the creation and circulation of the organic and inorganic compounds 
and materials necessary to sustain life; and it involves both inputs from the outside and 
deposits to the outside; energy from the sun is received, and organic compounds, through 
natural processes, form fossil fuels. Every act of nourishment and excretion is of 
consequence to the entire system, and to the extent that humans consume fuels and fuels 
and leave behind waste products of any kind --- from the simplest act of defecation to the 
disposal of toxic waste or exhaust from an automobile --- they are involves as political 
agents with the entire ecosystem. There is, in this respect, no essential difference between 
the photosynthesis of a weed and the energy production of a coal plant. 
 If they differ, it is in the responsibility that they entail; human agents are 
responsible for their actions in a way that plants and other animals are not. This is a point 
of great confusion. For some, human responsibility and freedom are expressions of a 
mental faculty which we possess as individuals and outside of any relation either to a 
community, or to the human species, or to nature as a whole. In this way, our freedom 
and responsibility are rendered absolute at the same time as they are absolved of any 
relation to a context that could give them meaning. It becomes the inescapable duty of 
each individual to be free --- though only as an individual. Freedom is now an end in 
itself; we no longer have any idea why we should be free, nor could we even broach such 
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questions, and if freedom is nevertheless still associated with a responsibility towards 
others, this is only a responsibility towards the freedom of others. We have the both the 
duty and the right to act as free as is possible without infringing on the freedom of others.  
If freedom is thought to rest purely on itself as a given of human nature, we could 
not conceive of its content as having evolved with the evolution of the human species and 
in reciprocal intercourse with nature. At best, taking some form of natural law as our 
starting point, we could show how social organizations have emerged through contracts --
- through the trade of freedom for security. In the end, however, freedom must be though 
of as something that has been created --- which is, of course, implicit in every conception 
of “natural law” --- and its true content and meaning rests on the intentions of our creator. 
So conceived, freedom must in the end come into contradiction with itself --- to be 
anything but an empty self-abstraction, it must have been intentionally created by a God 
who, being by definition all-powerful and all-knowing with respect to his creation, must 
have anticipated and pre-ordained every individual expression of our freedom.  
If traditional forms of religion were able to avoid this paradox, it was only by 
subordinating man’s freedom to his responsibility towards God --- a responsibility 
communicated not by through inborn ideas, but through specific acts of revelation. Man, 
in other words, is responsible before he is free. Once religion is submitted to the demands 
of reason, God can no longer survive as a viable extrinsic explanation for things --- he is 
either the whole of nature, or nothing. With God “dead,” ethics is left devoid of content. 
We are absolved of responsibility, and must begin the work of reinventing man through 
his interactive relation to nature. This nihilistic consequence, if it is not bravely accepted 
by those with enough courage to follow their premises through to their last consequence, 
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is distorted and obscured into the two pictures of human nature which we discussed at the 
beginning; “determinism” and “rational choice.” With the first, the creative force of God 
is transformed into the omnipotence of an environment which determines our values 
while leaving us without a trace of responsibility. In the case of the second, our freedom 
and responsibility remains, but without any content; since it is absolved of all 
responsibility for our environment, the only context in which true freedom is possible, it 
is, in fact, without any responsibility for responsibility, reduced to a mere rational choice 
between available options.  
If we are to gain a rich and full conception of human agency, we need to think of 
it as having evolved through an interaction with our environment.  And indeed, not only 
is this the only way to gain a rich concept of human nature --- one that contains more than 
that which is derived from the application of the moral categories of ordinary language --- 
but without recourse to God as a transcendent cause, this is the only way. If evolution had 
not been developed as a “scientific” theory with an empirical basis, it would have had to 
have been invented as “philosophy” --- as indeed it was, in the thought of Lessing, 
Herder, and Schelling and Hegel, and before them Herecleites and Lucretius. There are 
only two possibilities; revelation or evolution. The thought of the Enlightenment, which 








Human responsibility and freedom are simply modalities of the evolving 
community of nature; particular forms of expression of the political life of all organisms 
and species. It is impossible to limit responsibility to humans without undermining the 
foundation of all ethics.  
How are we then to fix the limits and scope of man’s free and responsible 
political agency? His political agency comprises all the ways that he participates in the 
entire system of nature as an exchange of resources. Is man, accordingly, responsible for 
all that happens through his nature? Or is his responsibility somehow more confined? 
Before we broach this question, a brief clarification is necessary regarding our method. 
Earlier, we stated that there is no absolute limit that can be drawn between the evolution 
of the human species, and the evolution of technologies on a historical scale; the 
technologies we create are not only realizations and extensions of out innate potential of 
adaptability, but may even open up a whole new kind of environment and adaptive 
potential, and thus belong within our evolution as a species. Our survival as the species 
that we are depends on all the ways that we adapt our environment, and not just those 
which are born into our bodies. And since a species is nothing else than its adaptive 
potential in its realizations, we cannot limit human evolution to some sort of pre-history.  
For purely methodological purposes, however, we will deal with these two 
processes as if they were distinct phases, first trying to establish the potential for free 
political action that is innate to our species, and only then attempting to account for the 
further evolution. Such an approach is necessary if we are to pose the question that stands 
at the very center of our inquiry. Namely, to what extent are the evolved, historical, forms 
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of technology (conceived in the broadest sense) expressions of free political action? Do 
they confirm, or do they undermine true human freedom. What we ultimately want to 
know is this; to what extent are the evolution of specific forms of technology guided by a 
free community and directed towards human ends, and to what extent do they no longer 
belong within human evolution, but rather merely subsist and perpetuate themselves 
through human communities, even while, at the same time, undermining them. We do not 
with to claim that this evolutionary process, if it exists, is wrong or evil, but only that it 
speaks against a specifically human responsibility, and thus that --- to the degree that we 
can still be politically engaged as humans --- we are summoned to act in resistance to it.  
Our innate potential for free and responsible political action rests in human 
language. Human language, as we have seen, is a system that has adapted towards the 
potential for adaptation, and indeed to an extraordinary degree; it is not merely a capacity 
for utterances referring to a finite set of possible arrangements of states of affairs out 
there in the world. Through language, we are able to make conversation; the 
confrontation of linguistic expressions that, unbounded in their possibilities, nevertheless 
demand a response --- responsible openness to infinity. Innately polemical, even when it 
happens only “in our heads,” conversation institutes an entirely new level both of creative 
freedom and responsibility. This reciprocal, responsible freedom --- what we call human 
freedom --- is the basis of free political action. It allows, for example, a community of 
people to converge and for shared cultural forms to develop among them --- these may 
still be coercive, but they remain human and freely political, at least to the extent that 
they do not silence language and repress its operation as the medium of communal 
organization. But even thinking, even a private conversation within our head, is political, 
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stitching all the disparate expressions of our active and passive nature --- our ideas, 
desires, passions, and so forth, into a more cohesive self. Self-hood is the process of 
dialogue between these interior elements and the larger community; it is neither purely 
individual nor dictated from the outside. It rests neither in a psychological process not in 
an act of transcendental apperception, but is built out through language. 
 We should not think, however, that the political action of language extends only 
to either the convocation of people into communities or the gathering of scattered mental 
acts into individuals. To the degree that language reaches throughout our environment, 
expressing actions that take place outside of human agency --- to the degree, in other 
words, that it able to grasp to action of nature --- language has always already extended 
our responsible beyond ourselves. Or rather, we are ourselves always extended beyond 
what we had wrongly thought ourselves to be. As soon as there is language, we have 
become politically responsible for all of nature. Within different cultures and languages, 
however, this political responsibility takes very different forms; in animism, the structure 
of human agency is extended throughout almost the entirety of the natural world. Nature 
is almost entirely besouled, and every part of it is converses with every other in a human 
tongue. In a theistic culture, both man and the world are conceived of as created, and the 
nature of both their mutual responsibility and their the form of converse is established 
through God’s will. Modern scientific culture, however, begins with the refusal, and 
refuse, of theism; a creation which has not only been voided of all innate meaning, but 
also orphaned from its creator. Amidst these ruins, it seeks to discover forms of causality 
which no longer assume the structure of human agency, refusing to explain things by 
attributing a will either to nature or to God. The different causal systems that it discovers 
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are fragments that do not yet speak to each other. These it must stitch together with 
human agency into a cohesive whole, joining the agency of man and his environment, the 
human and the inhuman, into a single political community.  
 This community, while anticipated within nature, is made explicit in the medium 
of human language. Language, we must note, is not authentically and properly restricted 
to the human; the language of man, to use Walter Benjamin’s expression, is itself just a 
specific mode of language as such, and this includes every system of elements that 
communicates with each other. Every scientific object domain, as it is described by a 
coherent theory, involves such a system of elements; matter and energy in nuclear 
physics, atoms and molecules in chemistry, all the different levels of organization, from 
the cellular to the ecological, that belong to biology. These systems describe possibilities 
of action, and such action, ultimately, is expressive; a real system is active to the extent 
that it expresses its combinatorial possibilities. Expression, in the most general sense, 
means the realization of a potential which is conceived neither teleological (as a final 
cause that is realized when a thing becomes most fully what it, by nature, is), nor 
dynamically (as a latent force that realizes itself by becoming active), but as possibilities 
of combination and communication.1  
All of nature, as a real system, expresses itself through the interaction between 
these different languages; matter is created from energy, forming a complex of atoms, 
which fluidly enter into every changing relations to each through chemical processes, 
communicating energy between them, and also, through nuclear reactions, transforming 
matter back into energy. Chemical processes create organic compounds which become 
                                                          
1 Teleological and dynamical causality --- indeed every form of causality and action --- may be regarded as 
a special case of expression, operating with a more narrowly defined matrix of combinatorial possibilities.  
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the building blocks of life, and as life evolves, these compounds come to be circulated in 
ever more complicated ways. The language of man is a way in which the whole of nature 
expresses itself, yet it opens up an entirely new horizon of expressive, adaptive potential. 
For through the language of man, the language of nature --- language as such ---, can be 
recreated, and express itself in its totality.  
This is first of all the task of ordinary language. Yet ordinary language presents 
the action of nature in terms of the action of man --- and when no easy analogy with 
human nature is forthcoming, it simply resorts to negatives, like “itness.” The task of a 
scientific culture, however, is to transform merely human language so that it expresses 
the action of all of nature in the manner of action that is proper to it. Human language 
must be able to translate into the language of nature, and express the very transformation 
that takes place between human and inhuman agency. This is the work of rigorous 
science, which attempts as much as possible to express the action of nature beyond the 
ontological constraints imposed by human language through discrete symbolic systems 
with a precisely determined signifiers. In this, science is aided by mathematics, which 
develops new possibilities for discrete symbolic systems without any regard for their 
empirical applicability. But it is also the work of philosophy, which brings these discrete 
systems into communication with each other through the medium of natural language, 
and thus at the same time discloses their relation to human agency. And finally, it is the 
work of poetry and dance --- what we will call dramatics --- which, as we shall see, 
provide a kind of synoptic experience of the whole of these interactions. A culture of 




  The basis of free political action is language, an inborn creative potential that 
connects our nature with the nature outside of us, joining them together in a reciprocal 
responsibility. Since human nature consists both in activity and receptivity, our 
sensuality, perceptivity, emotions, must all become responsible and enter into commerce 
with the rest of nature. Everything, in other words, is called upon to express itself, and a 
political community is nothing else than a community of people, which, through the 
common and polemical use of language, are constantly in the process of convening on 
cultural forms which will allow all of nature to come to self-expression through the self-
expressions of humans in their freedom. Every form of self-hood is itself such a cultural 
form, just as, likewise, no culture can be conceived outside of its realization in 
individuals. These cultural forms may be entirely ineffective --- as is the case with magic 
--- but as long as they are arrived at through the give and take of a discourse which 
responsibly grasps nature as a whole, a community is freely political. The language of 
such a community, simply put, must stretch over all of nature, showing its interrelation 
and interaction, and then allow for the open negotiation of all actions which express this 
interconnectedness.  
 This innate potential for free political action is the starting point for the historical 
evolution of human social organizations. To understand this evolution, we must 
rigorously determine how a community differs from a mere social organization. And 
since a community is itself a form of social organization, first we must try to understand 
the nature of an organization as such, and then provide a genetic account of how its 
different modalities emerge.  
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 An organization is simply any arrangement that mediates between and organizes 
forms of agency into a reciprocal commerce. Organizations, in this sense, are expressions 
of language as such, and may be found throughout the whole of nature --- inanimate, 
animate, and human --- and also as discrete symbolic systems within human language. 
Organizations can be either real or ideal, according to whether they express the 
combinatorial possibility of different recurrent patterns, or of their individual 
instantiations. And they can be either concrete or abstract, according to whether they 
involve an organization found within nature, or one which, while composed of a system 
of signs which is in itself a real organization, nevertheless refers to something outside of 




 The whole of nature is a real, concrete organization --- and as such it is absolute 
and purely relational. Nature, in this sense, refers to the whole of reality once we have 
abstracted away from all the forms imposed by ordinary language --- reality, in other 
words, as it is in itself, and as the perhaps unreachable ideal object of scientific inquiry. 
That it is purely relational is simply a consequence of the abstraction from all the forms 
of human agency. Scientific understanding is a retreat from the logic inherent in the most 
highly evolved forms to the logic of those that are less so; the scientist, simply put, is 
someone who tries to speak the language of things stupider then himself. To do this, he 
must try to abstract away from those structures imposed by the meta-adaptive structure of 
ordinary language, and at the same time --- and this is the difficult part --- produce a new 
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language that can communicate with nature through experimental verification.  Ordinary 
language is, in essence, a perspective of the world that allows for strategic interaction by 
conceiving of all actions either as the actions of agents that act against each other with 
intentions, desires, essentially like our own, and thus predictable and alterable, or, if need 
be, and as a last resort when this paradigm clearly fails, in terms of modes of agency 
derived from this privileged model, and conceived only through the negation of its 
attributed (as inanimate, senseless, purposeless.) In this way, the perspective of ordinary 
language allows us to act in anticipation of the action of others.2 There is a way, in other 
words, in which ordinary language conceives of all reality as a game, and one that for the 
most part makes sense, although occasionally it is interrupted by murmuring of idiots. 
Once we accept that world is evolved, and has not been created by an agent-God, there 
can be no disputing the need to abstract away from every suggestion of agency in 
describing the very system from which human agency emerges. And afterwards, what we 
are left with is action without agency, a purely verbal language. Here, an action is simply 
what implies possibilities for action, and a possibility for action a set of actions left 
undetermined because our framework does not yet encompass the whole.  
 Every part of the whole, in this way, is to be conceived as a possibility for action -
-- a set of combinatorial possibilities among actions, which themselves imply further sets 
of combinatorial possibilities. This suggests the sense in which the whole of nature is 
real; every part is determined as a part of the whole, it expresses its relation to the other 
                                                          
2 The very idea that the scientific revolution caused the disenchantment of the world results from the 
stubborn insistence on the forms of agency privileged through ordinary language.  For it is in no way clear 
why reality has necessarily become empty, voided of meaning, simply because it is no longer regarded 
either as animate in itself, or as the creation of a theistic God.  Stranger yet is the disenchantment attributed 
to Darwin; doesn’t the “concept” of man become infinitely richer once it is understand as the outgrowth of 
a creative universe, rather than the creation of a God that we could only understand after our own nature?  
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parts of the whole. And thus, it would make no sense to speak of the same thing existing 
in more than one way --- with different accidental qualities, in a different time or space --
- but only of greater or lesser degrees of similarity between different perspectives of the 
whole.  
 In this way, the system is also concrete and absolute. Nothing gains its meaning 
by referring to something outside of the system, nor does the system as a whole have any 
meaning beyond the possibilities expressed within itself. 
* 
Human language, as we have suggested, is simply another expression of nature; 
and in this way, it is also concrete and real. A properly scientific theory of spoken 
language must, ultimately, tie it into the mental facilities that are located within 
individual minds and that perform computations on what begins and ends with an 
individual sound wave conveyed through the vibrations of particular particles of air. 
However, if we consider language not just as an activity of living organisms, but 
according its own, internal rules of operation --- if, in other words, we try to grasp the 
action that takes place within language, we recognize a concrete, but ideal system. While 
it doesn’t refer necessarily and originally to anything outside of itself, it brings patterns, 
and not individuals, into relation. When we speak of an “individual word,” we do not 
mean the particular occurrence of a pattern of sound at a specific time and place --- it 
almost impossible, and nonsensical to refer to such a thing. What we speak of, instead, is 
a set of phonetic, semantic, syntactic, and graphic possibilities --- the potential to 
generate different patterns of sound, meaning, grammar, and written marks.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
And isn’t there an infinitely greater need to rejoice in existence, once we realize its fragile and perilous 
character?   
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 The action of language is not, in and of itself, referential. It combines linguistic 
signs --- representations of semantic, syntactic, phonetic and graphic possibilities --- into 
expressions, and it moves fluidly between these four levels, but it does not establish 
relations between words and things. Rather, the ways in which language is utilized ---
referring to things, creating mellifluous sounds, expressing feelings, commanding others, 
forming relationships between people --- belong, to use Chomsky’s term, to the level of 
interpretation. Language gives us tools, without telling us how they should be used. The 
kind of “potential tools” that are produced may be guided by some kind of exigency 
emerging from out of another part of the mind and ultimately rooted in the context of our 
utterances, and the expressions that are produced in our thoughts have to pass by a sentry 
post of inhibitions, and attest to a degree of usefulness and relevance before they are 
uttered as speech, even when there is no one around to listen. Yet this pragmatic 
dimension does not determine the action of language from within; words are not marked 
according to their use, but only according to combinatorial possibilities and their 
semantic implications.  
  These days, scientists and philosophers don’t just disagree about everything, but 
seem incapable of even finding a common mode of discourse in which their 
disagreements might assume a coherent form. Philosophy and science, we are told --- as 
if this were a {fait acomppli} --- are two worlds, completely irreconcilable, and incapable 
of communicating with each other but on terms that are almost entirely unsatisfactory to 
each. Such a position can only be satisfying to the self-satisfied, and if so many in the 
Universities are will to believe it (just as so many outside the Universities are willing to 
believe nothing), it is only because the academy, like practically every other institution of 
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modern life, has become not only specialized, but self-gratifying, content with its results 
and the particular form of institutionalized rigor that they express. But no serious thinker 
--- no one who has given him or herself over to the infinite political responsibility of 
language --- can be content with mere fragments.  
* 
Human language is the medium where the real and ideal converge; it is an 
expression of the system of nature, but also contains the possibility of human freedom in 
all of its expressions, not the least among which is philosophy. Like a skin, it enfolds 
both the inside and the outside, and allows both to touch even while keeping them 
completely separate. And because language is like a skin, it is almost impossible to 
approach; or indeed, it cannot truly be approaches, but only adopted, worn --- or rather, 
as it were, we must come to realize that it is what we always have on. If scientists and 
philosophers can find no common ground, it is, above all, because they are unable to 
convene on a single approach to language. Each tries to approach this meeting ground of 
the real and ideal from one of the two sides, and distorts the phenomenon accordingly. 
What they disagree about, above all, is the place of the pragmatic dimension. For a purely 
scientific approach, the use and application of language is a free human activity, and falls 
outside the purvey of science; linguistics is to be restricted to the study of a calculus with 
an enormous creative potential to enable free political action by projecting “human 
agency” onto the world and allowing for communication between human agents. Every 
interpretation of language is terms of human agency is to be rejected as inherently non-
scientific. Philosophers, on the other hand, wish precisely to attribute to the activity of 
language the freedom of willed, rational, agency. We bring words together into sentences 
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and communicate these to others in order to “do things”; through language, we try to 
realize certain kinds of intentions, and our utterance are successful, if, in the end, they did 
what they were supposed to. Such “ordinary language philosophers” and “pragmatists,” 
though, not content merely to describe different ways in which linguistic expressions can 
serve as tools, feel compelled to explain human language as such, and thus come to the 
absurd conclusion that linguistic utterances, and languages as a whole, are themselves 
created to serve these needs. Absurd, because in the end it leads to the deterministic result 
that if we know what all our needs are, we could exhaustively describe the possibilities of 
language. In their zeal to attribute rationalistic “free” agency to the action of language, 
not only have they excluded creative, infinitely deep, and truly political freedom, but they 
have undermined their own already shallow foundations. An example, once again, of how 
the two pictures of human nature conspire together to obscure human potential and 
human responsibility. 
 So long as linguistics simply places the questions of pragmatics beyond the range 
of science, it can neither guard against these misunderstandings, nor succeed in making 
its own higher conception of freedom available to science. And thus, it forfeits all hope of 
discourse that would unify, by translating between, philosophy and science. Moreover, by 
assuming that all pragmatics is in fact governed by human freedom, it, on the one hand, 
accepts the merely “rationalist” notion as decisive for the domain of human activity, and, 
on the other hand, makes it impossible even to ask whether the evolution of forms of 
social organization out of possibilities contained in human language has upheld true 
political freedom. And in this way it obscures beyond recognition the boundary between 
a community and a mere social organization. For these kinds of questions to make sense, 
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it will be necessary to overcome the most fundamental flaw of modern scientific 
linguistics; namely, its failure to provide an account of freedom which encompasses both 
the creative freedom of language --- our ability to produce an unbounded number of 
context-relevant utterances --- and the freedom which is projected into the world. The 
former can be empirically discerned and scientifically explained, and latter can only be 
discovered through the intuitions given us by natural language. Unless we are able to 
translate between the perspectives of science and the perspectives of ordinary language, 
these two kinds of freedom will remain mutually opaque.  
 What we need, to begin with, is a scientifically-informed account of the pragmatic 
dimension of language. To this end, we will approach language from the perspective of 
evolution --- not, of coarse, as a biological theory, but as way of understanding the 
genesis of every organizational structure. Through such a perspective, it is possible to 
conceive of the convergence of the real and the ideal by understanding each in terms of 
their interaction with the other, rather than as isolated, created, possibilities.3  
Let us then begin by considering human language as the totality of words which 
now exist or have every existed. To the extent that we treat words not only as parts within 
a hypothetically-conceived model of natural language, not merely as theoretical entities, 
but as things that actually exist, then we must ask both in what way they exist --- what is 
the manner of being of a word --- and what are the conditions of their existence. The first 
question involves great subtleties, which cannot be broached in this context. Suffice it to 
say, consistent with our earlier remarks, that words exist neither as graphic or phonetic 
entities --- a sound that can be pronounced with silence at the beginning and end, and set 
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of letters written down with spaces or punctuation marks in from and in back, a single 
pictorial representation --- but as the smallest meaningful, though not necessarily 
independently meaningful, element of a linguistic expression; and that furthermore, they 
are not real but ideal, and finally, that they are not primarily either graphic, phonetic, 
semantic, or syntactic, but involve a bundles set of representations at all these levels, and 
perhaps not only these. For example, they might also include a certain limited number of 
pragmatic representations; their degree of politeness, or their metrical value (which is not 
always reducible to the phonetic representation). What these bundles of representations 
express is a set of combinatorial and transformative possibilities; each word, in other 
words, expresses the possibility of entering into relation with other words and producing 
linguistic expressions which allow for the translation back and forth from grammar to 
meaning to sound to writing. Which brings us to our second question; what are the 
conditions for their individual existence. What is it that allows an individual word to 
survive as the word that it is? Why do some words thrive, while others disappear from 
use? How are some words even able, as it were, to outlive the language to which they 
seem to owe their origin and become international or canonical terms? What is the 






                                                                                                                                                                             
3 In a sense, the “deterministic” and “rationalistic” views take the paradigm of creator and created that once 
applied to the relation of God, Man, and the World, and apply it to the relation of Man and his 
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* 
 These are questions which begin to emerge once we approach pragmatics from 
this angle. Together, they constitute the scientifically-informed, if not scientifically 
rigorous discipline of “evolutionary philology.” Without trying to exhaust all of the 
implications of this term, I will just try to list the different levels of inquiry which open 
up when we begin to consider how individual words survive. We begin at the molecular 
level, not because we believe that language is merely a fragmentary phenomenon, but 
that we may systematically describe all of the levels of organizational unity, and all the 
way up to the unity of the language of man, and language as such. 
a) The innate language faculty; the capacity to perform operations on individual word-
units, producing utterances, and the inborn semantic system.  
b) The idiolect of an individual speaker; a set of words inhabits an individual speaker his 
own individual language. Each word within this idiolect survives as a word through its 
ability to come into relation with other words. Some words are more central, others more 
peripheral; the most central are those that serve syntactic functions, and the second most 
central are those that express the most basic native semantic relations. The more 
frequently a word is used, the more central it tends to be.  
c) A dialect, which consists in a number of idiolects spoken by people who are able to 
communicate with each other, and thus form a community bound, above all, by the 
spoken word. Such communities have more central and less central members (the town 
gossip, for example, is very central), and can be nestled within each other. The important 
thing for us is; one of the primary ways in which words survive is by being in commerce 
among a community of speakers. This, of course, is of consequence for the kind of words 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Environment.  
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that we can expect to find their conditions of survival in such a community; they will 
generally express the political organization within the community, the way in which they 
interact with each other and with their environment, understood in the broadest sense. 
Religious terms, for example, have no less justification than words describing familial 
relations or foodstuffs or the natural environment. If part of the political life of the 
community involves interacting with Gods through sacrifices, or manipulating natural 
forces through magic, than these are no more “metaphysical,” no less “concrete” than 
anything else.  
d) Within a free political community, people must always expect to have to pay account 
of the words that they use. Thus, words used within a community may have a referential 
value; the use of words in a free political community may carry with it the expectation 
that one know what one is talking about, and is able to justify the use of a word to 
someone else.4 Words refer to things simply through the kinds of explicit definitions 
which may be given by one speaker and accepted by another, and not through some kind 
of privileged act of pointing to an object in the world. God may be referred to with no 
more difficulty than man or cheese; as linguistic acts, both are equally easy; as things in 
need of philosophical explanation, equally complicated. Such definitions provide the 
conditions of survival for words; an individual word may survive, in part, because people 
are able to explain its use to others and agree on this explanation. 
It would be necessary, then, to account for all of the ways in which words can be defined, 
and their use explained and justified. 
                                                          
4 Not only is there no reason to suppose that this is a function merely of modern democracies with free 
speech and political accountability, but it may be far less important in such apparently open, yet actually 
institutionalized, societies than in the most primitive cultures. Who ever asks a physicist to pay account for 
his terms; only other physicists. Lay-men assume that specialists know what they are talking about. 
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In general, these explanations are built around systems of interrelated elements.  
Among these are; 
i) the systems of communal organization.  
ii) systems of geographical orientation. 
iii) systems of neighboring peoples, with themselves at the center. 
iv) systems of human aging. 
v) systems of time and seasonal change. 
vii) systems of the conditions of the human body (various modalities of sickness and 
health) 
viii) systems of different animals in relation to man. 
ix) systems of celestial bodies in relation to the earth. 
x) systems of emotions, moods, feelings. 
xi) systems of food in relation to the human body. 
xii) systems of moral qualities, norms, values. 
xiii) systems arising from the specialization of labor and political organization. 
xiv) systems of Gods (which of coarse overlap with other systems, and bring them all into 
interrelation) and Heroes. 
xv) systems of numbers. 
xvi) ontological systems --- the essential qualitative differences discovered in reality.  
e) Oral narratives, in a constant process of transformation, which establish the continuity 
of a community over time. Such an oral tradition, can, in particular, account for the 
preservation of proper names, and indeed, several of the systems mentioned in (d) may in 
fact be formed from out of such an oral tradition. 
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* 
 This brings us to the end of our discussion of what, roughly speaking, we might 
call ordinary language; language as an ideal, concrete system. Ordinary language 
develops out of a community of speakers. Our use of language in a community is 
involved in systems which do not simply belong to the innate faculty for language, even 
if, at least in some cases, they may be anticipated through inborn semantic structures. We 
refer to these systems in trying to explain what we mean by a word, clarify ourselves to 
others, or justify a particular way of speaking. In an institution, these systems are no 
longer openly and fluidly established through a linguistic community either by drawing 
from phenomenon accessible more or less to all through some form of common sense, or 
reflecting the very conventions through which a community is formed, and which are 
constantly being reaffirmed in everyday life. It is above all in this way that institutional 
language differs from the language of the everyday. Violence and coercion are not the 
issue; the open and fluid use of language is possible when there is coercion, while an 
institution may exist entirely without any use of violent force or even subtle 
manipulation. Reproductive relations, for example, may be enforced only through 
compulsion and violation, yet the very need for continual reinforcement and compulsion, 
or even to continually justify these structures by referring to norms and religion, suggests 
that these are “open” and “fluid.” Open, communal discourse is polemical, and may 
involve acts of physical violence, no less than words that evoke reasons or emotions. 
Even silencing the voice of some potential speakers can be part of a free political 
community.  
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 The difference between a community and an institution --- and this cannot be 
emphasized enough --- neither depends on, nor should be described in terms of, the 
relation between the organizational form and human subjectivity. It is not a question of 
how the individual subject is made to comply in its actions with the larger organization. 
What is at issue, rather, is whether it allows or permits agency to take the form of 
linguistic interaction; whether it allows for the saturation of reality by free political 
interaction. An institution abstracts action from language; it ties words to forms of agency 
that cannot in any way be secured merely through discourse, and in this way creates 
words which no longer speak, immediately, to their seeming fellows. Through this 
abstraction, it opens up a new level of organization and form of language develops; one 
that is ideal and abstract.  
 Institutions perform this abstraction through two kinds of procedures; the one 
referential and the other systematic. The former establish the reference of a word by 
bringing it into relation, through some kind of empirical procedure, to something outside 
of itself. The latter develop the meanings of a set of words by developing systematic 
interactions. These two procedures operate together, and through them, an institution 
exists, in a sense, as a kind of sub-language, which translates the action of the world 
outside of itself into a system of discreet system of interaction, a set of terms which are 
understood in terms of how they interact with each other, and thus through a mode of 
action which can take place in complete isolation from the outside world. Only in this 
way is it possible to approach the action of nature beyond the limits of ordinary language, 
and thus, true science is always institutional in form. 
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 Institutions can be either real or ideal; a real institution depends on some kind of 
actual physical embodiment --- machines and individuals --- as well as relations to 
specific event in the outside world. A corporations or government bureaucracy is a real 
institution; it consists in part in an actual physical plant, certain objects that are owned, 
certain individuals that are on the payroll, and relations to a specific society or market. In 
contrast, an ideal institution consists only in a system of patterns set in relation to patterns 
in the outside world. Such ideal systems stand at the heart of almost every science, even 
though they can themselves only exist through a real institution of actual scientists 
interacting with each other and actual machines producing the empirical information 
feeding theory. The real and ideal institutions of a given science each, in a way, provide 
the conditions of survival --- the ecological niche for the other.  
 Institutions can be either mechanical or creative, in both their interface and their 
internal operations. They are creative to the extent that the actions they perform are 
infinite and open rather than routine and predictable. It is, however, always a matter of 
degree, and not of an absolute, qualitative difference. Baring the possibility of true 
artificial intelligence, creative institutions involve the labor of actual people who 
manipulate signs internal to a system or interface with the world in ways that are not 
entirely predetermined by any set routine. 
 Finally, institutions can be either open or closed, and either cultivating or 
ineffectual. An open institution is adaptive --- it is able to adapt itself to its environment -
-- whereas a closed institution is rigid in its conditions of survival. A cultivating 
institution is able to transform its environment into one in which it can thrive. These 
factors our of great significance for our project. Only an open, cultivating institution, we 
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will see, is able to be integrated into a community --- though, at the same time, these also 
present the greatest danger.  
 
* 
 Corporations and bureaucracies are examples of largely creative, real institutions. 
While some aspects of internal regulation and organization may be settled through almost 
mechanical procedures, they depend, in large part, on creative processes. This is so 
because the world that they deal with involves people and free human agency; it is 
changing and unpredictable, and constantly in the process of adapting, and thus to be able 
to relate to it, the corporation must itself be capable of infinite adaptation --- it must be 
open, and this openness requires not only the fluidity of capital --- the ability to rapidly 
reapply its resources to new purpose --- but also the appropriation of human creativity. 
Likewise, just as a corporation may survive by being open to a changing environment, it 
may also try to cultivate its environment to suite its purposes. This is achieved by 
advertising and marketing, by political interventions, by investments in infrastructure and 
the development of human resources --- but in every case, through strategic initiatives 
towards a changing environment, that, once again, require human creativity. And so long 
as a company has people working for it, and relies on a human creative potential, it must 
also be organized not just merely through mechanical procedures, but rather, through the 
strategies enabled by language. Every company, in other words, creates a community 
within itself, a limited sphere within which free political speech is itself operative.  
 This free political speech operates in tandem with what we have previously 
identified as an institutional language, a language formed through processes of 
 54
abstraction. Consider the case of a corporation; certain terms like “commodity,” 
“capital,” “consumer,” “market share,” “net profit,” “gross profit,” and so forth, gain 
there meaning through actual procedures which relate it as a system to its external 
environment and are then manipulated within a system that determines its actions and 
responses to whatever changes occur in its environment. These signs do not themselves 
constitute freely political language, and yet they are nevertheless manipulated by human 
agents who are communicate with each other and apply human creativity to solving the 
problems that confront them. Ultimately, the manipulation of these signs is guided by 
principles that exempt themselves from and abstract away from a larger community, and 
yet it nevertheless itself proceeds creatively. 
 This results in a free political community that, in a certain way, is essentially 
isolated from other political communities. The actions that it is capable of are essentially 
limited by the kind of action articulated through the institutional language, and this, 
moreover, is itself incapable of entering the flow of a broader community of discourse. 
The political discourse within a corporation, or within any institution, can never embrace 
the entire range of actions within the world; it can never enter into relation with the entire 
community of action, but is limited and relative. And in this way, it in the end contradicts 
its own conditions, and cannot count as truly free; it does not affirm, but rather destroys 
the possibility of reciprocally free agency. Evidence of this is the strange fact that, in the 
United States, where a hostility to socialism is so deeply entrenched in almost every 
discussion of politics, and where, moreover, it seems almost impossible for us even to 
consider the ways in which our society is organized, let alone subject these to critique and 
change, --- where, in other words, we no longer really seem to possess a free political 
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discourse capable of comprehending the system of social relations as a whole, --- there is 
nevertheless a comparatively great deal of innovation within the work place, and even the 
development of quasi-socialist forms within corporations. Corporations, in other words, 
are beginning to realize the need to fully exploit human creativity through more 
management techniques that allow for a true community, where innovation and change 
flows in both up and down --- but only in order to become even more effective in their 
own limited, ultimately non-political, forms of agency.  
 Real mechanical institutions are technology in the narrowest sense. In its broadest 
sense, technology includes any form of political action, any way of action that helps build 
some kind of environment. This includes the labor of man as well as of nature; historical, 
conscious, unconscious, living, organic, and even entirely inorganic processes. In 
addition, we may also speak of techniques. These refer to any form of specifically 
conscious, human intervention in the natural world; for example, the use of tools, the 
building of shelter, and the cultivation of the land. Through these, human beings extend 
their communication with nature; each technique, as it were, builds a new kind of rapport 
with our natural environment, creating a new way in which the action of nature interacts 
with the action of man. In this way, techniques work together with ordinary language, in 
order to build our political community into nature. In similar manner, techniques differ 
from technologies (in the narrowest sense) in just the same way as ordinary language 
differs from institutional language; techniques, like ordinary language, are concrete rather 
than abstract.  
As we mentioned earlier, institutions become abstract in two different ways; the 
one referential, the other systematic. Following this distinction, we can specify the two 
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characteristic traits of real mechanical institutions. First, they refer to nature by 
translating one form of energy into another. The radicality of this transformation varies 
greatly; it may involve simply transforming one form of physical motion --- the blowing 
of the wind, the downward rush of water --- into another form of mechanical motion --- 
the regular turning of a wheel. Or it may even involve a transformation so extreme as that 
from matter to energy. In either case, they goal is to realize a form of energy which can 
be manipulated within the system. This brings us to the second point. Technologies, in 
the narrowest sense, require a system with a form of activity that, to a degree, operates 
independent of human activity. It is not difficult to see how these two facets of 
technology of closely interrelated, and sometimes, they even coincide perfectly. This, we 
will see, is the case with the first technology --- fire --- as well as what, perhaps, will be 
the last --- the nuclear weapon. Technologies becomes developed and refined, however, 
to the extent that their functions are separated and distinguished from each other --- a 
possibility granted, above all, by the discovery of electricity. 
 {At this point, I should discuss money as an abstract real institution.  This will 
complete the schematic discussion of the different basic forms of organization.  Money is 
abstract is so far as its functionality consists in referring to something outside of itself.  It 
is real, however, in that only a actual, existent quantity of money can have a referential 
function --- unlike language, which is potentially infinite and infinitely repeatable, money 
can only function as money in so far as it is limited in quantity, and that limited quantity 





 We have thus far provided a schematic outline of different forms of organization. 
Yet we are not concerned with these in isolation, but as evolutionary possibility that 
emerge and develop, and, therefore, we must attempt to show how they are joined 
together into a continuity.  This does not mean demonstrating the exploring the chain of 
efficient causes that allowed them to come into being; such a task belongs, of course, 
within the province of science.  Rather, what we wish to do is exhibit the forms of 
specifically human praxis, that build connections between these different levels of 
organization.  The question guiding our investigation is as follows;  assuming the basic 
givenness of nature --- human nature and exterior nature alike --- how is it that human 
actions have built themselves into their environment, realizing the different forms of 
organization as possibilities of human activity.  Treating every organization as a 
possibility for action, we wish to understand the kinds of human actions that created the 
organizations that create possibilities for action that are particularly relevant to humans.  
Such an investigation is not concerned with specific events within human history, but 
rather as it were, with the outermost limit of human praxis treated more or less in 
isolation from their actual historical genesis --- in a way, and roughly speaking, as "ideal 
types" of agency.  Since the human body, with its individual actions, is at the center of 
our real, concrete existence and interaction with nature, we will begin with a discussion 
of somatic language, and then continue on to a discussion of the techniques  that emerge 
out of somatic language, cultivating a human community in physical space and time.  The 
language of words shall ultimately be treated as just such a technique.   
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 The human species interacts with nature --- and it does so, first of all, through an 
organization of human bodies. The human body, with its innate potentials, --- including 
the brain and the nervous system --- is the starting point for all further development into 
the physical world. Our body, like every body, communicates with the language of action 
spoken by the whole of nature. There is nothing mystifying or obscure or essentially 
unscientific about this language of action; as already suggested, it merely means the 
entire system composed of all the separate forms in which energy is stored, released, and 
communicated. Nuclear physics, mechanics, electromagnetism, light, chemistry, and 
biology (at different levels) are abstract, ideal systems that describe these forms of real 
interaction. Their interactions are both layered and interwoven; and in their 
communication they constitute the real language of the whole of nature. 
 The way that man fits in is, of course, not much less complicated than the system 
as a whole. For our own purposes, however, it suffices merely to think of the human body 
as a nodal point within the whole, and to list the different “inputs” and “outputs” through 
which it communicates with its environment. The inputs include sensory stimuli (light 
which acts against our retina, as well as on our skin, vibrations conveyed through the air, 
tastes, smells, tactile sensations), oxygen, water, minerals, various kinds of organic 
compounds. Our outputs include energy in the form of heat, carbon dioxide, solid and 
liquid waste products and perspiration, mechanical movements and sounds, sperm, and 
babies.  
 These inputs and outputs may be characterized in the following way. First, while 
all of these inputs and outputs belong to the life of the human body, some are more 
immanently necessary for our survival than others. The inability to respire, for example, 
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brings death in a matter of minutes, while drinking water can be withheld for several 
days, and food for even longer. Secondly, some are absolutely necessary for the survival 
of the individual while others can be satisfied collectively. The capacities of movement 
and sensory perception, for example, may be absolutely necessary for a community of 
people facing the challenges of its environment, but certain individuals may be deficient 
in some, or even perhaps all, of them, and still survive within a community. They serve 
not for the survival of the human organisms, but for the satisfaction of its needs. Thirdly, 
some inputs and outputs function seem to function more voluntarily than others. Without 
resorting to the idea of the free will as either an isolated mental faculty or a metaphysical 
absolute, we can explain this simply by considering the extent to which its operation is 
itself implicated in free political discourse.  
 Politeness, in the broadest sense, is the name given to those forms of freely 
political language that regulate and control the impulses of the body; it guides the inputs 
and the outputs of different bodies into forms that can coexist within a polis, a 
community of people sharing a limited physical space. While mimicry and physical 
coercion may be necessary to guide a child towards polite behavior, what is essential, 
above all, is the interweaving of human language into the seemingly a-political actions of 
the body. The actions of the body become political through words that allow them to 
communicate with a larger system of human agency.  
 Perhaps this explains the tremendous power that vulgar words associated with 
bodily functions, and especially the release of waste, possess. Such words would stand at 
the root of politics; and it is in the very nature of polite speech to forbid naming directly 
the very things that it is above all concerned with. Shit is one of the root problem of 
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politics; and just as politics mediates the production of human waste products through 
social protocols, it insists that the words associated with excrement are themselves only 
spoken of in a round-about way.  
 The functions of human waste disposal --- which leave a strong mark on the 
world, yet at first resist bodily control --- form the basis of politics, and of political 
language. Proof of this is that even animals can join participate in the center of a 
community as long as they are able to control their urination and defecation. This is, 
fundamentally, what it means to be domesticated. Those animals that cannot be 
domesticated in this way must be kept in kennels, stalls, or relegated entirely outside of 
the home.  
 Other actions of the body are at once more open in their possibilities and more 
receptive to voluntary control. Consider, above all, the system of world-oriented bodily 
movements --- of the limbs and neck and torso and the outer extremities, and of the very 
refined complex of facial muscles. Often our body moves impulsively, nor do we direct 
every aspect of every movement --- even the most complicated physical actions are 
performed only under vague guidance. We choose to run, walk, jump, and skip; not to 
perform a complicated repeated series of movements. Nor can we ever completely 
control the way in which our body communicates our mood. Despite all of this, however, 
we are able to apply our body to an unlimited variety of tasks. Our body is capable of 
infinite expressiveness not only despite, but because our outer-directed movements are so 
deeply intertwined with almost all our passive (?) and active capacities. From the most 
rudimentary to the most sophisticated and free, there is almost no action of the body that 
cannot be expressed in a physical language. The beating of the heart, the circulation of 
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the blood, the vocalization of human language, cramping, bleeding --- all of this can be 
communicated directly through movement, without abstract symbolism.  
 Politics is, above all, about sharing the same real time and space. This time and 
space is that part of the real system of nature with which we interact through our inputs 
and outputs. Thus it is physical as well as chemical, biological, and so forth. This shared 
space is what sustains a community and guides and limits actions, and through the 
language of a community --- word-based as well as somatic --- this space and time is 
negotiated. This is true of the simplest community and of the most complex; the polis of 
free political activity must extend as far as our scientific conception of the limits of 
agency, and once we realize that we share a space and time of action with all life on this 
planet, we can no longer limit our politics to national boundaries and parochial, human-
centered concerns.  
* 
Simple communities are those which are defined through physical boundaries 
(which may be quite fluid or mobile), and where people interact not at a distance, through 
a medium of communication, but face-to-face; they are structured through a complex 
array of more common and more private spaces, and every event of political life takes 
place as an actual encounter of people. Beyond the most rudimentary problems of waste 
disposal, the sharing of space in such a community requires the development and 
refinement of outer-directed bodily movements. The movements of the body must be 
cultivated in a way that allows for people to interact in shared space without conflict; this 
cultivation must enable all of the political activities, conceived in the broadest sense, that 
take place in the community. Some of these activities are quite simple; walking upon the 
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same path, the use of dwelling spaces, even sleeping --- all of these are political activities 
that require certain physical protocols. Other activities, however, involve the formation 
and reformation of relationships between people. These include courtship rituals, 
religious rites and sacrifices to the Gods, communal discussions, any festivals which 
endow members of a community with a new rank or strips them of their privileges, and 
even, and perhaps above all else, war, which reforms the relationship between two 
communities or divides a community against itself. Yet, in every case, the language of 
physical movement is no more referential than the language of words. It consists not in a 
set of gestures which correspond one-to-one with a set of possible “statements,” but of a 
system of ways of moving that allow for people to interact through a shared physical 
space. Such interaction is reciprocal, creative and responsive; we are open and receptive 
to an infinite range of possible gestures, and can respond, in turn, with equal freedom. 
Often, a physical language opens the way to a word-language; people might configure 
themselves within a common space in a way that allows for a political discussion. Or 
physical language might complement, complicate, or even contradict the spoken word. 
 While the language of the body is no less expressive, creative, or free than the 
language of the tongue, it differs in many respects, and only through these differences 
may we begin to conceive of the full range of political experience. All language, to begin, 
is limited. Only because there are constraints to permissible expressions is it possible for 
an infinite number to be creatively produced and comprehended. Yet these limitations 
vary vastly among different types of language. Speech and writing are based on words; 
communication involves a set of discreet elements specified according to their 
combinatorial possibilities, and which can be concatenated into an infinite variety of 
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infinitely long strings, producing expressions through a linear arrangement. Somatic 
communication, in contrast, is limited by the flexibility and strength of the muscles in 
body, and the outermost range of movements allowed by the joints. The torso, as it were, 
provides a center for the limbs, outer extremities, as well as the neck and head. These all 
work together to allow for infinitely varied expressive possibilities within these physical 
confines. The body is limited by being centered.  
 Owing to these differences, the language of the body and the language of the 
word allow for very different forms of free political interaction. Neither of these forms is 
either logically prior or reducible to the other, and any concept of politics that addresses 
itself only to one of these is entirely inadequate. We note, to begin, that the action of the 
body is not built around a concatenation of individual elements. If we try to think of any 
bodily movement as composed from a series of smaller movements, we are led down an 
infinite regress. Nor can we discover any specific elements of movement that are “willed” 
as discreet entities; we do not mentally construct even very complicated movements out 
of parts, except, perhaps, when we are learning to move, and not yet actually moving. We 
simply move, and whatever the degree of conscious direction, our movements flow 
together. If there is still a sense in which we might speak of units of movement, this can 
only be discovered in the logic of the body, and not of the mind or a word-language.  
 The logic of the body is dictated by the nature of the skeletal and muscular 
system, and their coordinated by the mind and nervous system. It is a sum of potentials; 
what bodies in general, human bodies, specific human bodies, and specific bodies at 
specific times are capable of. At any given moment, the potentials of a given body for 
movement are determined by the state that it is in. If our weight is resting evenly on both 
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feet, for example, we are not yet able to lift one into the air without falling over. If our 
back is oddly hunched over, our capacity to jump without falling is limited. This is 
indeed the most fundamental principle of somatic action; movements determine the 
possibility of movements, a successful movement is one which allows us to move again, 
which returns us to an equal or higher potential for movement.  
 Following this principle, we can rigorously determine how the “unit” of word-
languages differs from that of body-languages, and also begin to grasp, at a deeper level, 
how their action and political nature also contrast. A unit, in any language, is simply an 
element that opens up possibilities. Languages do not create a mere artifact, a thing that 
could be over and done with, or a tool intended only for a narrow range of purposes. Its 
work is never finished; it creates nothing else than new possibilities for creation. In 
constructing a sentence, for example, no single word can bring a sentence to a point of 
rest --- every new element allows for new expansion. The only linguistic mark that really 
brings closure is the “period,” and yet this is not only completely foreign to speech, but 
only finishes one sentence by introducing another. It does not so much contribute to the 
composition of a sentence as mark a more or less abrupt transition that has been made. 
Punctuation marks, in effect, all come after the fact, and simply show how the words flow 
into each other. And even a seemingly finished work of poetry or prose is only the seed 
for the conversations that takes place among their readers and hearers.  
Every level of a given form of language, all this suggests, may ultimately be 
regarded as a unit, since in one way or another it helps to open up possibilities. Among 
all these, however, the most basic unit is that which, to the greatest extent, opens up 
specific possibilities. This explains the privilege of the word in speech and writing, and 
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why we speak of a language of words rather than phonemes, graphemes, or sentences. In 
constructing an individual word, individual phonemes provide a very small number of 
specific choices. A sentence, on the other hand, only offers rather vague restrictions on 
what will follow. An individual word, however, opens up an infinite range of 
possibilities, and yet with specific limitations.  
 Most important, for our purposes, is to understand how words open up 
possibilities. At first glance, the answer seems simple. New possibilities emerge when we 
add a new word to the existing chain, or, other words, through a serial, paratactic 
construction. The possibilities may, in part, be determined by other words lying farther 
back in the sentence, but, to a great extent, the simple act of concatenation is able to 
create an entirely new beginning. And at the same time, it is impossible to erase the 
words that are already in place. In short, it is always possible to start over, but never to 
undo what’s been done. While this is seems a very simply principle, it is of enormous 
consequence for the kind of meaning that a word language produces.  
These consequences, and their broader implications, appear more clearly if we 
draw a contrast with somatic language. The possibilities for movement, unlike those of 
the word, are not given through elements strung on what after another, but are contained, 
as we have seen, in the momentary state of the body, or in other words, its momentum. 
This momentary state is determined not by a free choice that could be made in the instant 
--- the decision, for example, to speak “and” and either allow a new independent clause to 
begin or repeat a sentence element in a parallel construction --- but instead by the 
continuous flow of events that preceded it and have led up to a specific configuration of 
muscles and bones in space. The unit of somatic language, it follows, is any flowing line 
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of action that end with the possibility of its repetition. Not only is the language of the 
body centered, but its movement is circular in structure; it does not add to a series, but 
returns to a point of departure. This circular, circulating unit can be discovered at many 
levels.  
 We see it, first of all, over the coarse of the entire life of the body. Physical 
abilities can only be learned and retained through repetition; it is only by doing them that 
one becomes capable of doing them. In a highly demanding activity such as ballet, even 
professionals can only maintain their level of facility through a daily regime of practice. 
 This roundaboutness also comes into play in longer series of movements that 
change our position within physical space; we wish to continue in such movement, we 
must make sure that we move towards a place where it is possible to continue moving. 
For this reason, movement in space, in the long term, always involves turning, and in 
fact, if one would record all the movements in space that an individual performs over the 
course of his life, one would find that he is constantly moving in circles. Moving in 
circles is, indeed, essential to any kind of physical community. It is politics in the very 
most fundamental and radical sense, which applies not only to human life but every form 
or organic, and even inorganic organization. If we did not always come back to where we 
started from, but just bounced around like random particles, we would not be human, or 
even animal, but instead our life would approach the inorganic and wholly unorganized --
- the beams of light that, emanating from the center of out solar system with its rounding 
orbits, jet forth into infinity. To live is, in a sense, at every level to be involved in 
processes of circulation. Likewise, a polis, a physical community, is not a space 
demarcated by some outside limit, but nestled system of centers --- furniture, rooms, 
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houses, public places, parks, neighborhoods, villages, towns, cities and networks of cities 
--- around which life flows.  
None of this should be thought either to privilege rootedness to the soil as the 
basis of political life, or question the validity of nomadic or even Diaspora tic 
communities. If anything, these involve a higher, more fluid, expression of the circularity 
of politics. And in a way, it is impossible for any human activity on this planet, or even 
within this solar system, to escape from the form of circularity imposed by the very 
roundness of the earth. Wherever we go, we are always returning to where we started; an 
obvious fact, and yet we seldom think about this.  
 The basic unit of somatic language is to be found at that level which, to the 
greatest extent, yields determinate possibilities. This, I would suggest, is the step --- of 
walking, jumping, skipping, running and the like. A step ends either in the possibility of 
repeating the same step, or in its symmetrical opposite, or in a state in which it is possible 
to embark upon a new step. When we walk, for example, moving one leg forward 
conditions us to advance the other leg. Steps, in other words, are iterative actions; and 
some, like walking in a circle, can, hypothetically at least, be repeated infinitely. We 
speak fluently with our bodies when we are able to move from step to step without 
crashing; without temporality, or permanently, losing our capacity for movement. It 
might seem peculiar that we should privilege the step over the far more articulate and 
subtle movements of the hand and the upper torso. Yet these, I would suggest, are already 
to open and free in their expressive possibilities --- and begin to approach word-language 
in their structure. In sign-language, for examples, gestures of the hands and arms become 
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the basis of a serial, paratactic construction which is no less a word-language than that 
spoken through the mouth.  
 A clearer picture now emerges of how the political interaction of the body differs 
from that of the word. Free political action, we have seen, is a reciprocal action that 
confirms the possibility of action. The step not only has a privileged place in the language 
of the body, but is, in this way, at the root of all political action; the basic unit of politics, 
as it were, is the step. In its broadest sense, comprehending the activity of every agent 
within a community, political action is the upkeep of a fluid system of interactions, a 
system that will not crash; it is to act in a way that retains and develops the existing 
circulations, preserving and building the possibility of a communication and circulation 
among the parts of the system. Or simply put, politics is the avoidance of catastrophe. 
And accordingly, the movement of the body expresses its most basic principle and modus 
operandi --- fluidity.  
Nevertheless, the most developed systems of circulation emerge out of a word-
language, which, precisely because of its essentially paratactic structure, --- the fact that 
each new word can open up endless possibilities ---, is open to infinity in a very different 
way. Words are free in a way that the body is not, and thus provide the basis for the 
greatest extension of free political action. It is true, indeed, that both the body and words 
are infinite, creative, and reciprocal. Yet the infinitude of the former is confined in both 
space and time. Bodies are only able to avoid catastrophe by always circulating back to 
the same space; they cannot, as it were, go off on an infinite tangent. And because a 
successful movement in effect always returns to the same position --- the possibility of 
new movement --- their movements are not, in the end, submitted to linear temporality. A 
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movement may seem to proceed as a series of partial movements, and yet the very 
linearity of this sequence dissolves in the very possibility of its reproduction. A 
successful movement is one that has not changed anything; time is lifted away as a veil 
concealing the true essence of motion. Words, in contrast, reproduce the structure of 
linear temporality, or even condition its very possibility, and preserve the past as the 
entire series of words that have proceeded. The new beginning that each added word 
provides is new only against this back-drop, and the possibilities that it opens cannot be 
determined but in this contrast. Words branch off into infinity like a tree. 
 The language of the body is intensive; details are infinitely important, the infinite 
is to be found in details. Every detail, however, small --- opens on to the infinite. Fluency 
exists as the operation of an infinite calculus, which integrates the partial moments into a 
smooth line. The language of the word is, in contrast, extensive; time preserves details as 
the dust of half-forgotten words, stripped of potential, while it races on towards the 
infinite. Human politics, however, involves both, and each complements the other. The 
language of the body is the basis of free political action, for only as this fluency does it 
avoid self-contradiction; the language of the word is the highest expression of freedom 
itself. Freedom rests on fluency, and they converge as truly political action. The verbal 
discourse must bow back upon itself; it must become a system of circulation and not just 
of infinite expansion --- it must become fluent. And at the same time, the fluency of the 
body must come to express itself more freely. 
 With this thought, a vista opens towards what we might call art and aesthetics. 
Such terms, though, do not speak to our purposes. We are here concerned neither with the 
creation of a particular privileged form of artifact, nor with its reception through the 
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senses, but only in how each of these languages, that of the body and that of the word, is 
cultivated to assume the qualities of the other, creating a model of a functional political 
community. This cultivation is culture; the rapprochement of the two opposite ends of 
free political discourse. 
 
* 
 The culture of the body, the cultivation of the language of movement towards the 
expressive potential and freedom of speech, is dance. Dance, of course, has a wide and 
vast history, and exists in every culture where it has not been violently suppressed by 
unnatural and inhuman prudishness. I will limit my discussion to ballet, however. While 
ballet is based upon kinds of movements and a body position which contrast sharply with 
other dance forms, it is not merely one form among others, but an entire system of 
dancing with the ability to incorporate, at least at its periphery, any kind of movement, 
and thus acquire an expressive potential which is not only infinitely subtle, but also 
infinitely expansive.  
 At the heart of ballet is a codification of steps; a step, a pas in the most general 
sense, means any movement or set of movements that returns to a state from which a new 
movement is possible. It is the movement not of one part of the body --- the foot or the 
leg --- but of the body as a whole. What allows for a successful movement is not the 
engagement of a specific muscle group, but a stillness throughout the body that can only 
be maintained through the proper cultivation and action of the entire muscular system; 
the body must be supported both within itself, and also in relation to the floor. This is 
achieved through the position of the feet --- which serve above all to properly distribute 
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the weight of the body in relation to the floor --- and the carriage of the entire body. 
Because the carriage of the arms and neck, and even of the back, can change to a certain 
degree without affecting the possibilities of movement of the body as a whole, the 
definition of the pas is oriented around the positions of the feet, and the port de bras 
functions as a partially independent, but related system. Each is learned in part 
independently of the other, in part in coordination, and sometimes, for either aesthetic or 
physical reasons, a specific port de bras is directly connected with a pas.  
 The language of the body, we have seen, has one simple principle; avoid 
catastrophe. This is the rule in everyday life as well as on the dancing stage. In the 
language of ordinary movements --- the walking, running, jumping, bending, kneeling, 
and arm extensions through which we “get by” --- this operates principally as a regulative 
principle. Not so much at the level of consciousness, but rather through a trepidation 
which resides in the body itself. We limit our movements to those that “won’t kill 
ourselves,” to a impoverished vocabulary of non-crashing movements that cope with our 
physical environment. In ballet, on the other hand, this principle is internal rather than 
external; it is not an outside constraint, but rather the germ out of which a system of 
movements develops. Every pas is built around the necessity of preserving the center of 
gravity and the proper relation of parts within the body as a whole; it is a movement 
which preserves the very greatest degree of support. By maintaining this internal 
coherence, it becomes possible to engage in ever more drastic movements, ever higher 
forms of somatic activity, without crashing. And these movements can be linked together 
in series and fluently, flowing together into a single action. The entire system of ballet, 
realized in the act of dancing, expresses the somatic principle, and to an extraordinary 
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degree. It realizes a purified form of the fluidity of movement, a fluidity whose criterion 
is not external, not the mere absence of catastrophe, but internal, involving the 
preservation of the center of gravity and of a smooth line down through the body. And at 
the same time, because this fluidity allows for a vastly extended range of movements, it is 
freely expressive, and approaches the expressiveness of words.  
 Ballet, we now see, allows for a fluid, yet serial connection of actions. Different 
steps are joined together into a combination, the different combinations of dancers 
integrated into the pas seul, and the pas de deux, or the corps de ballet, or dramatic 
scenes, and these brought together into an entire ballet. In this way, these concatenations 
of movement allow for an intricate narrative structure. In the effect, they open up the 
language of the body to the dimension of temporality. The present moment becomes rich 
with a past and with a future --- yet, nevertheless, let us not think that this proceeds in a 
fashion identical to verbal language. Whereas verbal language is, at first, more temporal 
than spatial --- it begins with the paratactic construction of speech, of words conveyed 
through sound --- the language of ballet develops temporality out of spatiality.  
 The language of the body, we have seen, makes it possible for people to circle 
around the centers of political life, and it is indeed, in the widest sense, the system of 
circulation of all that communicates through movement in space. While ballet does 
provide a tremendous extension in the expressive range of this language, it also and at the 
same time concentrates the entire polis into the unified space of the stage. And just as the 
polis is not merely a bounded territory, neither is the stage merely a flat floor surrounded 
by scenery and draped with a curtain. Rather, it is itself a complicated, involved space of 
internestled circulations created, at each instant, by the dancers. Through their 
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movements, the dancers spontaneously create their world, and in this way exemplify true 
political action.  
 Thus dance enacts a perfect community --- a world which is formed entirely 
through its own interaction --- and for this reason, there can be no before and after. The 
time that dance creates takes place entirely within its space, and indeed the two are so 
seamlessly interwoven that one may only really speak of an absolutely unified space-
time. There is no past before the events begin, and no future once they have ended. 
Unlike dramas, which must of necessity be situated within a mythic continuum of events, 
ballets should not and need not involve past events in their action; their plot --- if we can 
speak of such --- does not take place within a history determined by an agency outside of 
its limits. And likewise, a ballet trilogy or tetrology, even if technically feasible, is absurd 
through the very expectation that the audience would preserve narrative details beyond 
the synoptic event of the performance, or that a detail could have any life beyond this 
context. Narration through words involves a series of discreet, causally linked events. 
While these events may comprise an ineluctable fate, they nevertheless result from 
choices. And through their causes and consequences they are tied to the beginnings and 
ends of time. The body, in contrast, narrates by compressing an infinity of detail into a 
perfectly accomplished movement. Time and space exist neither as empty forms, nor as a 
network of relations between events, but as detail. The grandest ballet is, in the end, but 
the exposition of a single step.  
 Thus ballet is an almost completely expressive medium, and in the technical sense 
of which we have spoken. This does not mean that it brings to view the emotions of the 
dancers, or involves particular strong and primal feelings, but rather that it expresses the 
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system of the body --- the body-politic --- through the fluent circulation of its 
possibilities. These possibilities, as should be clear, do not consist merely in certain 
human ways of acting, but range over nature; they are what allows for the transformation 
from the inorganic all the way to the human, and for the reciprocal interaction of almost 
every form of agency. Or rather, they are this very transformation and interaction. Ballet 
expresses by fluently moving across these possibilities, from the lowest degree of activity 
to the highest. It passes from stone-like rigidity on to mechanical movement, and, at its 
peak, expresses true human freedom --- a free action which begets the possibility of 
freedom --- and then returns back to the dead and inorganic. Every ballet is, in essence, a 
leap through these gradations of activity. Performing this leap with perfect grace, it 
reveals that even the extremes are fully continuous; their difference is merely of intensity, 
quantitative rather than qualitative. Nor can fate and freedom stand in any sort of lasting 
opposition. For this reason, a freedom of mere choice --- a conception, which, as we have 
seen, results in the two incompatible pictures of human nature --- has no place in classical 
dance.  
 The action of an entire ballet is called a scenario, not a plot. Since a true theatrical 
dance neither plods nor presses forward, it cannot have a plot. Rather, it gives us a 
synoptic view of an entire scene of action. Classical dance is irredeemably spectacular; 
turning the Aristotelian categories on its head, it presents us with an “opsis” rather than a 
“mythos.” Yet spectacle is only superficial when considered from the perspective of the 
pathos of the audience. It is, indeed, least of all able to evoke feelings of fear and pity in 
the audience, and precisely because it does not show us a human being who makes 
choices and suffers for them. As we are not presented with an agent that we can relate to 
 75
through our own practical reason, neither can we fear that his fate might also befall us, 
nor pity the misfortune of someone like ourselves. What spectacle exhibits is not rational 
human agency, but all agency; the reciprocal interaction of all action. Thus the fear of the 
audience becomes terror --- openness to the possibility of catastrophe befalling the 
system of all things. And its pity becomes sympathy with the suffering and exaltation, the 
action and reaction, of all nature. Nor does ballet reach its goal with the production of 
these affects. For the true experience of spectacle rests not in an affect or a response, but 
in a synoptic glance of how the world, in all its commotion, expresses the simplicity and 
unity of nature --- it is the experience of the continuum.  
 The affects of fear and pity provide the basis for a politics of manipulation; they 
regard individuals as free agents who must be led to “do the right thing” by stirring up 
patriotic feelings, but who are to act morally purely through reason alone. Drama, as 
conceived by Aristotle, is not itself a free political action, but contradicts the very 
possibility of freedom by refusing to treat the audience as if they were truly free. In 
contrast, ballet provides at a glance the insight that would arise from a comprehensive 
grasp of reality. A dancer approaches divinity as no other artist can --- and yet this 
approach is itself nothing more than the fluidity of all human movement brought to an 
extreme. Dancers become gods as men --- and thus realize what is but the outermost 
human potential --- divinity.  
 Despite the centrality to ballet of such an absolute language of movement, this is 
not all that it can communicate. For there are also, without doubt, gestures of the hands 
and legs, comportments of the limbs, torso, and neck, and miens of the face, which are 
remarkably evocative, yet nevertheless quite simple and unambiguous in their 
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interpretation, and which in this way seem to convey a fact which can be grasped in 
isolation --- happiness, sadness, flirtation, deceit, to give some examples. And just as 
these tend to be concentrated in the outer extremities of the body, they likewise belong to 
the periphery of ballet as an expressive medium. Here the language of movement reaches 
into the registers of the language of words. For the first time it becomes possible to 
translate more or less directly between one and another, describing movements directly 
through words. We look at the way a ballerina moves her wrist, and can say “she is being 
flirtatious”; a certain bend in her torso shows us, immediately and without hesitation, that 
she is distraught.  
 Such expressions, peripheral to the language of movement, are nevertheless the 
most central to the language of words. Reflecting the most basic possibilities of human 
agency and interaction, we may indeed speculate that they would overlap nicely with 
those aspects of semantics which universal to all languages and wired into the brain. This 
helps explain their tremendous power; they tap into the deepest resources of natural 
language, the ontologies, or better, dramatologies that structure and texture reality. Let us 
compare, for example, how ballet and drama present compulsion. Drama, to the extent 
that it is void of all spectacle, and depends on words, is incapable of showing compulsion 
in a simple and direct way. Words insist on freedom. When a speaker speaks --- be they 
king or slave --- they become free; to strip their language of its freedom would be to 
render it ugly and unsuitable to a work of art. Compulsion --- which should not be 
confused with moral necessity --- therefore, can only be presented through complicated 
ruses woven by Gods or men; only at the level of plot, through involved conspiracies. 
Such representations, however, remain in essence superficial; they only present a series 
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of events that leads up to compulsion, or the structure of a world in which compulsion is 
possible, but they do not present the bare fact of compulsion itself.5 Ballet, in contrast, 
does just this, and with remarkable ease. One dancer seems, through the position of his 
hands and the attitude of his entire body, to push another, who likewise seems to be 
pushed, or drag him across the stage. Nothing more than this is needed for us to see what 
it means to be compelled. 
 Now that the body means in the same way as words, its expressiveness is no 
longer regulated by the centering structures of the polis. Rather, it begins to break open 
into temporal infinity.  
 This happens, above all, through the gestures, comportments and miens that are 
exchanged between the dancers in a ballet. These form what we might call the libretto --- 
a narrative dialogue which, in a sense, is built within the scenario and fills out its details. 
This narrative closely resembles the action of a drama, and to an extent it transforms the 
dancers into characters with rational agency. But even here, where ballet seems most 
decisively to assume the qualities of tragedy, it nevertheless rejects its primary impulses. 
For the hero of a tragic ballet is not offered a choice of actions, he is not made 
responsible for what he does as a free agent, but rather is faced with the necessity of 
correctly discerning the proper object of his affection. We see this most clearly in Swan 
Lake. Here, the denouement hangs on the inability to distinguish between two swans, one 
white and the other black, with names different by just a single syllable --- a thread so 
tenuous that it seems absurd, especially if we apply Aristotle’s concept of “unity of 
                                                          
5 We might compare this with the tendency to interpret to conceive of political events in terms of 
conspiracies wrought through the machinations of an individual or secret organization. Unable to properly 
understand the impersonal forms of compulsion that guide our everyday life, we interpret these in terms of 
some kind of hidden human agency.  The modern cinema provides a perfect medium for this. 
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action.” Yet Swan Lake has no need for such a criterion; the tragedy, ultimately, rests in 
the inattentiveness to detail. Because the difference among action is always continuous, 
and thus expressed only through details, truly free political action within the body-politic 
requires just this manner of attentiveness. Only so can we grasp the difference between 
love and coquettishness, naiveté and foolishness, wisdom and sophistication, compulsion 
and freedom. This also applies to the difference between the inorganic, mechanical, 
bestial and human; Clara, in the Nutcracker, becomes the hero through her capacity to 
distinguish between the inhuman and human. While she treats the dancing automata with 
an indifference, her attention to the details of the nutcracker which opens into a world of 
phantasy. And it applies even to the distinction between the living and the dead, as we see 
not only in Romeo and Juliet, but in La Bayedera, where the hero visits the realm of 
shades, or in Giselle. 
 The hero of the ballet appears not first of all as a human, freely willing agent, but 
as an observer. His actions flow out of his perceptions, and the mood of the whole is 
contemplative. This contemplation is sympathetic, in the broadest sense, for it requires an 
absolute responsiveness to all action --- everything that happens on stage must touch the 
hero in all its details. Yet it is not dominated by any particular affects, but is, rather, a 
state of almost perfect openness. In this way, the hero himself becomes the ideal 
spectator; he is as the audience should be, open to every detail. That he nevertheless 
dances simply expresses how all actions flow out of the state of perfect contemplation. 
His actions, indeed, are always at the same time passions; there can be no absolute 
difference between the two. Love, hatred, compulsion, sorrow, joy --- these are all 
expressed in the movements of the dancer.  
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 Since the audience and the hero are both in essence contemplative, their 
identification is absolute; the hero does nothing more than translate the passions of the 
audience into movement, expressing their own private feelings as life of the polis, and 
transforming these into a public and open experience.6 And since these passions do not 
emerge from the give and take of dialogue, since they are never faced with resistance, 
and have neither need nor opportunity to adapt and be mollified, they must always tend to 
the extreme and the simple. No one has ever “liked” in a ballet, and the audience, 
likewise, cannot simply like what they see, if they see at all. In contrast, the identification 
of the audience with the dramatic protagonist is complicated by the contradiction between 
his activity and their passive receptivity, and in this way expresses the contradiction 
between the absolute rational freedom of choice, and the absolute determinism of fate. 
The audience and the protagonist jockey back and forth between these two sides of the 
equation; the heroes activity is experience only through the audiences passivity, and his 
ultimate submission to fate only through a freedom that allows them to stand beyond the 
stage of action. If we experience fate as the work of the Gods, we nevertheless experience 
it as Gods, and in their absolute distinction from men.  
 What in the end allows for the perfect contemplative unity of the audience with all 
the dancers, and not just the hero, is music. Both are bound together through the shared 
attentiveness to this. We expect all the dancers to be perfectly responsive to the element, 
and that every nuance, every change in tempo or mood, every quality of rhythm, and even 
the contrapuntal texture is expressed through their body; not a single detail can be lost in 
the translation. It is not a virtuosic display of superhuman ability that we seek, however, 
                                                          
6 The audience should be understood not as a mere consumer of a certain aesthetic experience, for which a 
certain price was paid at the box office, but rather as part of the performance, whose task --- and one that 
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but only that they show their responses and their perceptiveness to be the same as ours. It 
is, indeed, infinitely more difficult to dance than to listen --- we cannot, in the end, help 
but listen. The mind is of nature almost incomprehensibly rich in its subtlety and the 
delicacy of its perceptions, while body can only become supple through a rigorous regime 
of training. Yet even the coarsest body also cannot help but dance, and even when it finds 
itself completely hapless. For it is also impossible not to dance; in the end, we can 
tolerate everything but our being given over to gravity. 
 As a language of movement, ballet, on the one hand, perfects the principle of 
continuity, fluidity; a good dance, in the end, is one where no one falls down. Yet even as 
it presents a perfect community, where nothing crashes, still, at the limit of its expressive 
potential, it opens us up to the very possibility of a catastrophe that would bring down the 
whole. This is the tragic dimension of ballet; it exposes us to the terror that things, indeed 
everything, falls apart. The tragic denouement is Swan Lake, for example, is absolute --- 
become the scenario stands outside of history as a world unto itself, nothing could 
survive its demise. And yet the world explodes not through the schemings of Gods or 
men, nor because it is sinful and sick through and through, nor because it is mere 
creation, unable to sustain itself but through the Creator --- but simply because of a lapse 
of attentiveness. The world is no more when we fail to take notice of the splendor of its 
nuances. No longer ornate, no longer a spectacle, the world ceases. 
 At the outermost reach of balletic language are gestures, comportments and miens 
which point beyond this world, and even beyond its down-fall. The most beautiful of 
these is the climax of an arabesque pencheé en pointe --- the neck and back of the 
ballerina arc towards the ground, but her legs form a straight line pointing directly 
                                                                                                                                                                             
must treated with great respect --- is to produce a receptive silence. 
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upwards. No movement in ballet is possible unless the torso support the legs rather than 
the legs the torso, and in this sense, the art of ballet is a relevé which lifts the feet and 
legs off from the bondage of gravity. This is achieved by proper body placement, by 
having the entire body lifted upwards, and in leaps --- where the quiet relation of parts is 
transformed into the movement of the whole. But above all, it is expressed through the 
alternation between a supporting and moving leg. One leg, released from the burden of 
holding the weight of the body, is free to move in an arc away from the earth. In an 
arabesque pencheé, the supporting and moving legs join together at the out limit of 
extension, becoming a single, perfectly straight line. In this instant, the legs are 
transformed; they no longer bare any trace of their wearying life as supports for the 
weight of the torso with its heart and lungs, kidney, liver and digestive tract. No longer 
succumbing to the human organism and tending to its needs, they are as a string hung 
from the heavens; weightless.  
 For a moment --- and it will always only be for a moment --- there is release from 
the terror of catastrophe. Weightless, nothing could fall; gravity has been suspended. This 
gestures towards the infinity of the language of words, that, at its own periphery, is no 
longer enmeshed in the body-politics and no longer given over to gravity and catastrophe. 
Yet even this point of transcendence is only reached gradually, and through a continuity 
of movements, and is not an absolute departure from the language of movement, but only 






  Der Baum entwächst 
Dem heimatlichen Boden, aber es sinkem ihm 
 Die liebenden, die jugendlichen 
 Arme, un trauernd neigt er sein Haupt. 
  Hölderlin 
 Dance, by cultivating the language of the body towards the free expressive 
potential of verbal language, exhibits the body-politic as a perfectly free community. This 
is one side of the rapprochement of the two poles of politics. The other side is poetry, 
which transforms the freedom of words into the fluid mechanics of meter. The essence of 
poetic meter is the strophe; this puts a twist in the linear arrangement of words. Words, 
which otherwise would accumulate into an infinite sequence, are made recursive, 
continually turning back after a set distance. In this way, the language of words, 
otherwise purely temporal in its composition --- existing only as a series of “nows” --- is 
given a spatial form; narrative and prose become verse. Like ballet, this spatialized form 
depends on a kind of pas --- the foot or measure. Yet here an almost total uniformity, 
with only slight possibilities for variation, prevails. Whereas in classical dance the pas 
brings the principle of stasis --- the preservation of possibilities --- towards freedom of 
expression, poetic meter imposes a rigid, recurrent form to a medium where, ordinarily, 
new possibilities emerge anew from every new beginning. Meter, in other words, creates 
a form of movement within verbal language that is successful only when it returns to the 
possibility of its repetition. This requires a mechanical fluidity; the flow of the meter 
must not be interrupted, else it is no longer possible to continue. And just as balletic 
fluidity expresses the action of the body-politic, poetic fluidity expresses the action of 
language; the syntactic interaction which transforms words into meaningful expressions. 
Words are discrete elements, but meaning is only possible where there is a continuous 
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movement between them. Since words --- at least as they are perceived --- take place in 
time, only such a continuity could rescue them from isolation. Time, the medium of 
speech, is just such a movement --- and possesses a quasi-spatial structure that unites all 
“nows” into a single, fluid, continuum.  
 Between the cultivated language of the body --- the temporalization of space --- 
and the cultivated language of words --- the spatialization of time --- lies absolute music. 
Music, it is important to see, is no more temporal than spatial; it articulates time into 
space and space into time, uniting the two seamlessly into a time-space of absolutely pure 
continuity. Yet while absolute music if infinitely detailed, subtle, and intricate in its 
construction, and cannot be regarded just as an empty form, it lacks both bodies and 
words, and thus might be regarded as merely the schema for the unification of somatic 
and verbal language. It offers an example of how these could by united according to their 
formal properties without sacrifices the nuances of either, but it does not yet present this 
unification itself. What, in the end, presents the perfect rapprochement of somatic and 
verbal language could only be the actual political system in its totality, and if there is a 
form of art which provides a premonition of the perfect political system, it is what we 
must call true, rather than Aristotelian, drama. Its nature remains obscure, and we can not 
even be sure of what media it will require. Drama concerns itself with action in the very 
broadest sense; it need not take the form of theater.  
 The following  diagram should help clarify the relation between the different 
cultural forms. Keep in mind, however; these do not belong under the heading of 
aesthetics, but, in the broadest sense, dramatics. Aesthetics concerns itself with how an 
object, natural or manmade, is perceived through the senses. Whatever manner of activity 
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it is thought to possess emerges out of its synthesis as a phenomenon in space and time. 
Dramatic forms, in contrast, are forms of activity whose spatio-temporal configuration --- 
there aesthetic palpability --- emerge out of their ways of being active. 
                 politics 
 
 
      true drama  
 
     
                           absolute music   
  
   theatrical ballet                                                                              opera 
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* 
 We have tarried so long --- if not nearly long enough --- with a discussion of 
classical dance not in order to valorize a particular art form, but in order to show how the 
real, concrete system of nature is stitched together with the ideal, concrete system of 
human language. The body, with its specific inputs and outputs, is what weaves an 
endlessly subtle web of links between the real and the ideal. If human language enfolds 
these two into each other like a skin, the human body is its real substance and fabric. 
Human language has its real existence at the periphery of our body --- through particular 
vocalizations of words spoken out of the mouth, and movements that appear the way they 
do through the unique way in which skin fills out space --- yet it expresses, first of all, the 
way it which the body itself communicates with nature through food, waste, actions in 
space and time, words, and the senses. And nature is not primarily either what we 
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perceive through our senses or understand through our mind, but the entire system of 
bodies, real or ideal, abstract or concrete, in communication with each other. To avoid 
confusion, however, we will speak of these as organizations, and limit the term “body” to 
its narrower meaning.  
 The human body is an imperfect microcosm. Understood dramatically rather than 
mimetically, this claim loses its mystical, fantastic, or romantic aspect. For clearly, the 
body does not contain the universe in all its details, it does not represent the whole or 
contain it in germinal form. Nor is it a monad that expresses everything with imperfect 
clarity. But as a real, concrete organization through which the real and concrete, real and 
abstract, ideal and concrete and ideal and abstract all interact with each other, it is, as it 
were, the center for the communication of every kind of activity within the system. Not 
that it is capable of every sort of activity; a plant, for example, does something that we 
could never do --- bring the energy producing fusion of the sun into a real relation with 
the mineral deposits of the earth through the photosynthetic production of organic 
compounds and the building of cells. But it is able to bring some kind of relation into 
effect between different forms of activity, if only by speaking of them in language or 
describing them as scientific processes.   
 The human body, as such an imperfect microcosm, is the center of a community. 
A community is an organization of human bodies that bring the activities of nature as a 
whole --- including human nature --- into relation with each other and with itself, under 
the orchestration of human bodies that are in constant reciprocal political interaction and 
dialogue about different ways to express their potential. Such a community might extend 
through all nature and to all human bodies, or it might be much more limited in scope --- 
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a single village with its Gods and natural forces. But it must be centered around the 
fulfillment of the human body. It is not that it must privilege human activities over the 
activities of nature, or install mankind as a self-serving master of the universe, but only 
that the activity of nature passes through the human body as a central node. The body 
becomes, as it were, an eddy; a self-maintaining circulation within the flow of nature. 
And this, once again, is what we mean by expression; not the realization and explication 
of some sort of inner content of a system, but a fluent communication among its 
elements.  
 A community, like a ballet, is centered around human bodies; only these are no 
longer conceived first of all as mechanical entities within a physical space, but in all of 
their organic complexity --- as organisms living among organizations. And the principle 
of community life, like that of ballet, is to act in a way that preserves the possibilities of 
action. Yet this action is no longer simply physical movement in time and space, but 
comprehends everything that expresses the potential of the human body. Which returns 
us to our definition of free political action. Free political action is action that preserves or 
develops community life; an act, in other words, that produces a community in which it is 
possible to act freely.  
 In a performance of dance, actions are of more or less immediate consequence --- 
catastrophe is always an immanent possibility. A community, in contrast, not only 
realizes its possibilities and impossibilities very slowly, but it would be impossible even 
to speak of a chain of actions and their results, but only of spheres of activity internestled 
within the life of the whole. Cultivation, this suggests, is the primary form of political 
activity. We have already spoken of the cultivation of the language of the body and the 
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language of words, but now we may conceive cultivation, more generally, as any act 
directed towards creating the possibilities for activity.  
 If as a performance, ballet exhibits the perfection of activity, it is as a discipline 
that it exemplifies the meaning of cultivation. In the beginning, very little is learned for 
its own sake, but rather, almost everything is learned in order to develop the body in such 
a way that it becomes capable of executing an ever greater range of movements without 
causing injury. It is not a matter just of learning simple parts that can strung together into 
a whole, not of building of physical strength of coordination, but above all of 
transforming the body into an instrument capable of maintaining the correct relation of its 
parts through even the most difficult of movements. In a sense, the point is not even to 
lean ever more complicated movements, but rather, how to keep still as these happen. 
The dancer’s individuality expresses itself not through the affected movements of his 
extremities, but in a constancy that survives even the most difficult choreography, the 
most trying turns of fate, as it were. It is not personality, but substance and character. 
 Cultivation can be directed either towards human nature as human nature or 
towards mere things. In the case of the first, it builds character, in the second, substance. 
And furthermore, human nature may be cultivated as a thing, by undermining its freedom 
rather than building this towards stable expression.  Neither character nor substance, 
however, should be understood as metaphysical abstractions; rather, they speak of 
nothing more than stable possibilities --- possibilities that can be expressed without 
undermining their foundation. Since ballet, to an extent, is directed towards the human 
body as a mere mechanism, it involves both of these.  
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 The different forms of cultivation are diverse; education in reading, arithmetic, 
and the like creates the possibility of thinking --- it cultivates the mind. The arts don’t 
merely create artifacts, but cultivate the expressive possibilities of different media. 
Agriculture cultivates the soil towards the production of foods, and animal husbandry 
cultivates animals towards our material needs. A craftsman does not merely make things, 
but cultivates the inorganic or dead to become useful for humans. An architect does not 
just build houses, but develops the physical world in a way that allows for community. 
Military training does not teach people how to kill each other, but cultivates the qualities 
that are necessary to defend the community against its enemies. Parents do not mere raise 
children, but cultivate them towards participation in a community. 
  Politics includes all of these, and indeed every kind of community-building 
activity. No one kind of activity within a true community is of necessity more political 
than others; politics is not the work of specialists, but of all who interact with each other 
through their work. Nor even are children excluded --- far from being will-less blank 
slates, ready to absorb whatever values are pressed upon them, they are faced with the 
most difficult political activity of all --- becoming people. 
* 
 Techniques, it is now clear, are forms of cultivation.  They build up the 
relationship between the activities of the human body and the activities of nature, and 
thus allow for new forms of communication between the two. Because it occurs in the 
medium of natural causality rather than human language, this communication is real, not 
ideal, and while techniques may require new forms of inter-human organizations, or the 
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teaching of new skills and knowledge, their primary goal is the cultivation of things of 
substance, or better yet, a nature with more stable possibilities.  
 Nature as a whole, --- regarded from the very widest perspective --- is perfect.  
Since this includes the totality of time and space, and regards nature as an absolute, 
without relation to anything outside of itself, there is no sense in which we could speak of 
unfulfilled possibilities.  However, as either a species or as an individual, man only 
touches nature at certain points and at certain ways.  All of his innate technologies, and 
likewise all those of every animal, build a report with a natural environment, or rather, 
create an environment through development of certain forms of rapport.  It is, indeed, 
often astounding to think how far these bonds can reach; we look towards the heavens, 
and the far corners of the universe and distant times reach us through subtle beams of 
light.   
These limitations give man, both as individual or as species, a perspective on 
nature, and this perspective, determined ultimately by the positions of bodies in relation 
to themselves and to the rest of nature, comprises a set of potentials for interaction.  
These interactions take the form of an exchange between the inputs and of a body and of 
nature at the point where it touches this body. Perceiving through our sense, touching 
with our hands, moving to another space, eating food, vocalizing with our mouth, 
respiring, defecating, or even just standing still are all forms of such interaction. 
A technique, we might now say, is a kind of step; it realizes a possibility for 
action within such a perspective, and through this creates a new set of possibilities and 
thus at the same time shifts perspectives.   Because every human activity requires some 
quantity of time, and our position in time helps determine our perspective, this shift is 
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inevitable.  Essential to a technique, then, is that it sustain and develop our possibilities 
towards nature, and in this regard, it may truly be seen as an extension of somatic 
language.  And true interaction between man and nature must take the form of a 
technique; as reciprocal, it must not undermine the possibility of continuing action. 
How is it then, we may ask, that such interaction is either yet impossible, or 
becomes so.  One way might be if either nature or man is too inert with respect to a given 
kind of action, and doesn’t allow for its possibilities.  This inertness is not meant to imply 
any sort of precise scientifically-conceived state of affairs, but simply, and tautologically, 
the impossibility of a certain way of acting.  An object may be too far away to see, or its 
details to fine too perceive at a given distance or without magnification; a piece of rock 
may to too soft, or ill-shapen, for a certain task; a body of water may lie to close to the 
ground to be able to flow in a certain way, a chemical might not be found in the proper 
concentration, or a piece of firewood is so wet that it is unable to burn --- and so one 
might go on and on.  In every case, however, we could speak of too little organization 
(relative to a given purpose) at either the beginning or the end of an action.  But it might 
also happen that either man or nature is too volatile. A powerful stream or gust of wind, 
for example, may act in a way that overwhelms our body’s inputs and outputs; we are 
unable to bring its actions into relation with our own in a way that allows for a certain 
kind of activity, and may even find ourselves overwhelmed and endangered, and 
incapacitated --- even through death --- in a way that vastly, or absolutely, reduces the 
potentials of our perspective.  Even a dead corpse is not entirely without a perspective on 
nature; only that it has become must more limited.  Or, likewise, our own actions might 
be to volatile in relation to what they are directed towards; we try to prod a soap bubble 
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into movement, and end up bursting it.  In either case, volatility implies too little 
organization in the process.  Volatility and inertness are, indeed, closely connected; a 
volatile action often leads to an inert result.  A hurricane, typhoon, earthquake, or 
explosion leave corpses in their wake.    
 All techniques, in other words, make man and nature more organized, or better, 
reorganize them towards specific possibilities of interaction.   Either they cultivate an 
inert perspective towards greater possibilities of activity, or a volatile action towards 
greater stability.   
* 
The most basic techniques involve breathing, the preparation and consumption of 
food and water, digesting, copulating, and defecating.  It may seem strange to speak of 
these as techniques at all, since they are common, in one form of another, to all animal 
life, and, in essence, all life. Yet, as we have already suggested, their regulation not only 
provides the basis of communal life, but also may be developed and refined to 
extraordinary degrees of subtlety.  What they involve, above all, is a rapport with nature 
as a system of nourishment, of the exchange of organic and inorganic substances 
necessary or harmful, but in either case of consequence, for life.  These techniques are 
closely related to our senses of taste and smell.   Usually considered the most brutish and 
unrefined, taste and smell tie us into the world of chemicals; through them, we 
communicate with nature as a language that combines, dissolves, and recombines 
molecules into longer chains --- a language that reaches the greatest degree of 
expressiveness with carbon-based compounds.  And through the above-mentioned 
techniques, we built out this communication, and often to almost absurd degrees of scope 
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and refinement; sophisticated cuisine, for example, might combine food-stuffs from all 
over the globe into the same meal. 
* 
Next we might speak of those techniques that involve moving the body in relation 
to space and time, and in relation to other things and bodies.  These include walking, 
running, touching, grasping, throwing, embracing, striking, and even coloring and 
vocalizing sounds.   These, too, are common more or less to all animals, though we note 
that different species vary vastly in the range of possibilities they have available, and 
some of these seem to belong uniquely to higher primates, or even humans.  Whereas the 
first techniques we mentioned relate to nature in essence as a system of chemicals, or --- 
in the ordinary way of speaking --- as substances which sustain, nourish, heal or poison 
us, these touch upon nature as a system of physical forces located in time and space, and 
natural phenomenon such as light and sound. 
All of these techniques, we notice, belong to the dramatic arts, and yet, as I have 
suggested, drama is not itself a technique. A technique must involve a change of 
perspective, --- as for example, when we from one place or another.  And while dramatics 
cannot avoid taking place as an event, and thus every performance changes perspective in 
trivial sense that it allows a certain time elapse and expends energy, the real work, if it is 
not, indeed, a mere “pastime,” takes place within a perspective that has been fixed by the 
physical limits of the stage and silence and immobility of the audience.  Within this set 
frame, activity is developed in extraordinary detail, but without repercussions for the 
world outside.  Consider, in this light, the movement of a dancer. This, as we have 
already discussed, does not take them to a new point of space, but is confined within the 
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limits of the stage, and thus, in essence, circular.  In similar fashion, however, we might 
characterize all those strange traits that distinguish a dramatic performance from an 
ordinary human action, and are the cause of such wonder among children and adults 
alike; for example, that a performance has a beginning and end and invokes its own sense 
of time and place, that the actors don’t wear clothing but costumes, that they don’t really 
hurt themselves when they fight.  Everything belonging to the very pretense and 
playfulness of a play contributes to the isolation of actions from the broader action of the 
world.  
Such a description of drama, one notices, stands in brazen contrast to Aristotle’s 
famous definition.  For Aristotle, drama was to be understood, ultimately, as an action 
directed towards a definite end; the purification of the  of fear and pity in the 
audience through these very .  It was, in other words, a technique performed by the 
actors on the audience, not as freely human, but as “human nature” in the quality of 
thingness.   This supposes not only that the audience doesn’t belong to the performance, 
standing outside of it in a purely receptive capacity, but --- because it speaks only to 
emotions, and thus sunders these from their intellect --- that they are not human in the 
same sense as the actors.  In the end, the actors and audience could not even be said to 
belong to same freely political community. Indeed the audience, split into a reason and 
sensibility that no longer partake of a common experience, could no longer be said to 
form a community unto himself.  The forms that drama has taken in the West since 
Aristotle --- that is to say, since the death of Greek tragedy --- testify to this two-fold 
schizophrenia. Whether social outcasts deprived of all bourgeois respectability, or stars 
and celebrities, never are actors treated as peers with their audience. And audience, 
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likewise, has always been forced to fill out one of two roles --- the critic, or the mob --- 
pure reason, or pure passion.   And never has this been worse than at present; now, actors 
no longer even appear in corporeal form and in a common space, but as celluloid 
projections and beams of light, infinitely removed from our touch, and if there are still 
real people behind these images, they are hidden behind their wealth and fame, tucked 
away in gated mansions on uncharted streets, and it is left to stalkers and lunatics to 
discover if they truly exist.7  But at the same time, the split between reason and emotion 
has become so entrenched that the popular audience is itself divided into a mob and 
critics. The critics have become a viewing population unto themselves --- a critical mob, 
as it were, and each is serviced with its own form of entertainment.  For the former, pure 
and manipulative sentimentality and affect, and for the latter, irony, self-referentiality, 
and cynical humor.  These may even be hopelessly blurred together, creating genre that 
seem to activate both functions simultaneously; never, however, is their ultimate 
sundering of these two ways of being human challenged. 
 With Aristotle, in short, drama became an institution.  This, in germ, is what his 
famous definition of tragedy amounts to; it communicates within itself as a closed 
system, and at the same time, with the outside.   Starkly opposed is drama as spectacle; 
here, the very greatest degree of abstraction is applied to isolate the dramatic action, but 
not in order to act towards the audience with particular efficiency, but rather to invoke the 
                                                          
7 It follows from this that cartoons and claymation are the only truly honest forms of modern media --- 
unlike more conventional forms, which try to hide the fact that their actors no longer confront us as 
humans, cartoons wear on their sleeve the conditions of their creation.  It should not surprise us, then, that 
of all forms of popular entertainment, they not only often command the greatest expressive range --- the 
“Peanuts” specials, for example, attained a purity and subtlety of mood unequaled by more adult formats --- 
but also have proved adept at offering sustained and genuine critique, and above all of media and 
advertising.  This is apparent to a degree even in programs aimed almost exclusively at children, such as 
“Tom and Jerry.” The endless repetition of violent scenarios expresses the nature of the fantastic, image-
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very spectacle of nature as a whole. Spectacle is not a play of costumes and stage effect, 
but the most comprehensive form of action --- action as a self-involved and absolute 
totality.  While the foundation of spectacle is, in a certain sense, ritual and magic --- 
invoking the activity of the macrocosm through an action within a microcosm --- 
spectacle itself is the product of an enlightened, scientific age. 
* 
 The third form of technique deals with nature neither as a chemical, nor as a 
physical system, but as an ecology --- a world of living creatures and the cyclical 
exchange of elements upon which they depend.  From a modern scientific perspective, 
this may seem like a rather odd grouping.  What these all have in common, however, is 
that they confront us as seemingly vital forces, coming and going, and obeying a certain 
discernable, if never entirely predictable, logic in their actions.  Animals, of course, seem 
to respond in a far more direct and predictable fashion to our actions than other natural 
forces, yet it is perhaps because of the ultimate analogy of their actions that humans tend 
to treat all of these as besouled and responsive to human initiative. 
 Because these techniques deal with vital forces, with a nature that appears 
immediately and explicitly as kind of agent akin to ourselves, and because, moreover, the 
manner of initiative depends on knowledge of how these agents will act, it is of great 
significance whether the conditions are too inert, or the action too volatile, and the 
techniques falling under this heading divide themselves up accordingly.  Belong to the 
first category is agriculture.  This confronts a nature that is too inert; seeds, for example, 
need to be properly dispersed into a field, and the earth itself properly nourished and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
created world of all media with a brutal honesty; nauseating repetitiveness is the enduring mood of a 
“virtual” world that has divorced itself from the richness and constraints of physical reality.    
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watered, in order for their active potential to be realized.  Belonging to the second are 
hunting and fishing and sheltering --- these confront a nature that is too volatile; before 
wild animals nourish us, they must be killed.  And too protect ourselves from the 
elements, and from the cold, we obtain shelters and clothing, creating, as it were, a 
further barrier between the activities within and beyond the body. 
* 
 The fourth form of technique involves the manufacture of artifacts.    Artifacts 
include not only what we ordinarily regard as tools and implements, but also clothing, 
furniture, houses, roads, and so forth --- everything, in other words, that is created 
through human initiative, from some kind of pre-existing material, and that possesses a 
real body, abiding in space and time.   
Every part of nature, as we have seen, implies a perspective of potential actions, 
the ultimate extent of which is determined by the lifespan of a given object.  Through the 
process of manufacture, different parts of nature are gathered together and transformed in 
such a way as to create a new perspective.   Ordinarily, artifacts are regarded as things 
that serve a purpose, means to some or another human end, and they are classified 
according to their use.  And indeed, we cannot deny that artifacts do normally serve 
towards some other purpose; they do not ordinarily exist for their own sake, but are 
applied towards other techniques, and not least of all the manufacture of new artifacts. 
Yet conceived in this light, they appear only in relation to “rational agency,” and not in 
their deeper political significance.  A political community, as we have seen, is not merely 
a collection of rational agents negotiating their reciprocal freedoms through contracts and 
utilizing things to serve either individual or common ends.  Rather, it is a group of people 
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who express each-others freedom, and through their freedom, --- through both language 
and outward-directed techniques --- the activity of nature as a whole.  Communal life 
circulates around a natural world that has been cultivated to provide possibilities for the 
interaction between man and nature.  This cultivation produces artifacts --- in truth, all of 
nature that surrounds a community is already thus transformed ---, and these, thus, could 
be said to provide the centers of communal political life --- new bodies, as it were, 
around which a body-politic of greater scope revolves.  To distinguish between different 
kinds of artifacts, we should ask what kind of community they serve through their 
potentials for action; how long does their particular form of organization endure, and how 
many people is it used by, and --- more generally --- in what way does it become the 
center of some form of communal activity?   
I will not try to enumerate all the subtle gradations we would discover were we to 
classify artifacts in this way, but will limit myself to a few observations.  Most 
importantly, and to begin with, we should become more clear on the need to reject what 
we might call the Aristotelian definition of an artifact --- that they are made by people 
with some end in mind.  Were we to follow this through, we would have to conclude that 
communities are logically and genetically prior to artifacts.  Through either collective or 
individual labor, the members of a community would create objects to serve pre-existent 
ends. Since only an already existing community could assign the purposes to objects, and 
these assigned purposes provide artifacts with their essence, it would be impossible for 
artifact to play an essential role in constituting a community.  Nature, as we have said, 
comes into relation with man through artifacts; through these, the human community is 
extended into nature.  If, then, a community is not simply a consequence of our created 
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nature, or ordained through the direct intervention of God, it could only have created 
itself from the labor and interactions of man towards man --- through social contracts, 
coercion, or education --- but not, in any essential way, out of the interaction of humans 
with their environment.  And if a community is to involve human freedom, then it stands 
to reason that, since, following these assumptions, it would be impossible for human to 
create something greater then themselves, something greater than what they could have 
had in mind, then freedom must simply be a given of our nature, and could not itself have 
arisen through intercourse with nature.  These Aristotelian assumptions, in other words, 
result in the isolation of human freedom and responsibility from the rest of nature.   
Before communities can create artifacts, artifacts must create communities.  The 
perspective that a new artifact allows, the possibilities that it contains, emerge only with 
its use --- they are not necessarily preordained or presaged by their creator, nor is it 
necessary that an artifact be created by a single agent --- a stone wall might be the work 
of an entire community, even spread out over generations --- or that the act of labor is in 
any way equal to the possibilities that it contains.  Through these possibilities, the artifact 
becomes the center of a certain kind of community activity.  Or as we might say, an 
artifact becomes part of the environment in which communal life takes place, and which 
indeed provides a home and niche for communal life, just as, in the end, this environment 
is itself composed of artifacts.  We do not wish to deny the role of human purposefullness 
in the making of things, but only to suggest that there is not an essential, but only a 
gradual, difference between the action of nature and the action of man in this regard.  
Natural evolution involves the creation of new environments; every species, every 
organism, creates an environment for others, just as the appearance of the earth created an 
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environment in which, ultimately, life would be possible.  But the same, we now see, may 
also be said of specifically human techniques --- these differ only in the manner in which 
they do so, and this, again, is a matter of degree and not essence.  Humans create 
environments with a view towards the possibility of a human community, and 
communities are themselves constantly at work developing and sustaining --- in a word, 
cultivating --- this possibility.  Community-building is a freely political action.  This does 
not mean that they have a certain vision of a final result in view, but only that they try, in 
every action, to preserve and build this possibility.  In this way, a community works 
towards the cultivation of stable techniques, and every deployment of technique, the 
making of every artifact, may be considered a freely political act.  Human 
purposefullness and human freedom a merely traits of a particular organization with its 
own way of doing what every organization does if it is to survive; free political 
communications are simply organizations that perpetuate freedom through freedom.   
Human purposefullness is precarious, and dark in its ways.  It does not belong 
exclusively, or even primarily, to individual agents; and it may often be quite difficult for 
people to articulate why they do things the way they do, or to what end; the purposive 
actions of a community might exist only as customs that no one can entirely justify. And 
even radical changes may emerge in just as dim fashion.  Yet this should only seem 
perplexing if we hold on to the idea that human freedom is some kind of faculty of the 
mind or universal essence of man as individual; once we realize that human freedom is 
the function of a political communicating, and that it has developed gradually as the 
development of the human species in its interaction with nature, than every glimmer of 
strangeness should disappear. There is no reason to think that freedom, as the expression 
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of a communication, would not often assume forms that are obscure to the individual.  
The idea, and ideal of “rational freedom,” --- of a human freedom that can be perfectly 
comprehended in all its implications as the essence of human nature, and then claimed as 
an individual right --- is derivative and essentially misguided, for it cannot but come into 
contradiction with itself. 
Before, we described this self-contradiction as a contradiction of logic; rational 
freedom, as a given of human nature, must have been created by a willing agent who thus 
makes it dependent on his will. On the basis of what we have just said, we may now 
begin to understand this also as a real contradiction --- seeing how, in other words, a 
community that is either itself explicitly founded on the rational conception of freedom, 
or increasingly understands itself through such a conception, will tend to evolve in 
directions that contradict its own principles. We speak here only of a tendency, and not of 
a fixed and absolute rule, but nevertheless of a tendency rooted in the inadequacy of its 
principles, and their failure to realize a true political community. It is also important to 
note that this “real contradiction” is, in a certain sense, the most basic concern of our 
entire inquiry.  To have insight into this, is to begin to know, in germ, how the world has 
become mad.  Here, however, we limit ourselves to one rather narrow dimension of the 
problem, with the hope, however to lead the way towards an illumination of the whole. 
The free rational agent, as was explained at the very beginning, is, in essence, the 
ideal consumer.  His freedom is not creative, it does not work towards new possibilities, 
but, as we might say, merely optative --- it exhausts itself in the act of choosing between 
a set of pre-given choices.  Only because of the tremendous importance attached to this 
rather paltry sort of freedom could we make sense of the bazaar idea that a society is free 
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above all when everyone has the right to vote.  Yet while this rational agent, in his 
capacity as consumer-elector, does not in any meaningful sense work towards creating an 
environment, while he does not act, either communally or individually, with an 
awareness of his communal responsibility, nevertheless a world springs up around him.  
And what a world it is!   A panoply of things appear and offer themselves at every turn.  
Wonderful in there diversity and ingenuity, none, however, could gather back to itself the 
freedom with which he chooses them; none, in other words, could equip this freedom 
with anything to equal its promise.  In each, his rational freedom finds itself reflected 
back to itself as a mere thing.  And thus, at the same time as these gratify the needs, 
desires, whims and fancies of the individual, they compromise the very reason which his 
sensibility should serve.  The artifacts, we have said, create communities; but those that 
congregate and busy themselves around freedom of choice, rather than building that 
freedom into something more, can’t even create a community equal to that freedom.  
Instead, they transform the self into an aggregate of isolated needs and desires, bumping 
about around the head like sperm in the scrotum, beside itself in expectation of the 
moment when it will couple with the one thing that would satisfy its needs.  Meanwhile, 
artifacts become ever more limited in their possibilities, ever more short-lived, tending 
towards absolute disposability --- but at the same time, each carries with it, as if a token 
of its provenance, the promise of absolute fulfillment, of absolute freedom.  And the 
more ephemeral an object is, the more noisily it screams out this promise. 
* 
Artifaction involves the transformation, through human labor, of one set of 
object-bound perspectives into another, where each perspective describes not only a set 
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of potential uses, but also the lifetime of an artifact, and thus suggests the kind of 
community that would form around it.  Because this definition involves several variables, 
it allows for a variety of different limit phenomenon.  
The first of these we have already mentioned; the disposable object.  Here both 
the outlay and the final result, and the invested labor tend towards zero, though, 
nevertheless, labor stills adds something; the perspective has increased as a result of 
manufacture.  The direct opposite of the disposable object is what we might call 
infrastructure --- roads, bridges, sea-faring craft, and the like. Here, the invested labor is 
very large, and both the usefulness and lifespan tend towards infinity, and far beyond a 
human generation.      
 Next is the aesthetic object.  These involve a tremendous investment of labor, and 
while usefulness tends towards zero, their lifespan and community-building potential 
reaches towards infinity.  In our earlier discussion, we tried to work against the notion 
that drama is a purposive activity and not a pure spectacle.  Now, turning to aesthetics, 
we must confront a similar, and similarly founded, prejudice.  This expresses itself, above 
all, through the idea that pure art must be distinguished absolutely from mere decoration 
and handiwork.  An object, simply put, cannot be servant to two masters; if it was created 
for a human purpose, it cannot be purely aesthetic.  Traditionally, this idea has taken two 
forms.   
The first, which we might call classical, starts off from a mimetic conception of 
art. The work of art, this claims, should be an imitation of nature; either it should show 
nature the way that it appears to senses (empirical), or it should somehow present the 
ideal essence of things (Platonic), or it, finally, convey nature in its very mode of activity 
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(Aristotelian). None of these, it would seem, necessarily implies conflict with the utility 
of the object; a Greek vase, for example, can present a mimetic representation on its 
surfaces, and at the same time serve hold water.  Yet the contradiction emerges in full 
force in both the act of artistic creation and its reception.  For both the former and latter 
demand an attitude of free contemplation that excludes the base interests associates with 
an object’s usefulness.  To capture either the appearance, of essence, or activity of nature, 
we must abstract away from our own interests; we must cease to regard nature as either 
good or bad for us, and experience it as it is in itself.  And similarly if we are to witness, 
as viewers, nature as it is presented through a work of art.  In either case, the freedom of 
contemplation is purely rational, and not truly political --- it exhausts itself in the absence 
of all compulsion through needs. Aesthetics, in other words, is turned into a “liberal art” -
-- or rather, gives the mold to the liberal arts as the whole; no longer an extension and 
development of the artisan’s labors, it is a pursuit of leisure and gentility --- of those who 
have been lifting off from life’s more pressing concerns.   
The second form, --- we shall call this the romantic --- regards the artwork not as 
an imitation either of nature or anything else, but as an expression of the subjectivity and 
the inner life of the artist. Just as historically this makes a later appearance, logically it 
may also be regarded as a development from the classical conception, and one that is not 
so radical as may at first seem. What is does it take the mental attitude of the artist and 
viewer, and, in effect, turn this into the object of the artwork.  Inner, rather than outer 
nature, becomes the basis of aesthetic experience.  The rational freedom that previously 
expressed itself in contemplation has itself become the immediate and direct concern, and 
thus the artist must be all the more compromising in his rejection of all instrumentality.   
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The concern however, may take two forms, which correspond perfectly with the 
two visions of human nature that, as we have shown, are both rooted in a purely 
rationalistic conception of human freedom.  In the one, the artist is called upon to express 
this to the very highest degree --- he must be a genius, or in other words, bring this 
conception to its limit, and to the point where it seems to verge on real, political 
creativity.  The name given to this limit-case of freedom is imagination; bound neither to 
imitate its object, nor arrange its material according to either logical principles or 
utilitarian concerns, imagination allows for highest possible experience of rational 
freedom; its choices are constrained merely by sensibility, alone by the fact that its 
original materials are given to it.  And at the absolute limit is intellectual intuition, where 
the material of thought is itself freely produced. Intellectual intuition indeed comes very 
close to what we mean by political, creative freedom --- for here, indeed, the most 
elemental choices are themselves produced.  Yet because this was not yet conceived of in 
evolutionary terms, because man was still conceived as created, and his freedom in 
abstraction from nature, this idea --- powerful as it was --- could not be given any 
content, and was left to flounder in its apparent absurdity and enthusiastic pretensions.   
 The other form, in contrast, seeks to present the zero degree of human freedom, 
regarding both the artist and the artwork as an expression of the absolute dependence of 
the individual on his environment. The artist becomes pathological. If before his genius 
had approached such a degree of freedom that, transcending individual subjectivity, it 
could no longer be regarded as a fully conscious activity, now, on the contrary, it is 
transformed into the tumult of unconscious and even subconscious forces.  The artist’s 
work comes to be seen as, and it turn becomes, obsessive, disturbed, guided only by the 
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soul’s hidden undulations.  No longer granted the dignity of freedom, but at most rash 
excess and inconstancy, he could neither deliberately and carefully exclude instrumental 
values through the purity of his art, nor overleap them one and all through a single bound 
of genius. Rather, the artwork is useless simply because the artist is insane    --- or, more 
likely, has contrived access to the subconscious --- and is no longer able in the act of 
creation to assign things a place within the everyday weave of human purposes.  For no 
longer is it in the artist’s power either to bar entry to merely useful objects or transfigure 
them beneath the veil of beauty, and so the things of the world return to us, torn out of the 
context that alone gave them meaning, and yet naked, exposed to the indiscretion of our 
gaze --- no longer do they seem entirely familiar to us, as they had when they passed so 
lightly through our hand while serving our needs, and in this new and strange aspect, they 
seem to raise a murmur of protest.  Indisposed of their own disposability, they sit with the 
same heaviness on the surfaces of a canvass or installation as the homeless sit on our 
streets.    
 With each of these misguided conceptions, we find that their rejection of utility, 
their need to draw an absolute distinction between the realm of art and the everyday 
world of ordinary things, stems ultimately from the inability to gain a positive conception 
of a human activity not directed towards rational, individual, conscious ends.  Unable, in 
other words, to conceive of human freedom as a truly political activity --- one that builds 
and develops communities rather realizing choices --- and yet aware nevertheless of the 
ways in which art complicates the rational model, their only choice was to conceive of 
artistic freedom simply as the negative of rational freedom, thus denying either its 
interestedness, or the limitation of its choices through receptivity, or, finally, it very 
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rationality.  Since their concept was, at origin, purely negative, it could only survive by 
contrasting itself with use-guided and rational freedom --- only by defining itself, in one 
or another of its aspects, as absolutely not that. 
* 
 A better conception of aesthetics takes it starting point from decorative art, and 
shows that even those works that seem to stand at the furthest remove from all utilitarian 
functionality differ from decoration and handiwork only by a matter of degree.  
Decoration builds itself onto useful objects, and is not, in any essential way, threatened or 
distorted by their usefulness. For it is not merely a question of changing the way a thing 
appear to the senses, making it more pleasing to the eye --- but of investing into it more 
labor than is necessary for it to perform its given function.  This is, in the very strictest 
sense, a freely political activity, for it endows things with a life beyond their mere 
functionality, beyond their station.  It transforms them into heirlooms that, handed from 
generation to generation, become the centers of a communal activity surpassing a single 
generation’s span.  Beauty or aesthetic pleasure is not the goal of decoration, but merely 
provides a receptacle for this added and seemingly needless labor; it provides a way, as it 
were, for work to cleave to things and appear as work, rather than become subsumed in 
their use.  And for this reason, above all, we should not confuse decoration with design.  
Design seeks to maximize the aesthetic qualities of a mass-produced thing against fixed 
production costs; it explicitly seeks aesthetic beauty, but limited always by the conditions 
of mass production and of the market. Reconciling these contrary demands, it has 
chanced upon the happy formulation “form follows function,” and the beauty it produces, 
following this mantra, is almost always sculpted and rounded towards geometric 
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monotony, flatness with texture, coldness and sterility --- in a word, sleek.8  It exhausts 
its possibilities in aerodynamics; here, form no longer follows or expresses, but is its 
function.  Decoration, on the other hand, tends towards the baroque, gauche, and 
tasteless; towards the overdeveloped, excessively intricate, towards strange, even 
grotesque involutions and details.  Beauty, as aesthetic pleasure, it seems, has been left 
behind in the very labor of making things costly.  
                                                          
8 A perfect analogy could be drawn between decoration and design, and the decorative clothing word by 
unmarried girls and brides of yore, Zierde and Schmuck, in the German, and the “sexy clothing” of today. 
Whereas the former – heirlooms and artifacts of great labor --- were employed to display woman as 
themselves a sort of heirloom, passed from one family to another, and, through the act of giving birth, 
founding the link between generations, the latter, on the other hand, both explicitly tries to maximizes the 
beauty of the human body and also display its utility for performing the sexual act.  This aesthetic beauty 
tends towards the same ideal as the design of products; a lack of detail, a purely formal aesthetic of curves 
and shapeliness --- ultimately, in other words, sleekness.  Of course, a measure of detail is preserved in 
make-up, with its endlessly refined palette of colors, and here, as in the manner and quality of fabrics, the 
subtle language of class distinctions and wealth sneaks in.  Yet even in cosmetics --- quite literally the 
transformation of the surface of the body into a reflection of the cosmos --- we discover a tendency away 
from the aesthetics of decoration and towards an aesthetics of design. Parts of the face are colored as if to 
illuminate surfaces, bringing out an underlying geometric symmetry and structure.   
Curiously, however, the male physical ideal --- which to a limited extent influences the female, as visa 
versa --- does depend on a sort of detail.  Namely, the male body is supposed to show off the musculature 
as vividly as possible, and so the muscles are built out until they almost want to burst out of the skin.  Such 
details, it is clear, serve only to display the utility of the body as a machine, and of a very limited kind --- 
possessing only strength, but almost no flexibility, and able only to perform the very functions, lifting, 
pulling, which these days are far better performed by real machines.   
As a result of these two ideals, the human body has been sundered into two ridiculous extremes; on the one 
hand, flexibility and sleek curvatiousness, and on the other hand, pure strength expressed through a 
grotesque excess of detail --- with every vein and even the very fabric of the muscles rippling beneath the 
skin.  It is as if the human body, split off into caricatures of the male and female, has been transformed into 
the visual demonstration of a machine -- a technology – and with only one purpose; the sexual act.  Its 
different functions have been separated, and no longer present themselves through a fluid interaction, but, 
as it were, in a linear sequence. Strength feeds into flexibility as a piston turning a system of gears --- the 
act of copulation is merely the moment in which the entire machine comes into operation.  
The aesthetics of the motorcycle is the perfect counterpart to the contemporary ideals of male and female 
beauty.  Unlike an automobile, which is sleek to the outside, but conceals its motor --- its own musculature 
--- beneath the hood, the motorcycle exhibits an aerodynamic, even flexible form, with a sumptuously 
curvy body and a visible join, while at the same time its motor and gears are in large part visible.  Its 
actions as a vehicle follow directly and visibly from the motions of its body; it turns because its torso is 
twisted, it moves because its gears turn.  In this way, it approaches the human, or animal, body, whose 
movements in space are expressed throughout the body as a whole, and not through the restricted motion of 
a certain part.  Yet like a machine, its operations are nevertheless divided up --- the production of power, 
steering, and continuing in motion are all separate actions.  
This might explain the mystique of the motorcycle; almost universally acclaimed to be sexiest of all man-
made objects, it is the visual realization of the “iron horse” we were promised at the beginning of the 
industrial age.  
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 But let us disabuse ourselves of the very notion that beauty is first of all 
something experienced by the individual, that the beautiful object, by properly 
stimulating the senses, produces an aesthetic pleasure.  For beauty is, first of all, just this 
overgrowth of detail, and in essence has nothing to do with the harmony and happy 
proportions perceived through the eyes and the ears.  This definition applies to both the 
beauty of nature and of artifacts, but it also allows us to properly grasp their difference.  
Nature – and this should be clear to anyone who has opened their eyes or ears at least 
once – is almost endlessly detailed; the simplest insect possesses a complexity that 
exceeds the finest craftsmanship.  Look where you will --- new details open themselves 
up.  It would be impossible for us to remember, or record, even the smallest sliver of 
these --- for nature is always surprising us.  Yet the details that we see before our eyes are 
only the superficial semblance of those that are to be discovered in its workings.  In their 
totality, these details express all of nature as an evolutionary system; evolution is, as it 
were, nothing less than their creation and sustenance. This applies to the first beginnings 
of the universe --- the galaxies and stars are nebulae scattered through the night sky, spat 
out from the big bang --- and to its physical and composition, but above all, to organic 
life. Nature is always and everywhere at work --- since every part is an expression of 
the whole, is interwoven into its fabric, nothing could be said to be inert; from the 
perspective of totality, there is no mere potentiality.  This is simply to stress, once more, 
that the activity of nature does not take the form of human agency, it is not the activity of 
things working against each other, each with its own agenda, but is purely relational, 
defused over the entire system.  One can only speak, therefore, of different organizations 
that draw together the activity of their infinitesimally divisible parts into expressions of 
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agency that are greater or lesser relative to each other.   By building and maintaining 
stability and expressing nature through a certain recurrent circulation, these organizations 
preserve details, and thus allow for the system of nature as a whole to be built out in ever 
more detail. This is what we mean by evolution, using this term both for inorganic and 
organic processes --- indeed for all natural processes. Every higher form of evolution is 
akin to a new language, which, with an even greater capacity to preserve details --- as we 
see quite clearly, if, for example, we were to compare inorganic chemistry, organic 
chemistry, and genetics --- allows for a new, and even greater and more infinitely refined 
accumulation of details to take place.  
 Compare, then, the activity of nature with that of the artisan.  Techniques, as we 
have stressed, are extensions of somatic language; the artisan not only makes artifacts 
through a transformative labor, but he must do so, specifically, through his body, and by 
applying its movements, with or without the mediation of tools, to raw materials. In 
nearly every case, and always if the artifact is to be decorous, this requires investing it 
with details, and thus demands a refined movement of the body.  For most people, such 
refined movement comes easiest to the hands, and more easily to one hand than another; -
-- and while the entire musculature, and even sometimes our breathing, comes into play 
in the artisan’s labors, it is primarily through the hands that the material is manipulated, 
and subtlety and refinement achieved.  Artisanship is thus handiwork or handicraft, 
human force and strength channeled through the hands.   
 Thus concentrated into a single part of the body --- the hands ---, which, working 
together, can’t normally do two things at once, the labor of the artisan towards his 
material must assume a linear form; it can be divided into a sequence of steps that, 
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executed in the proper order, yield the desired product.  Or rather, labor, in essence, is 
just this --- a serial activity towards a material that is different than us, and offers only 
passive resistance, neither speaking up against us our acting out, but being, at worst, 
stubborn.  Because labor produces detail through a series of steps, each of which takes 
time, no matter how efficient an artisan becomes relative to others in his guild, there 
remains a direct correlation between the time expended on labor and the quality of the 
final work.  This helps explain decoration as a political act.  The excessive labor-time 
invested in an artifact becomes the seed around which an enduring community builds. 
 The opposite of work is play, and together these constitute the two poles of 
somatic language, as indeed of all human activity.  In play, the body is not constrained to 
a serial activity, but is simultaneously active in all its parts, and through them.  Play is not 
without details, but these appear simultaneously through our movements, in a reciprocal 
relation to others, and without even being crystallized into an object.  Between play and 
work are many forms, and it is perhaps, indeed, only in extreme cases that they appear in 
any sort of pure opposition.  We shall now describe these is some detail, in order to give a 
fuller sense for the range of somatic language, and the complexities of the human relation 
to detail. 
* 
 These fall into two categories.  The first includes sports, games, and toys.  The 
second: video games, musical instruments, singing and dance.  The former tend from play 
towards work, the latter from work towards play --- and thus all together, and in the given 
sequence, they describe a circle that begins and ends with play. 
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Sports, to begin, are a form of play that involves both a full and simultaneous 
range of bodily movement, and reciprocal interaction, but nevertheless works towards a 
product different than the activity, --- the score.  The score expresses the activity itself, 
the simultaneous and reciprocal movement of bodies, the playing of a game, as a 
sequence of events unfolding in a linear sequence of time and adding up to a numerical 
result.  Since scoring proceeds through abstraction, it tends to develop towards essentially 
institutional forms --- the use of referees and precise timing devices, for example, or ever 
more elaborate systems of rules --- while the result itself, the product of this abstraction, 
is a sort of deficient artifact, possessing almost absolute permanence, yet expressing few 
details, --- only those that can assume the form of statistics.  
This suggests a peculiar contradiction that we discover wherever sports are played 
and enjoyed.  Details are absolute necessary, the very substance of the game; athletes 
must not only possess certain physical attributes, but, above all, an extraordinary 
attentiveness to their bodies and to every nuance of a situation unfolding in time --- they 
are expected to be able to “read defenses,” “read offences,” or anticipate a pitch before 
the ball has left the hand.   Yet these same details are also, in the end, rendered 
meaningless, dissolved into the finality of the score.  Nowhere, however, is this 
contradiction clearer than in the two mutually opposed founding principles; “Winning is 
everything,” and “Its not whether you win or loose, but how you play the game.”    
A game is simply a sport without play.  The full, free, playful movement of the 
body is replaced by a linear series of action, performed either through the action of the 
hand, or through some other signifier.  Games involve either reciprocal human agency, or 
some kind of medium that, involving randomness, surprises us, or some combination of 
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both.  There are also some games involving the reciprocal manipulation of a merely 
passive medium --- players are supposed to stack blocks until they fall over, or extract a 
tiny object from a hole with prongs without touching the sides.  In these, details of 
physical movement play an important role, but otherwise the physical actions and 
physical representation (the deck of cards and the actions of play, or the chess board and 
the movement of pieces) merely signify an already abstract content, expressible through a 
finite number of variables. And thus there is no need to translate from the action to the 
result through some kind of institutional procedure; the action is already the result, and 
nothing could happen that is not of direct consequence to the final outcome.  Games of 
this sort are not only capable of being represented perfectly by computers, but, moreover, 
since the game can always be expressed through a finite number of variables, their play is 
always reducible to a mathematical problem, and with sufficient computing power, it 
would be possible outdo even the best human opponents.  
While sports and games produce a result, they remain otherwise aloof from the 
practical concerns of everyday life. If their particular forms of activity imitate anything, 
they imitate war, which does not belong within, but rather at the limit of, the quotidian.  
But they do not, in general, follow the model of any of the forms of technique that we 
have mentioned, and least of all handicrafts. Toys, on the other hand, turn play into an 
imitation of work, either by offering miniaturized versions of the things that are the 
concern of everyday life --- babies, houses, cars, trucks, machines, and the like --- or by 
allowing the handcraft of actual things, either ephemeral or enduring.  In this way, they 
institute a form of play that is, at once, both real and symbolic.  For on the one hand, it 
involves either the entire movement of the body, or a subtler, concentrated manual 
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dexterity, and, in this way, invests the play world with endless details.  Toy-play has no 
need for rules that give order and coherence to games and sports, but rather builds up 
around scenarios where the individual details of a given situation or object an almost 
endless source of fascination and interest to the participants.  A tea party plays out the 
subtleties of etiquette, dolls and doll-houses acquire the decorations that give substance to 
domestic life, a train set or sand lot becomes a microcosm of human productivity.  A herd 
of stuffed animals shows off the animal kingdom in its wonderful diversity of shapes and 
colors.   Yet at the same time toys remain symbols of something else, and thus these 
details not only fascinate in their own right, but acquire as special, almost magical 
significance. Through these details, the things themselves seem present before the child’s 
hand, at its grasp --- they allow the first contact with the world that had been promised 
them.    
 Perhaps, at their limit, toys would allow not merely for the imitation of human 
labor, but of nature in its spectacle.  Play, having become work, would again become 
play.  Here, perhaps, we find the marionette theater --- the most involved, intricate, 
worked out kind of toy, but also the most playful.  Thus within the world of toys we 
would find, in miniature, the very same trajectory that, picking up the thread of our 
discussion, we will continue now to describe. 
* 
  Because they do not involve the simultaneous movements of the body, games do 
not, of necessity, take place in “real time.” Time limits, if they are invoked, concern 
processes that, strictly, take place entirely outside of the game itself; the strategic 
thinking of a chess player, for example, between moves.  This suggests that video games 
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should not be understood as pure games, but rather as a strange fusion of a sport, a game, 
and a handicraft. For they take place in real time, yet not through the immediate and 
reciprocal interaction of real bodies, but instead require the translation of refined hand 
motions into the purely symbolic medium of the computer, and then back into a real time 
video image.  In this translation, the original details of the movement are lost --- they are 
represented through variables of a limited range.  Yet manipulating these according to a 
fixed rule, the video game builds a finitely detailed world around them, limited only by 
the speed of the microprocessor and the resolution of the screen.    
The skeleton of every sport, we could say, is a game; if a sport involves coherent 
rules, and does not depend on some form of qualitative judgment, it must be possible to 
represent it through a purely symbolic medium, without relation to real bodies.  Video-
games reconstruct this skeleton back into something approximating a sport.9   
Musical instruments also translate a concentrated somatic movement—a 
movement of the body that is focused in certain parts and does not express its movement 
as a whole—into a real time event.  Yet they do not result in any loss of the detail of 
these movements, but instead make even the slightest difference, so slight as to be 
imperceptible to the eye, manifest to the untrained ear.  In the very process of translating 
a physical action into an acoustic event, they amplify the language of the body; the 
subtlest gradations of grace, of touch and rhythm seem to come alive in the texture of 
sounds.  And just as there is a ranking of instrumentalists, so also there is a ranking of the 
different instruments, according to their sensitivity to the movements of their player.  All 
                                                          
9 The speed of microprocessors itself increases as the circuit boards become ever finer in their details.  In 
this way, video games provide a visual representation of technological advances that have become part of 
our everyday life. Progress, nowadays, is felt through Moore’s law --- history, in the age of virtual reality    
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instruments are extraordinarily sensitive, though some even more so than others, and with 
the strings, tremendous skill is required simply to produce a sound that it not hideous. 
And so with the violin – the most sensitive of all—a detailed hierarchy emerges even 
among individual instruments, and the first among these have become household names.   
Arranged after their sensitivity, suppleness, and expressive range, with pride of 
place given to the violins, the panoply of musical instruments, --- as varied and peculiar 
in their qualities as the animals of Noah’s ark, --- assemble to become an orchestra.  
Almost inconceivable is the amount of human labor that has been gathered here.  Every 
instrument is the work of the finest craftsmanship; they draw together the diverse stuff of 
nature --- metals both noble and base, woods, reeds, the skin and guts of animals, ivory 
from elephants tusks, resin --- and not for the sake of mere decoration.  For they don’t 
simple show off the surface of things --- absorbing, reflecting, and transmitting light --- 
but allow density and constitution of the material itself to resonate, to ring true.  Each 
musician has dedicated his life to the proper play of the instrument; his life has become a 
love towards a thing, the infinite task of coaxing every nuance of potential contained in 
its materials.   And finally, there is the composition itself, which expresses not merely the 
work as an individual act of creation, but the entire labor of the history of music, of the 
unfolding of its system of harmonic relation towards the limit of tonality, --- and even 
past these limits --- of ever greater complexities of rhythm and orchestration;  a detail and 
expressiveness that could only work itself out slowly, building up like a Gothic cathedral. 
The principle violinist rises, the players tune their instruments, the conductor 
takes his stand, and, suddenly, all this detail, like the agitated vapors of a storm cloud, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
--- is punctuated every 18 months by the doubly of processor speed.  Through video games, we see our 
world unfold.  
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bursts into life, and just as a lightening bolt’s path reflects the earth that draws away its 
energy, so the music conducts itself through his hands or his baton, and shapes itself after 
their every nuance, unfolding the qualities of movement into rhythm.  Rhythm is the 
confluence of details into the simultaneity of “play time,” and it is here, above all, that 
the conductor must prove master; if the first violinist allows the orchestra to agree on the 
subtle question of pitch --- all harmony, of coarse, depends on this --- the conductor, on 
the other hand, invokes all towards a common meter. In this way, he stands at the very 
limit of artisanship; unlike the musicians, whose play is concentrated in certain parts of 
their body, he conducts through his entire body --- his hands and his baton, indeed, are 
only at the periphery, but every movement, from heaving his torso to winking his eye, 
becomes significant. His gestures no longer suggest the peculiar stuff and shape of a 
particular instrument, but rather the sonorous possibilities of the entire orchestra, freed of 
all trace of the mechanical awkwardness that mars even the most accomplished violinist.  
Yet nevertheless, like a craftsman, he acts towards a medium outside of himself,  --- 
though only playfully, since its product remains always ephemeral.  
The conductor, we might say, is the opposite of the referee. For rather than taking 
play and transforming it into a score, he takes a composition, --- a score --- written down 
in an abstract symbolic medium, and with only a few, peripheral qualitative descriptions -
-- in other words, something which in large part could be interpreted by a computer and 
manipulated according to a set rule --- and transforms this into play.  And in doing this, 
he becomes almost a dancer.  Fixed to the dais between the audience and the musicians, 
only this steadfastness binds his movements, keeps him from leaping, evaporating into 
the music. And so the theater remains a workplace, is not yet a stage.    
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The orchestra recreates the spectacle of nature; not that it would paint tableaus of 
a spring day or a summer storm, producing their individual features one by one. Rather, it 
makes manifest its quickening. Like a lightening rod, it draws the silent workings of 
nature, channeled through the craftsman’s labor and the musician’s cultivations, towards 
a single instance where it explodes before ear and eye.  Yet this activity, and this 
spectacle, remains lopsided; it is of a nature that has only been worked over by man and 
that works against him, that agitates and is agitated, but that does not yet interact with us.  
Nature has not yet been spoken to, and it does not yet speak to us; it has not yet been 
suffused with human language. Instrumental solos, to an extent, work to overcome this 
limitation, adding a more lyric quality, but no instrument is able to form musical tones 
into the articulated textures of spoken language.  Music remains murmuring.10   
 The nature and cause of this articulateness allows for very precise formulation; it 
is not merely a subjective observation.  Music, as already stated, develops from a purely 
abstract musical representation towards an event that takes place in the flow of time.  The 
representational system itself is quite simple; a key signature, the indication of the 
rhythmic division, and individual notes, each representing a certain position on the scale 
as well as a duration relative to the rhythmic unit.  Music is composed by the 
simultaneous and subsequent combination of notes and rests, and even in the simplest 
case, a melody of whole notes played by a single instrument within a single seven-tone 
scale and without raising or falling an octave, the possibilities that emerge increase by 
powers of seven with each note, and soon become unfathomable.  A single measure of 
orchestral music, with numerous instruments playing together, and several simultaneous 
                                                          
10 The Jazz trumpet, when played with a muffler (?), comes closest to overcoming this limitation, imitating, 
effect, approximating the stopping motion of the lips. And Jazz, in general, seems to come closest to a 
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melodic lines, allows for absolutely unimaginable, bewildering detail. Thus the listener 
finds himself constantly startled with surprises.  While he is able to gather these together 
into a coherent experience, and is reminded of them when they return, and while they 
always seem, in a way, familiar, even when they are thoroughly unheard-of, he is never 
able to keep pace with what happens --- the music rushes him along, and if he is able to 
describe anything that happened through words, it is only in a limited way, and only 
either through vague metaphors or through the precise terminology of the musician.   
The experience of instrumental music is restless; it does not give the mind a 
chance to consciously recollect it as it proceeds, but tears us along.  And this is so for the 
very reason that, between its simplest elements --- individual notes --- and its overarching 
structure --- key changes and compositional forms --- it does not articulate itself into units 
of a middling complexity that, without preserving every detail, could reconstruct the 
whole.  At best, one could blur these details together, as when one whistles a simplified 
version of a tune one has heard.  But there is no natural division that gives us a handle on 
things; it is without steps, moves, or words.   
Human language, as we have seen, is of a double nature, and thus this 
inarticulateness is itself overcome in two very different ways. First, through singing.  The 
singing voice is richer in overtones than any instrument, and has an expressive range that 
suggests the possibilities of each --- it can be flowing or percussive, pure like a flute or 
gritty like a trumpet, shrill or soothing.  Yet even the simplest voice, untrained and 
unversatile, gives music an articulation that it could never achieve on its own.  For if the 
orchestra is like a storm cloud, and the audience, a lightening rod, the words of music are 
capacitors.  Concentrating the discharged energy around themselves and releasing it in a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
dialogical, conversational form, through the freely improvised interaction of its solos.   
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purely linear, no longer simultaneous, sequence, they make the music comprehensible. 
For the first time, we have a hold on it.   
This is both the strength of lyrics, and their liability. Since it involves the linear 
arrangement of pre-given material, and since it is concentrated in a certain bodily organ, 
speech is itself a form of handicraft. Words, as we will explore in more detail, are among 
the limit cases of artifaction. Without getting ahead of ourselves, let it suffice to mention 
that, while a word-language, no less than absolute music, is playful in its details, this 
playfulness takes different form.  Both do, indeed, share similar potentials for expressive 
phrasing, intonation, accent, and so forth, and both allow for playful interaction across 
the linear dimension.  But unlike music, speech tends away from simultaneity.  Our 
minds, largely incapable of processing more than one extended sequence of words at any 
given moment, wouldn’t allow two simultaneous but contrary voices to harmonize.  
Instead, they could only babble.  Nor could music possess anything like the “meaning” of 
speech --- any attempt to provide a one-to-one correspondence between musical events 
and human “meanings” ends in absurdities.   For these reasons, it is impossible to 
translate the perfectly playful detail from speech to music, or from music to speech. It is 
not only that there is no mechanical rule that we might apply, --- this would be 
impossible in any case, --- but that every attempt at a translation, regardless of which 
direction it moves, will prove reductive.  It is as if one were to project a triangle from a 
sphere onto a plane, or from a plane onto a sphere.  
Dance does not face this same limitation. For as we have already explained, ballet 
cultivates the body towards an infinitely refined expressiveness, and while this 
expressiveness is articulated into steps, it nevertheless allows for infinitely subtle 
 120
gradations of simultaneous detail, and thus the perfect representation of rhythmic flow.  
In other words, while it articulates music and gives it hold, there is no formal obstacle to 
the perfect expression of its every detail. This does not mean that a dance could be 
recorded as music, or music as dance, and that we could perfectly reconstruct one from 
the other, but only that may appear as perfectly equal partners, neither forcing the other, 
and neither inattentive; ever step, as it were, becomes a pas de deux.11 
Practically the first thing a beginning student is told is to “make the foot as 
articulate as the hand”  --- a simple thought, an infinite task.  For it demands nothing less 
than that we cultivate the body away from its natural one-sidedness, overcoming the 
lopsidedness that concentrates its subtlety in the dexterity of a single limb.  The step, the 
movement of the entire body, must become as articulate and expressive as the hand; the 
pas becomes word.   
The dancer labors to develop his body towards this ideal, struggling against an 
element that would constantly return to its former state.  This work could never be 
finished, since it works against a condition that is both innate and ever confirmed by the 
tedium of the everyday.  Man, indeed, became lopsided as soon as he stood erect and 
applied his opposable thumbs in labor towards the world.  It became his fate; at his hands, 
he has built up his world, enticing the secrets away from nature, unlocking its gems and 
minerals. And at his hands, perhaps, this world will perish. His hands are able to imitate 
nature in all its details, reproducing its finery, but, in the end, all his handiwork is uneven 
with an unevenness that presses through all that we have made for ourselves. One-sided 
                                                          
11 This point is rather subtle, and might require a good deal more explanation.  There is neither a one-to-one 
equivalence between musical events and dance events, nor any sort of mechanical rule of translation , but 
formal analogy, a harmony of mediums, understood by the dancers and choreographers, and felt by the 
audience.  
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in its action towards nature as well as its relation to our own body, all human agency, if it 
models itself after handicraft, is lopsided, and thus becomes laborious, tedious, and dull.  
Even spoken language, concentrated in the voice, is an expression of this --- and if 
singing makes the voice more sonorous and rich by transforming the entire body cavity 
into an instrument, ballet goes further. Just as the foot becomes as articulate as the hand, 
so the entire body as articulate as the voice --- and thus, the expressiveness even of 
language is no longer focused at a single point, but spread evenly over our entire skin.  
The body is not only perfected as instrument, but its very instrumentality is overcome --- 
it becomes playful, pliant.  The playful body is alone able to express nature in its 
reciprocation with human activity, transforming the infinitely rich details of music into 
the details of a movement suffused through with human language, and thus recreating not 
simply mere nature, but the world’s spectacle.  If man became one sided when he stood 
erect, the dancer’s comportment, perfectly balanced and centered, with feet become 
hands, the entire body, indeed, a single, no longer lopsided, hand, approaches divinity, … 
nature as a whole.   
* 
Nature, or God works playfully, its work is play and its play work.  It allows no 
difference between the two, for its details are produced through a perfectly playfully 
activity, diffused equally throughout.  Man, on the other hand, either works or plays, but 
cannot do both at the same time.  There are, indeed, techniques, such as hunting, 
gathering, even agriculture, which lie between the two extremes, and it is also possible to 
mix to two. And, on the other hand, the performance of music or dance creates a world of 
tremendous detail before the eyes and ears of the audience --- yet this world is ephemeral, 
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it cannot survive the moment. As soon as man invests things with detail by his hands, and 
so gives these details an enduring home, his body must be still and its forces 
concentrated; he can no longer be at play. Thus: to speak of the playful work of nature is 
not to force it into the mold of human agency, but to burst this mold open.  Formulated in 
the terms of ordinary language, it points beyond its limits, towards an activity that 
belongs to rigorous science to describe and understand. 
Because our work is never truly playful, the fruits of the artisan’s labor will 
always appear labored and artificial; belabored, in a word. The time invested in them sits 
heavy on their surface, for it appears to us, through every detail, as labor --- we touch 
them, and it is as if we had touched time itself. Like words penned on a scroll, the time of 
its making unfolds before us. To an extent, this tedium disappears when we put things to 
use --- but then we fear ruining what had been so carefully wrought.  So the decorous 
thing sits alone, and oppresses us; or sinking into the king’s skull, or resting in his hand, 
becomes the very token of a top-heavy, oppressive politics.   
Thus the artisan, as a political creature, faces a peculiar kind of dilemma.  To 
create the things of value that would become the centers of communal life is, at the same 
time, to make life tedious, and politics oppressive.  And the more that an object’s artifice 
outweighs its utility, the more pressing this dilemma becomes.  
His answer?  To approach nature not only in its details, but in the arrangement of 
these details.  Let us explain. 
* 
Because nature produces its unfathomable subtleties through a playful activity, 
spread evenly throughout, these details could never appear tedious, and do not weary the 
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eye.  No longer are we able to read off the sequence of its construction from the finished 
project, and thus, it would not expose itself as a certain duration of linear work-time.  
Instead, the natural object --- as indeed all of nature --- appears to be built up of details 
from the inside, through an activity, which, while it still takes time, is simultaneous rather 
than serial, taking place everywhere all at once.  We discover this at every level of natural 
organization; from the interaction of gravitational and electromagnetic forces, to 
mechanics of fluids, to the formation of crystallization and other chemical processes, and 
geological formations, and organic life, and, above all, in the operation of the ecosystem 
as a whole.   
The activity of nature, in other words, is always circular, is always a circulation.  
Circulation is nothing else than a non-lopsided relation.  The simplest form of a 
circulation involves relatively discreet elements in a reciprocal relation, where each acts 
on the other simultaneously; the orbit of one heavy body around another, or of the 
electrons around the nuclear kernel, or even a more static relation --- the two protons in a 
Helium nucleus, for example.  Thus, even the matter within a single unmoving heavy 
body is in circulation with itself, in so far as all of the gravitational forces emanating 
from its different relative parts all mutually interact.  The simplest physical expression of 
this is the notion of the center of gravity; only because all the forces are in a mutual 
relation can they be thought to act out of a single point, thus allowing the force exerted by 
a body against other bodies to be described as a vector. Complex systems involve ever 
more subtle forms of this reciprocal action, but they remain circulations.   
Circulation, in other words, involves an originally non-linear temporality.  This is 
not to deny that natural processes also take place within a linear temporality, and may be 
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described as a sequence of actions, as if they had been performed by a demiurge.  
Physics, for example, might describe the collision of billiard balls as a chain of events; a 
chemist divides the synthesis of a complex compound into a series of smaller processes.  
The biologist might speak of the genesis of the fetus as a sequence of stages. And the 
geologist, examining a cross-section of earth, lists in order the different processes that led 
to its formation.  And even the earth and all its unique manifestations of life have their 
own natural history, as likewise, cosmology traces the development of the universe from 
its first beginnings.   But in every case, the linear time only develops out of a circular 
time and a circular activity.  The zugleich precedes the nacheinander. 
* 
This is what we mean by play-time.  If we experience time as fundamentally 
linear, as a chain of now-moments, with effect always following cause, it is because we 
model time after the work of the craftsman, who orients himself in the world through 
handicraft, applying his force to things through his hands.  Opposite the artisan, we saw, 
is the dancer.  Preserving his center of gravity, and allowing an infinity of detail, his 
steps, each in essence circular, link together into a sequence that always remains a 
circulation, cycling back to the same position in space, and never in the end proceeding 
forwards.  He does not direct himself towards a world, not even through his whole body 
(as we might say of the conductor, who remains always firm in his orientation); but a 
world unfolds out of his body.  History and a  purely linear temporality, if they appear at 
all, only emerge at his extremities. 
The emblem of the work-time of the everyday is  spinning and cutting 
human lives, --- curious, indeed, that the gods would mortalize men through such a 
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common handiwork. In contrast, the emblem of play-time, we might say, might be a cross 
section of tree. Every new layer of growth gradually encircles the last, together creating 
the weave through which the vital juices circulate. Together, these record a natural 
history; the passage and strength of the seasons, times of drought and times of growth.  
They build outwards into a linear sequence, but one that radiates out in every direction, 
and that only a narrowed perspective could make appear lopsided. The linear sequence, in 
other words, is always a diameter; it cross-measures what has formed itself circularly 
through circular activity, and thus marks out its circulations as a chain of events.  And 
this diameter could only appear through a cross section; it presupposes the dissection of 
the tree, and thus its death.12   
The time we experience in our workaday world is itself, perhaps, but the cross-
measure of nature. But we could also say the same of the time of animals; for man is 
unique only in the detail of his labors and the degree to which they have refashioned his 
world, but all animal life, nay, all life, even all partial organization, is lopsided and 
laborious.   Least so, perhaps, the one-cell and asexual organism, which communicates 
with the outside through a spherical wall, and less so the plant, which branches out both 
into the soil and into the air, like a thread frayed at both ends, absorbing sun light and 
respiring through all its leaves, and sucking up nutrients and water through its roots, and 
reproducing not by seeking out its mate, but simply by dispersing its pollen (?) and seeds.  
Yet as soon as animals acquire digestive tracts and movement, their lopsidedness became 
of a different order.  For their inputs and outputs are now not only divided, but  
concentrated at two ends --- the mouth and the ass.  Life became a matter of ever moving 
towards food and away from shit; it became tedious 
                                                          
12 Foot Dilthey. 
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Perhaps this is why the earthworm, the most useful of animals --- for it does 
nothing less than transform the remains of death into the conditions of life --- disgusts us, 
and seems to forbode our mortality.  Its form, with two orifices, functionally distinct and 
yet scarcely discernable to the eye, is the simplest representation of what we are and of 
our origin, yet seems even to confuse the very distinction upon which all our activity is 
founded.  Jerking itself across the wet pavement with a motion that confuses means and 
end --- the mouth, for which it moves, is itself the source of motion --- we see never more 
clearly the tedium that belongs to all earth-bound life.   
And this might also explain why the snake is the most sinister, and the most wise. 
His entire body is a single vector that focuses itself in the mouth and fangs towards which 
it points; thus he exemplifies the cunning that orients us in the world as we pursue our 
needs.  Perfectly sleek (his shape reproduces itself throughout the modern words; in 
hoses, wires, trains, even the Boeing 747, which looks rather like a winged snake), it’s 
body seem to know no leisure or fat or play --- it is but one muscle joining its ends, and 
expresses only its ceaseless labor. It body is always taught, never in repose.  If it rests, it 
is only in a coil, returning to a form that, almost perfectly symmetrical, approaches the 
effortless circulation of the inorganic.  Only because the snake’s purpose appears in such 
purity, stripped of all fat and of every tangential line, could it also have become a symbol 
of eternity.  Biting its tail, its own singular orientation comes to contradict itself. In this 
way, it expresses a linear infinity that has been bent back upon itself; the paradoxical 
grasp of eternity that becomes necessary when the action of nature is conceived after 
man’s labor.     
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Nature, as a whole, is perfect.  Every part of nature, every partial perspective, 
however, is not only a circulation, as we have said, but now, as we see, a lopsided 
circulation. For as much detail as it contains and brings into commerce and circulation, its 
activity is only part of the whole. Every such perspective is, as it were, a cross-section 
through which the time of nature becomes lopsided, straightened out into a linear 
sequence.  Human activity, oriented around our lopsided manual dexterity, is only the 
outermost natural expression of linear time, the straightest bisection that nature gives of 
itself as it evolves ever more narrow yet detailed perspectives on its own activity. 
If the individual organism is thus always a rectification of nature’s circulation, 
political activity, at every level, is its restoration.  Political activity simply accomplishes 
the strange interaction between lopsidedness and symmetry that is the universe.  Every 
organism is political in so far as it participates in the ecology of the earth, or even of the 
entire universe, the most perfect , and thus partakes of the circulation of the whole, 
through which all the partial activities, the partial perspectives of the activity of the 
whole, are brought back into relation.  Man’s true freely political activity is no different; 
as we have suggested, it begins with problem of waste disposal, and through language, 
both somatic and wordy, and through his techniques, which bring him into a real relation 
with the activity of nature, it comes to express and reconcile ever greater natural 
communities.  Since the circulations of nature extend in both time and space, this requires 
founding communities that express every greater temporal perspectives. At its limit, 
man’s truly free political activity grasps what we might call eternity, the action of the 
universe in its perfection, or, indeed, true religion --- the extension of human community 
to the absolute.  This explains the significance of artisanship, which makes the tools that 
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allow him to touch nature in new ways and with new efficiency, --- extending the reach 
of his hand, as it were ---, and above all, of decoration. For, as we have seen, it is through 
the decorative arts, by investing surplus labor into objects, that man seeds the long times 
of political life.  
Yet even as the temporal frame of the community is in this way extended towards 
infinity, the very fact that it appears to us as human labor makes its time appear all the 
more lopsided, all the less capable of grasping the true circulation of nature as a whole.  
If the decorous object should become the foundation of politics, it will be a top-heavy 
politics; the king or leader will appear as the center of all activity, the entire mass of 
communal labor will rectify itself into a single vector of regal might.  And if the decorous 
object --- a temple or tabernacle --- should become the foundation of religion, it could 
only be a top-heavy religion, in which God appears as a craftsman, having created the 
world of his own labor and separate from himself, and in which it becomes ever more 
impossible to assign any true efficacy to the work of men as men.   
This infinity, in all its glory as the outermost expression of man’s labor, must be 
curved back into eternity, expressing nature not only as the most perfect creation, but as 
absolute self-creation, as complete, fully-filled and, thus, full-filled.  The decorous object 
must become a work of art, and the craftsman create an object in which details appear as 
if they had come forth from the object itself.  They must not appear worked in and 
belabored, but as if they came emerged playfully and of their own accord, having 
developed to just the point that suits their nature.  Thus far, we have spoken of the 
circular action of nature in terms that assume the advances of modern science; but these 
same natural processes, and hard as they are to discern through the fog of ordinary 
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language, show themselves through visual traits that can be registered, if not always 
articulated, by anyone. Owing to these traits, the things of nature have always seemed to 
be of a different order than man-made artifacts, even if man neither assumed a 
sentimental attitude towards them, nor had the slightest inkling why this might be so.  Of 
these, let us restrict our discussion to two, which might be considered the most 
fundamental.  
The first of these is the way that nature curves.  Neither wholly predictable like 
the precise geometric figures of the craftsman, nor chaotic, like the random squiggle, the 
curves of nature seem to possess a subtlety and flowing detail that defies description and 
challenges even the most cultivated hand.  Smooth, but not sleek, but seem rather to 
possess a luxuriant fullness and grace.   Rather than being constructed from a simple 
generative procedure, as are the point, line, and circle --- the basis of Euclidean geometry 
---, their patterns arise as tendencies from interaction of infinite detail. The river winds in 
an ever-changing pattern, for example, because the earth, with its multitude of grains, 
offers resistance to the downward flow of water and sediment.   
Dance becomes flowing through the step, music through rhythm, and poetry 
through the meter. The fine arts, on the other hand, flow forth from the stroke.  If the 
artisan’s labor tends to divides itself between the heavy work of the arms, beating metal 
into shape, stretching out hides, and the fine work of the fingers, sewing, spinning and 
weaving, the artist unifies both the fingers and the arms into a single, graceful, motion.  
In this way, through combined action of all the six joints the runs from his shoulder blade 
to each finger tip, through, indeed, the entire body engaged at once, he is able to replicate 
the subtle curves of nature.  And while the artisan’s tools tend either to be blunt or 
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pointed, the painter’s brush is itself made of hairs that, delicately curling as they are 
pressed, impress carefully articulated streams of paint unto the canvass.  
Second is the way that nature colors.  Light, reaching us directly from the sun or 
reflected off of the moon, its beams filtered through the atmosphere in its countless 
permutations, or emitted from heat and conflagration, shows of nature’s surfaces through 
a varied and splendid display of hues and shades.  A single surface shows the most 
unfathomable variation, with colors either passing over into each other through variations 
so subtle they cannot be discerned, or standing in a stark and strange contrast.  Yet 
however slight or rash their juxtaposition, two colors need no other reason to touch then 
the very fact of their juxtaposition.   It is as if, sitting atop the world of natural bodies and 
artifacts is another world, and with another law.  With ease, our language reaches out 
towards things and events. It gives them names and explains how they act against each 
other.  But though colors help us discern and name things as the things that they are, our 
words touch them but crassly. Scarcely infusing them with the form of agency that it 
elsewhere imposes on the world, it leaves them to exist and converse among each other 
on their own terms, and in their own way. And in these interactions, colors know nothing 
of the limits that divide the world of things against itself.  For while men march against 
each other under banners of different hue, and even the animal kingdom has its shields 
and insignia, colors themselves know only peace.  Each becomes the other through a 
continuum of gradations, and associates happily with its every kin. If colors clash, it is 
only in relation to a particular thing, within a perspective limited through worldly things; 
they seem not both to belong on the same face or body, or in the same room, or even in 
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the same landscape.  In other words, only because we ask of them that they reflect the 
differences in the world that we discover and give names to.   
If the painter approximates the nature’s curves through the form of his stroke, he 
approaches its colors through the material from which he takes his name; that is, his 
paint. The pigments and dyes that invested the artisan’s works with their subtle 
distinctions of quality, worth, and significance, that gave each local dress its character, 
and that even gave the king his purple, were won from nature, and not without great 
difficulty.  Whether drawn from the juices of flowers and plants, or generated through 
chemical procedures, they are the fruit of carefully refined and slowly-developing 
techniques, and thus represent a real and laborious  relation to the activity of nature.  
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of these techniques, and the most significant for our 
purposes, was the fixing of the colors after they had been extracted. Most of the colors of 
nature appear in rather ephemeral forms.  The colors of the sky and water last only for a 
moment, the pure white of rushing water last only momentarily, and of ice and snow only 
under the conditions of cold.  The brighter colors of flowers and trees are, apart from the 
ever-greens, are given over to the passing of the seasons, and even the skin of animals 
loose their distinction with time. Colors fade, in other words, and this fading is among the 
ways we experience the lopsidedness of life, the mortality of the things of nature and of 
ourselves.  With the sparing exception of gemstones, which, perhaps for this reason are 
considered precious, the more permanent a thing is, the more earthy, dark or metallic its 
tones.  The brighter colors, radiant greens, blues, reds, are of the moment, and might even 
be said to belong to a language of nature which unfolds between the brown of the earth 
and the transient shades of the heavens. The first tone is the green of leaves. Capturing 
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the light of the sun, these are given over to its march across the Zodiac.13 Some animals 
are colored as camouflage, others to frighten; and some that they may be seen through a 
more opaque medium.  The peacock attracts his mates with his brilliant plumage, just as 
varied colors and scents of flowers speak to bees.  Nature’s varied surface has itself 
evolved as a communication among its species. 
By fixing the hues that have been pressed out of plants and flowers, the dye maker 
transforms nature’s ephemeral surface into an enduring artifact, and thus allows the 
artisan to dye and stain his materials, and bring these together into intricate details.  The 
fine artist, on the other hand, if he is to express nature’s details in their natural 
organization, must exhibit the way that they merge into each other with the subtlest 
gradations, or contrast in the most brilliant intensity. And furthermore, he must be able to 
express the way that light itself act towards the surface of things; whether they are shiny, 
or dull, mirror-like or white, opaque or translucent, or even clear.  For this, it is necessary 
to have a system of colors that could produce an infinite, if limited, range of variations, 
which, however, even in the most extreme juxtapositions, seem to belong together.  The 
different medium of painting --- watercolor, ink, gouache, encaustic, casein, acrylics, and 
oil --- each represent such systems, joining pigments, --- inorganic, organic, and even 
synthetic,--- together with a common base. By combining diverse elements within this 
substrate, thus allowing for their interaction and circulation within a more or less fluid 
medium, each system may be seen as a language, a partial perspective on humanly 
perceived color in its entirety.  As we said earlier, colors clash not in and of themselves, 
                                                          
13 We must agree with Kermit; it isn’t easy being green.  For green is the color of the labor with which the 
entire food chain begins, and the first act of communication between the organic and the inorganic.  It 
doesn’t merely symbolize this work, but is this; photosynthesis involves the absorption of light, and thus 
the color belongs intimately to the action. 
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but only in their relation to a thing; they seem to disagree with a thing, either because of 
its predominant color scheme or on account of some other quality, such as its use, or 
mood, or the things with which it converses.  Because it almost entirely lacks the 
qualities that define its relation to colors as colors, the base, on the other hand, allows the 
pigments to agree and interact freely; it is neutral, determined only through its relative 
fluidity (from almost solid to completely liquid) and drying qualities, the surfaces to 
which it can be applied, its translucence, opaqueness or reflectivity, and its longevity and 
color-fixing properties.  
Every system of painting is a prelude to the world of pure colors, just as this 
world, like ballet, and like poetry, is a prelude to a truly cosmopolitan politics. Or is such 
a politics, at a glance.  Of all these mediums, oil is most expressive. Viscous, it allows 
for subtle texturing and modification of its surface, and also for a complex overlaying of 
different colors and glazes. Thinned with turpentine, however, it takes on the qualities of 
more fluid medium without losing its underlying characteristic. Yet even oil paint cannot 
express all the entire range of color, and remains but a fragment of the whole.  Thus 
every system is needed, and remains so; none should be treated as a mere historical relic.    
Mixing together his paints on his palette, and stroking them onto a canvass with is 
camel-haired brush, the artist becomes a conduit through which the colors and curves of 
nature assemble together and enter into a mutual commerce.  No longer of necessity 
mediated in their interaction by the things of the world and their lopsided transactions and 
perspectives, these curves and colors flow together into a playful spectacle, representing, 
though never in its totality, the complete circulation of all of nature’s activities. For these 
have now been curved back towards eternity; no longer constrained to the purposes that 
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adhere to the parts, they translate freely each into the other.  No longer limited to certain 
inputs or outputs --- submitted to a linear temporality that divides the before and the after 
of an event --- each moment within the frame gives way to every other. We do not stare 
straight at a painting, but rather, our eye traces over its countless details of stroke and 
color, each time describing a new path through the details, and thus each every curve and 
color translates into every other.  It draws us in; no longer do we rest on the earth with the 
solid feet of a critic, but are as autumn leaves in an eddy.   
It might seem strange to speak of painting as an activity that has nothing to do 
either with the conscious activity of the artist or the viewer.  Painters seem to paint for a 
reason; to depict human beings and natural objects as they appear to the eye, or relive 
great battles and scenes from secular and religious history, or produce symbolic 
representations of moral qualities, or explore the play of light and color off of surfaces, or 
capture the mood of a moment, or to explore abstract formal principles, or as agitprop, or, 
simply, to create beauty?  And no painter, perhaps, paints simply that the curves and 
colors of nature commune with each other.   
True.  Painting, as a human activity, is not merely one form of artisanship among 
many but the most exquisite blossom of handicraft. Everything, from the preparation of 
the canvass, the manufacture of the paints, to their mixing and application, and the final 
glazing and framing, involves skills and know-how that have been cultivated only slowly 
and with great labor, and every step must be performed with clear purpose and 
painstaking care.  And even the viewing of a work of art takes a training of the eye and 
attention to detail; thus most children, while they suck in movies and television like 
sponges, are seldom more bored and restless than when in an art museum. To be 
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enraptured itself requires a laborious preparation; the eye must have learned not to let the 
world’s details race by, but tarry with them, submitting to their own movement.   
Yet no activity is just human, or feline, or simian, or solar, or lunar, or galactic, 
but always universal; an expression of the manifold unifold of nature as a whole.  If we 
speak of activities only in terms of their proximate cause, it is only because this is easiest, 
since, for the time, their wider significance remains obscure.  And this was also the case 
with aesthetics.  Lacking the perspective to see how man’s activity belonged within 
nature, we were forced to sunder his freedom from his surroundings, and so came to 
understand fine art through one of two misconceptions. Having now gained this 
perspective, we begin to see that art not only must be thought of as freely political, 
extending man’s purposes towards nature, but that it has significance as an event purely 
removed from any human end.  
The production and reception of paintings, seen as a real event, brings nature’s 
colors into a new kind of organization.  If, previously, we have not spoken univocally of 
color as either subjective or objective, psychological or physical, this is because both 
terms are misguided; color, first of all, is an event, a communication between light, 
matter, and the perceptive faculties of biological organisms. We can describe this event in 
terms of discrete processes through a rigorous scientific method, but this, in fact, only 
obscures the evolutionary significance of color; namely, as we already in part suggested, 
that it is one of the ways in which animal and plants, as individuals and species, relate, 
with each other and with inorganic nature.  Evolution, thus, itself involves the circulation 
of colors through the senses; colors develop both towards vibrancy (with flowers, 
peacocks, and the like), subtlety and nuance (as with natural camouflage), and even 
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variability (the chameleon, but also the masks and make-up of humans).  And at the same 
time, the eyes develop towards subtlety of perception, opening to view and action those 
features of the environment that are relevant to the survival.  The visual surface of the 
world is reflected in the endless varied perceptive faculties of different species and 
individuals; each of these is a different perspective on nature as a whole, and each may be 
regarded as a real event, a real organization.  In this way, new sets of color enter into new 
possibilities of communication.  In every case, however, the communication of colors is 
mediated through the particular forms of activity of different organisms and 
organizations.  It is through this activity that it sees the world.  
 And this is true also of men, to a degree.  But sometimes the world alights as 
spectacle.  Colors shine before us, disencumbered of the gravity that cleaved them to 
things and drew them towards the ground and its earthy tones.  Flowing upwards like 
dawn’s rosy fingers at the ephemeral moment that splits night and day, they communicate 
with each other freely, joining together into countless subtle permutations. As if relieved 
from every other purpose, they no longer speak to us, but only to themselves. Such 
moments, though, are brief; steeling from the master’s bedroom where they lived out the 
passions they must swallow in silence as they go about the business of the day, the sheets 
are clean, and no trace remains of their deed, and their children, all these fantastic 
mixtures, have dissolved into the instant.14   
Perhaps men first began painting to capture this moment of wonder, whose 
subtleties elude the word.  But we need not make such a conjecture. All that matters is 
that it is alone through artisanship, and above all, through painting, that the free 
commerce of the colors of nature was able to take on a more enduring form, and that, in 
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this way, the human manipulation of colors allows them to interact in a way that nature, 
before then, had never known.  Every new work is unheard of.15   
But what is the relation between this real event and the human work and human 
ends through which and towards which it was made?  If we no longer speak of the artist’s 
activity in and of itself, what becomes of the particular distinction between the artifact 
and the work of art?  How are we to understand the painter’s brush stroke and palette, if 
not as something that he does? 
What we might say is this.  All the many techniques that gather together in the 
finished painting, and all the various purposes and interests that gives artisanship and 
painting value as a political activity, --- not least of all which is the investment of an 
object with labor ---; all of these provide an occasion for the pure communion of color.  
While this could never appear explicitly as the goal of human endeavor without coming 
into contradiction with itself, it nevertheless comes into being through our colorful 
activities, and through crafts and artworks especially, acquires an enduring home.  And as 
the techniques of artisanship develop to ever higher degrees of refinement, becoming the 
fine arts --- a process that is gradual, without any leaps of genius --- this communion 
becomes ever more free and varied.  And here also, we may speak of an evolution of 
organizational forms, without, of course, wishing to imply any sort of teleological 
principle, but at most a process in which each stage builds upon those that come before. 
Representational painting, through its fidelity to the ways things appeared to the eye, 
brought a wide range of colors into circulation on the compass. Yet since these works of 
art were largely imitative in intent, and most of the technique was directed towards this 
                                                                                                                                                                             
14 Compare Novalis, Hoffmanstahl. 
15 Footnote Heidegger (I think) 
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end, they also reproduced the very things that divide colors against themselves and keep 
them from their purest association.  Only to the extent that painting either abandoned or 
complicating the world of things, presenting relations of color and form rather than 
identifiable objects, or displacing the forms of objects and discombobulating their colors, 
could art allow the freest commerce of colors and become pure spectacle.   
Art never abandons craftsmanship, or if it does so it becomes mere “conceptual 
art,” which is to say didactic; no longer art at all. And thus it remains always divided 
between two kinds of activity; on the one hand, a human technique towards human 
purposes, and on the other hand, the activity of nature appearing before itself in all its 
splendor.  Yet it is possible for these two hands to join each other in the work of the 
artist. Without ever intending anything more than the rigorous cultivation of his 
technique, he is able, nevertheless, to approach the way that nature acts.  Or indeed, this 
would only be possible through the most rigorous technique, one that is no longer guided 
by any purpose beyond his medium, enacting nothing more than its inner possibilities; 
allowing the colors to mix and the brush stroke according to their own, hidden law. This, 
in a deeper sense, is what it would mean to approach nature not just in its details, but in 
its organization.  It is no longer a question of imitating these details as they appear 
towards the eye, but of allowing the colors to curve and blend together after their own 
rule, organizing before our eyes in ways that make vain every attempt of our perceptive 
apparatus to structure it into a world of things, and thus presenting the spectacle of an 
activity that does not take the form of human agency.  Through such ambidextrousness it 
would be possible to overcome man’s lopsidedness; the shaking of these two hands 
broadens man’s freely political activity, --- that it might approach all of nature. 
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* 
Every human activity involves the bifurcation between the activity of man and 
nature. And with every art emerges a new way that these activities are brought together. 
Art in this way, is the essence of political activity --- unless purely didactic, where an 
overgrown slogan is given aesthetic values only in order to catch eyes.16  Yet among 
different arts, this bifurcation assumes different forms and is overcome in different ways.  
Every new configuration of these parameters creates the possibility of a new art form, 
and neither in this context, nor, indeed, any context, could we speak of a dialect that 
exhausts itself in a certain configuration of logically-derived possibilities. For let us again 
stress; we are not concerned with a teleological, but an evolutionary system that 
expresses itself through confluences.  With the human species and the human individual, 
new confluential possibilities emerge; man’s activity is able, in a way that is perhaps 
unique, to allow the confluence of the whole, to become a node through which the whole 
passes, and in this way, expresses itself.  This, above all, is what we mean by spectacle.  
Yet this possibility is in no way the purpose of the system, in no way guaranteed by some 
kind of mechanical or logical law, or divine purpose.  It happens, through our labor, 
though not as our will.  Which is why it must be cultivated, and cherished --- tended, in a 
word.    
Nevertheless, among the arts that we have discussed --- the arts of technique and 
not technology --- we might distinguish between artisanship, on the one hand, and the 
performing arts, on the other. In their purest forms --- namely painting, and ballet-
technique --- these two hands are, once again, to be thought of as extremities that, shaken, 
                                                          
16 Footnote Benjamin (Art in the age of mechanical reproduction) What I am saying should not be confused 
with the aestheticization of politics.   
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come together into more ambidextrous forms.  But each considered according to its own 
possibilities, a clear distinction emerges.  Whereas artisanship starts with a strong 
opposition between man’s work and nature’s play, and advances towards its overcoming, 
ballet is based on steps that, in a sense, represent the fusion of play and labor, not only 
because each must be cultivated at the barre through laborious exercises, but because they 
involve at their periphery an irreducible linearity; they do not always end with the same 
possibilities as which they began.17  This is true of music, but to a far lesser degree; it a 
factor of the technique of a particular instrument (each action of playing limits the 
possibilities of the next action), and the laws of harmony, but not of the symbolic 
medium of music itself.  Any rhythmic or melodic interval is not only reversible, but in 
theory could be played back in any order.  Choreography, in contrast, does not exist as a 
symbolic medium beyond the specific possibilities of the dancer’s body at a specific 
moment, and thus, while a certain combination may be reversible, it would make no little 
or know sense to speak of reversing the choreography of a dance as whole. 
A third kind of art of technique, and one that we have only mentioned briefly, is 
poetry.  Poetry involves both a work and a performance; what has been created, and 
endures beyond the act of creation, is itself performed.  This may be said of drama, and of 
musical composition, as well as to a much lesser degree, the choreography of dance.  But 
with each of these, the performance of the work depends on real conditions that may 
disappear in the course of things, and thus even its conception as a work remains tethered 
                                                          
17 Because the barre is ordinarily held by one-hand, each combination concentrates on only one side of the 
body, and thus must be scrupulously repeated on the opposite side.  And the barre exercises themselves 
often represent only one part of a movement that, during a performance, is always performed as a whole. 
The plie, for example, stretches the Achilles tendon and develops the fluid motion of the legs and stability 
of turnout necessary for jumps, while the proper movement of the foot is developed through the frappe, 
which requires the stability of a supporting leg and is not generally performed on stage.  The highly 
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to the specific possibilities given to the artist by his world. Some works --- one thinks of 
Beethoven’s later symphonies, or Wagner’s operas --- may have strained these 
possibilities to their limits, or may have even been created explicitly with an eye towards 
the future.  But performance remains a tacit restraint.  Poetry, on the other hand, has no 
real conditions, but only ideal conditions --- namely, a language of words --- and these 
conditions its creates through its very work.  Or rather, as we will see, it creates the very 
ideality of language as its condition.  Thus, whereas the other performing arts work 
towards a performance, just as painting performs a work, poetry is always at once a work 
and a performance, though not exactly in the same time.  And in this way, poetry allows a 
confluence between the possibilities of artisanship and the performing arts.  
But let us not race ahead of ourselves.  For before we can discuss poetry, we must 
first treat the third limit case of the artifact.  Words, the raw material of the poet’s craft. 
* 
 Already we have spoken of a word language both as part of the real system of 
nature, but also as an ideal system unto itself. And we saw furthermore how we could 
understand words through the lens of evolution, in terms of the conditions of survival. 
Such an approach, it was suggested, would help explain not only the diverse phenomena 
unearthed by the taxonomic methods of the philologist, but also the very nature of the 
relation between the real and ideal.  Yet if we are to truly grasp this relation, we cannot 
regard words simply as pre-given idealities, concerning ourselves only with how they 
“stick around” to enter dictionaries and archives and provide the raw material for 
philology.   We must ask; how do words come to be? How did they happen?   
                                                                                                                                                                             
regimented order of the ballet class, involves a progression towards ever more symmetrical kinds of 
movements.   
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The first answer is easy.  God, we insist, is neither a transcendent nor an 
occasional cause.  Thus, the famous question of the origin of human language disappears; 
human language is a possibility that first emerged with human beings, and every 
phenomenon of human language is, in some sense, a human creation.  Words, therefore, 
must be artifacts. Yet of a special kind.  
For they are not made out of some kind of stuff, but, as it were, shaped from the 
very air; they are winged, windy, and endless.  Their survival depends not on the 
durability of a raw material, but solely on a combination of real and ideal conditions.   
Thus they could either last forever, or disappear instantly.  At the moment of their birth, -
--- when they first become possible --- neither of these possibilities is determined, nor 
could they ever be.  A word, in and of itself, is without momentum. And because there is 
no material to be labored over, word-craft, in and of itself, requires neither time nor 
effort; words appear effortlessly and instantly. We might go to great pains to invent a 
word that is right for a certain purpose, and yet these pains are purely negative.  New 
words line up before us, unheard combinations of sounds burst to mind --- soon a whole 
mob has congregated, and like Helen’s suitors, we put them to the test.18  But we can only 
summons them by emptying our mind of other things, or perhaps by setting it into 
commotion. We do not ourselves will them into being. 
 A spoken word, all of this suggests, appears only as an ideal possibility.  Words 
appear only as the possibility of being words, which is to say, of appearing again.  If we 
could speak of a real event, it is only the instant in which the ideal possibility emerges.  
And yet the ideal possibility is itself unthinkable otherwise than as the repetition of the 
ideal event. It follows that wordcraft is a real event that creates an ideal artifact.  It is the 
 143
real act of making the ideal, and thus enacts the very transaction between the two, indeed 
is this very transaction. Or, at least, one side of this transaction.  
 This transaction is the very basis of politics, and word-craft, thus, the eminently 
human political action. We become free political agents when words start popping into 
our head, even if they are never spoken. For already we are no longer acting merely as 
isolated individuals, and have entered into a potential relationship with a community that 
will survive the cohesion of our parts.  Yet at the same time, since the durability of words 
bears no immediate relation either to human labor or nature’s stuff, it seems impossible to 
conceive of this political action as the action of man.  And thus, to the extent that we 
conceive of labor as a human labor, we must conceive of words as the work of a 
superhuman artisan, working through a kind of craft that is essentially impossible for us 
to conceive. Every theistic or deistic conception of God has at its origin the peculiar 
nature of the political action of language, and we can only begin to unravel this error, a 
sin no less against true religion than true science, through a proper understanding of the 
nature of language as a human artifact.  Since anyone who reflect on their own cognition 
would soon realize that new, strange, unheard of words constantly move in and out of 
consciousness like insects beneath a lamp, it becomes necessary for theistically-oriented 
cultures to explain away this evidence of linguistic evolution. To this end, three concepts 
emerged; magic, prophesy, and babble.  Unheard-of words were either forgotten formula 
with an efficacy beyond that of ordinary language, or were inserted into our minds by 
Gods.  And if languages appear to be in constant evolution and to assume such a diversity 
of forms, it is only because God confused them and perhaps continues to do so, reducing 
man to a kind of babble, that they not understand each other, nor grow too mighty.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
18 A more rigorous explanation for this phenomenon as we proceed. 
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Vestiges of this remain even in a more secular age --- above all in the absurd idea of a 
Schriftsprache, namely, that a cultivated language is fixed in its forms and vocabulary by 
past usage.  Top-heavy in the worst way, for it is time itself that weighs on us when we 
submit living language to the tribunal of dead judges.  
 Here as everywhere, we must open our ears to the yet unheard.  So let’s begin.  
* 
 Left unheard, above all, was the sonorous language of nature.  While Herder 
showed that the language of man grew out of the language of animals, he did not go so 
far as to realize that even inorganic things speak through sounds. And while Walter 
Benjamin wagered the thought that language belongs to all things, and not merely by 
metaphor, he entrusted this language to God’s creation. And so, in each case, sonority, 
the substance through which nature speaks, remained unexplored.   
 What we wish to show is how human speech evolved out of the sonorous 
language of nature, and thus, despite its unique structure, is itself but an expression this 
whole, just one of its possibilities.   
 If we start by conceiving sounds psychologically; are what are heard through 
human ears and brains, we have already strayed. For this makes it senseless to speak of 
sound but in relation to human beings; we have no access to the perception of other 
animals, or even other people, but can only speak through an analogy with our own 
experience, and since this experience is itself only available to us in its purity in the 
present moment, if at all, we are obliged to conceive all spoken language in terms of a 
solitary and momentary act of self-communication.19   
                                                          
19 Footnote: Derrida. 
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Sound, instead, must be conceived scientifically, as a fact about the natural world 
as it is in and of itself.20  We do not, of course, intend to appropriate the terms of science 
with any sort of precision, but only through the roughest qualitative approximation --- 
what anyone should remember from high school, or could learn from an encyclopedia. 
Our wish is not to reach nature in its details, --- these, if they are not to be mere factoids 
have no life outside an abstract framework --- but to blast open cracks through the granite 
of ordinary language, and allow juices to begin to flow from one side to another as roots 
and veins grow through the fissures.  These words are dynamite.21 
 To cite the online version of Encyclopedia Britannica, sound is  “a mechanical 
disturbance from a state of equilibrium that propagates through an elastic material 
medium.” It continues; “A purely subjective definition of sound is also possible, as that 
which is perceived by the ear, but it is not particularly illuminating and is unduly 
restrictive, for it is useful to speak of sounds that cannot be heard by the human ear, such 
as those that are produced by dog whistles or by sonar equipment.”  This disturbance and 
its propagation involves a vibration, which, elsewhere, is defined as a “periodic back-
and-forth motion of the particles of an elastic body or medium, commonly resulting when 
almost any physical system is displaced from its equilibrium condition and allowed to 
respond to the forces that tend to restore equilibrium.”  From these qualitative scientific 
                                                          
20 This is not a confession to a “Realist” “Epistemology.” Since I do not ascribe to a referential theory of 
language. Nature, for us, means all that potentially encompassed in free political activity through a 
transaction with human language.  “In and of itself,” simply means, in the manner of action that belong to it 
when it has not been obscured through the constructs of that ordinary language, with its specifically human 
terms of agency, imposes on things.  Of coarse, we will never penetrate this dumb language completely, but 
to say that we cannot it approach it through rigorous mathematical models and research technologies is 
absurd, a purely abstract, ideological claim, which flies in the face of the tremendous success that human 
beings have had in harnessing the activities of nature through the application of scientifically-informed 
theories.  What could it possibly mean to deny the “objectivity” of scientific language when it is able to 
reach nature where it hides. Bacon, the founder of experimental method, understood this well when he 
quotes Herecleites.  A map is accurate when it helps us get around; a scientific theory, likewise, when it 
orients us towards the way that nature acts.  
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descriptions, presented through a language whose meaning, indeed, could only be fully 
grasped through a rigorous method, we may glean several important points.   
First, the more-or-less objective phenomenon of sound is not limited to the 
audible range of the human ear, or to a certain kind of material, but refers to any 
disturbance propagated between any “elastic material medium.”  Elasticity is defined by 
the Encyclopedia as “the ability of a deformed material body to return to its original 
shape and size when the forces causing the deformation are removed.”  Thus, it seems, an 
elastic material medium is simply one that is capable of vibrating.  Second, sound 
involves a kind of communication; this is simply what it means to speak of the 
“propagation” or disturbance or vibration.  This propagation is a form of radiation, and is 
subject to attenuation according to a mathematical law.  The impedance of a material 
describes the ease with which a sound travels through a medium, the degree of the 
attenuation.  Thirdly, sound always occurs in a medium; and since its propagation 
through a medium involves spreading a disturbance, it could be said, in this way, to bring 
about a communication among the parts of the medium. And finally, since sound begins 
with a disturbance of equilibrium, and end with a return to equilibrium, and since the 
strength of the disturbance is attenuated as it spreads; or indeed, very roughly speaking, it 
is through the propagation of the disturbance throughout the parts that equilibrium is 
restored to the whole, we may not only speaks of sounds as necessarily transient, but as 
formally akin to steps.  Every sound event involves the restoration of the possibility of 
another sound-event.  A tuning-fork offers a simple example of this.  Striking a tuning 
fork lightly will produce a more or less pure tone of its given frequency. Yet if we strike 
it again while it is sounding with an equal intensity, its tone will become distorted.  Each 
                                                                                                                                                                             
21 That no one understood this better than Nietzsche… 
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action of “ringing out,” in other words, returns it to a state where it be struck again with 
the maximum degree of force without distortion.    
 Applying these principles to our planet as an inorganic system, we begin to gain a 
sense for the first level of sonorousness.  Just as the inorganic earth is the basis of the 
evolution of organic forms, it is from this language of sound that all other possibilities 
arise. Following the insights of modern science, the earth can be divided into several 
different layers; a solid inner core composed mostly of iron, a molten outer core, a 
lithosphere and outer crust, with a mosaic of plates, a large quantity of mostly liquid 
water, and an atmosphere consisting in a mixture of various gasses.  Pressure increases 
towards the center, and decreases towards the outermost periphery of the atmosphere.      
All of these layers interact dynamically, and in extraordinarily complicated ways; 
not just a “big rock,” the earth involves the complex interactions and circulations among 
many different substances --- it has its own language. Roughly speaking, however, we 
could speak of two kinds of communication; the circulation of particles, and the 
transmission of disturbances --- the one language we may call material, the other 
sonorous.   Both of these are ways in which the earth as an inorganic system expresses 
itself, but there is a very essential difference, and one which might justify us in speaking, 
if only with a certain poetic license, of the latter as a higher form of expression of the 
former.  For the former, we see, begins with a displacement from equilibrium, which is 
only rectified, if ever, through a higher level of organization, the level of the . Of 
course, within such a system, every displacement is itself always a rectification; yet, still, 
with respect to a given part at a given moment, the action is remains one-sided.  The 
latter, on the other hand, as we have already seen, begins with the return to equilibrium 
 148
after a disturbance; the communication of a disturbance is nothing but such counter-
action. Instead of moving to another location, the parts of the system oscillate back and 
forth while retaining a relatively static relation to the other parts of the system, and in this 
respect, their action is circular in form rather than linear. 
Sonorous communication is, in all its aspects, circular, radial --- radioactive.  And 
because it does not produce the deformation of a system, but instead returns it to its 
equilibrium, it is able to bring the parts of a system into communication not only without 
disturbing the possibility of a new act of communication, but through its very restoration.  
Sounds, the events of sonorous communication, thus have an evolutionary trait.  On the 
one hand, a stable equilibrium system, to the extent that it is subject to disturbance either 
through the commotion of its parts or through interaction with other systems, creates an 
environment in which sound is possible.  On the other hand, however, sounds themselves 
create the possibility for such a stable equilibrium.  One hand shakes the other.  
Let us now apply this evolutionary concept of sonority to the earth as an inorganic 
system. Recall, to begin, that sound is dependent on a medium, each with different sound 
conducting possibilities.  The interface of two different media creates an impedance 
mismatch, with the result that only part of the sound wave is transmitted from one 
medium to the other.22  In this way, then, each relatively discrete layer within the earth 
creates its own sound system, and as they disturb each other at their boundaries, and are 
even disturbed from without the stratosphere, through gravitational, material, thermal, 
radioactive, and sonorous forces, different sounds pass through them.  Sounds, as it were, 
are the expression of the earth’s stability as a dynamic system.  Like all true expression, 
this happens step-wise, not by indicating a fact to something else, but by continually 
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restoring the very possibility that it gives voice to.  Language is, in root, has nothing to 
with words, or meanings, or signs, or any other such anthropomorphic residua.  Rather, it 
is the in-gathering of the potentials of a whole. 
 Consider, then, our planet as the whole, in a form more or less like the present, 
with its various layers, everything in a constant motion and tumult, a precarious solidity 
to be found only in its core, its icy caps, and the thin crust which separates the mantle 
from the oceans and atmosphere.  What sounds emerge?  Without pursuing either 
comprehensiveness or detail --- speaking only roughly, that is to say --- we divide the 
earth’s native sonorities according to the origin of the disturbances that is their cause. 
 The first of these are the chthonic sounds; those that arise from the actions and 
pressures of the outer core and mantel and that ultimately influence the outer crust and 
atmosphere through volcanoes, earthquakes.  The vibrations produced by the sudden 
disruptions of the plates travel both within the earth and across the surface, or translated 
into tidal wives, traverse the ocean, and through their rumbling, they even sound into the 
atmosphere. Thus they communicate a material, elastic, relation throughout the whole 
earth; or indeed, they communicate this very wholeness.  Strangely, then, while to the 
human being trying to make his stand in the world, the earthquake seems the most terrible 
disruption, it in fact expresses that most extraordinary fact that is the starting point of all 
life on this planet; namely, that things don’t fall apart.  Nothing is stronger proof of the 
fitness of the world for man, and of its coherence.  If it appeared as a threat to this, and a 
challenge to reason, it is only because we fashioned God after ourselves, and saw his 
work as a handiwork rather than the craft of the whole of nature.  Heard rightly, it is like 
a belly roar --- a sign of health and life.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
22 That this principle is operative in the construction of musical instruments… 
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 Secondly, we might speak of gravitational sounds, or, in other words, sounds that 
originate through the gravitational action of the moon and sun against the earth, and 
above all, the cycles of the tides.  Thirdly, there are those that originate from the heating 
action of the sun against the earth’s atmosphere and surface.  And finally, there are 
sounds that arise when bodies from beyond the atmosphere collide with the earth.  
 With the exception of the last, all of these stand in a very close relation to the 
movement of the earth as an orbital body, and above all its diurnal rotation.  And thus, in 
a way, they all reflect the cyclical patterns of movement that are among the most basic 
preconditions for life on this planet. Their periodicity, whether heard over the coarse of a 
day or through the seasons of the year, is lulling, for it reminds us of the recurring 
dynamic upon which our livelihood on earth depends. Meteors, however, open up the 
earth to far more precarious relation with the outside.  It becomes possible for the earth to 
be acted on in a way that it cannot grapple with; that would permanently disturb its 
equilibrium.  Indeed --- comets and meteors are heavenly messengers.  But they no longer 
indicate anything beyond themselves, but simply express the possibility that threatens us 
through their orbit.   
 What these earthly sounds all share is their noisiness; since they reflect the earth’s 
inordinately complex and dynamic details --- all the manifold interactions that take place 
throughout the whole --- they tend towards both randomness in their pattern and an 
extremely wide dispersion through the spectrum of tones.  The rushing of water, and 
crashing of waves against the shore, the roar of thunder and wind, or the pattering of rain; 
all of these approach white noise.  Since these sounds arise from disturbances, they could 
not possess any more order than the system of inorganic nature as a whole, and thus, 
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while a degree of regularity might be discovered through a perspective wide-enough to 
represent the circulative organization of an  over time, the sound itself will always 
express the relatively chaotic condition of the parts. 
 Contrast these, now, with the sounds of that are produces by the interaction of 
nature and organic life.  The wind blows through reeds whistles; resonating at narrower 
range of frequencies, they radiate this tonal regularity out through the air.  Or consider 
the chirping of insects.  These seem to obey a regular cycle and rhythm.  Listening to the 
sounds produced by inorganic phenomenon, the only order we observe is the tendency of 
similar sounds to follow in proximity to each other; the individual plops of rain on a 
puddle cluster around each other, as do claps of thunder, or even seismic disturbances, 
but the individual spacing between sounds does not seem to obey any predictable rule. 
Every instance surprises.  And finally, with living animals we not only recognize 
repeated pattern, but even sense that the sound of one animal responds to another.  A 
flock of geese flying over head seem to maintain a communication among each other, or 
the screeching of the prey follow the roar of the predator.  In the case of human beings, 
both the sounds and their ordering seems to display a new order of complexity; we 
observe the same elements of sound being combined in ways that cannot be predicted and 
yet which seem, nevertheless, to answer to each other.23 
 Nature’s sounds, like its colors, are an evolved system; through the polemical 
interaction of species and individuals, with others and with nature, sounds emerge with 
ever greater clarity out of the white noise of nature, and also acquire more harmonic 
subtlety; they become both less random but more complex --- more ordered, in other 
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words.  And at the same time, these sounds enter into more complex systems of 
interaction both with themselves and with other patterns of organic life.   
 Combining these different factors, we might produce the following list of the 
different natural systems of sonic communication; 
 
 
i) The simple propagation of a vibration through a medium following a disturbance. 
ii) Motion linked to a sensitivity to vibration. 
iii) Sensitivity to vibrations produced by the bodily movement of other organisms, either of the same or a 
different species.   
iv) Sensitivity of an organism to vibrations that are self-produced and reflected off the surroundings, 
reflecting its features and allowing for an appropriate motive response. 
v) Sensitivity to sounds that are produced by other organisms, of the same or a different species, and the 
ability to respond to these through movement or action. 
vi) Sensitivity to sounds that are produced by other organisms, of the same or a different species, with the 
ability to respond to these with the production of sound. 
vii) The ability to perceive patterned combinations of a fixed number of sonic elements produced through 
individuals of the same species, and either respond through an action, or through a pattern of sounds.  
viii) The ability to produce and respond to varied patterns of sound with varied patterns of sound, according 
to a determinable rule.  
ix) The ability to imitate an infinite range of sound patterns within a certain range of parameters.  
 x) The ability to perceive an infinite number of possible combinations of a fixed set of sonic elements and 
respond accordingly with a combination that could not be fully determined according to a fixed rule. 
  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
23 We speak here only of subjective phenomenon, but these same facts about our experience of sound could 




Considering these all together and applying our previous insights with a greater 
degree of generality, we might speak of an ever increasing degree of responsiveness. This 
should not be understood merely as a phenomenon that we observe through our senses, 
but as a more-or-less objectively accessible aspect of an organizational system. Nor is it 
limited merely to organic, let alone human languages, but rather, every sonorous 
language is responsive, to an extent.  What responsiveness consists in, then, is simply a 
relation between parts that can be described through a law simpler that that which 
describes the organization as a whole.  In this way, even acoustic waves involve a degree 
of responsiveness. This is what distinguishes them from purely chaotic phenomenon and 
allows their physical properties, the speed that a wave travels through a given element, 
the rate of attenuation, to be described with a high degree of accuracy through fairly 
simply models.  The principles of refraction, reflection, diffraction, which describe how a 
wave communicates through a complex medium, are, in this way, aspects of the 
responsiveness that govern acoustic phenomenon.  The individual droplets of rain emitted 
from a storm cloud, might be considered to a very high degree mutually irresponsive; 
they express the whole, rather the parts.   
 Applying the terminology from before, we could say that a responsive system is 
one in which each part, each partial action, describes a perspective that involves the 
possibility of the other parts.  In other words, a system of interactions that obey a law, or 
better, express an organization, simpler than the whole to which it belongs (which may, 
itself be relative to another whole, and so forth).  The greater the degree of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
clear, furthermore, that the psychological of the mind, by and large reflects objective mathematical traits.   
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responsiveness, the more complicated the organization that is expressed through the 
parts.  The simplest kind of pattern, then, is simply a more-or-less similar event that 
repeats at a more-or-less regular interval.  A pulsar, for example, is an extraordinarily 
complicated phenomenon, but because of its regular cycle of rotation, it emits a beam of 
radiation that is perceivable to the astronomer’s observational equipment with extreme 
regularity, thus generating a pattern that can be described through a simple mathematical 
equation.  An earthworm is also quite sophisticated in its organization, and biologists still 
are far from being able to understand how the genomes of multi-cellular organisms 
explain its organization and activities.  Yet its response to stimuli such as vibrations or 
mild electric shocks, while far more complicated than a simple rhythmic interval, 
nevertheless displays a high-degree of regularity.  And finally, consider human language.  
No one could possibility begin to grasp all the subtleties of a single human brain, let 
alone of the totality of brains and bodies in their interaction with each other and with their 
natural environment.  And yet human speech, while extraordinarily complex, 
nevertheless displays a great deal of regularity.  This is apparent not only as a 
psychological fact --- for without this, how could we converse in any sort of coherent 
fashion --- but as an objective phenomenon.  If individual sound patterns, for example, 
did not obey a high degree of regularity, it would be impossible for speech recognition 
software, which depends solely on mathematical models, to discern the individual 
syllables of human speech.  Or if the grammar of individual languages, and of all human 
language in general, did not display organizational regularity, despite the infinite 
creativity that they allow, then the project of structural linguistics would be completely in 
vain, and would never have enjoyed the success that it has. 
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 Thus understood, this concept of responsibility help explains what it means to 
speak of every organization as a political system.  An organization is nothing else than a 
system of responsiveness, and thus it is political, since politics itself simply means the 
responsive interaction of the parts; politics is, in ground, ecological.  In fact, all of these 
terms --- , , responsibility, organization, system, whole, circulation, amount 
to the same thing approached from a slightly different angle. Every formula identifying 
one with another is purely tautological, serving only to move us away from our workaday 
assumptions.  
 Free political action is nothing more than a peculiarly human form of the 
responsiveness of nature as a whole.  This peculiar form of responsibility expresses itself 
in everything that human beings do as human beings --- in their work, their play, their 
body language, and their perceptions, their eating and shitting and breathing and 
sweating, their copulation and birthing, and their speech.  Man’s sonorous language is 
but one form of his responsibility --- it would be wrong to credit it with an absolute 
privilege. But nevertheless, through his sonority, he enters into an extremely wide 
commerce with nature, organic and inorganic, as with other humans.  The earthquake 
resonates through the entire planet, bringing its parts into commotion, and so the far 
greater responsibility of man’s sonority binds his activities to each other and to their 
environment, giving him his soundness, and entrusting him, the youngest of nature’s 






The basis of this commerce, it would seem, is the human word, and thus the 
artifaction of words an eminently human, responsible activity. Testifying to this is the 
wall that cinctures our thoughts and controls their passage to speech. To repeat a word in 
the earshot of others is create it anew, for no words exists but through its continued 
recreation, and it follows from the responsibility of this act that it must be subject to a 
tremendous amount of control.24 All soundness of mind and sanity depends on this 
barrier, just as the health of the body depends on the cohesiveness of its skin.25    
But words are themselves just one part of our distinctly human sonority. Man’s 
sonorous language doesn’t exhaust itself in word-craft.  Let us turn back to our list of 
evolved language forms.  When we refer to man as  (check), we place 
particular emphasis on the tenth characteristic; but in fact, man partakes of all these, and 
none may be regarded as either completely essential or completely inessential to his 
sonority.  To these we might also add an eleventh; the play of instruments. Man’s 
                                                          
24 This control takes very different forms in different human political organizations.  A meaningful 
approach to the question of “free speech” cannot treat it as a mere abstraction, as the right to say whatever 
one wants whenever one wants, but as an extraordinarily subtle political question.  Speech is not an 
individual act but implies always not only a listener, but a larger community in which the words will 
resonate. As tricky and dangerous as this formulation may sound, and as leery as the author is of its 
potential for misinterpretation, the conclusion is inescapable; free speech is not a right of the individual, but 
the right of the community. This has two very clear consequences.  First, a community has an absolute 
interest in forbidding forms of speech that threaten its very possibility of a community. If a real political 
community is able to forego enforcing this but when the threat represents a “real and present danger,” this 
could only be either because it is sound enough to allow for a great degree of inner disturbance, and has 
developed a sufficient confidence in this soundness.  This soundness can either represent the vitality of true 
political life within the community, or its complete ineffectualness. At the same time, though, a real 
political community also has an absolute interest in allowing for a transformative political discourse; a 
discourse which would increase its political vitality.  And this requires not only that it be open to the 
exchange of politically significant (organizationally transforming) ideas, but that it consider the real 
distribution of speech-power. Not content merely with defending the right to speak in private, it must insure 
a fair and open public discourse.  Simply put, and in terms every one may understood; money must be 
quieted, voices heard. 
25 This concept of madness is directly related to the madness of an inhuman world.  For in such a world, 
crazy words enter into circulation.  This is evident in both the language of advertising and Racism, both of 
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handiwork enables a new relation to sound, independent of his speech and yet no less 
unique in the animal kingdom. Perhaps its closest analogue is a gorilla beating his chest, 
transforming his entire body into a drum.  
If we are to describe man’s sonorous language as a whole, it must be in terms that 
encompass, and give room to, all of these.  Not, in other words, through a single type of 
organization, but rather through the commerce of all the arrangements of sound that reach 
man, and in the manner that they reach him.  For we can no longer speak of these sounds 
as purely objective phenomenon (mere vibrations), but as what we call, roughly speaking, 
subjective.   
But what is the nature of this subjectivity, the conscious awareness? We must not 
think of subjectivity as a special sort of thing.  As we have already seen, there are no 
things, only actions, only infinite detailed interactions.  What we think of, ordinarily, as 
things are, in fact, merely perspectives on the actions of the whole.  Or, in other words, 
responsibilities. And thus our subjectivity itself is merely a system of interactions, its 
unity is not logical, but circulative, economic.   
Accordingly, the different forms of sound perception do not become subjective 
through some kind of special magical admixture, the metaphysical abstractum par 
excellant of consciousness, but rather through the very forms of responsibility they 
involve; through the way they are organized, and nothing more.  
The sonorous language of man, in other words, is the gathering together of all the 
ways that human beings interact with sound.  It is the communication though man of all 
the sounds that could act either towards or against, or in any way influence his actions.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
which take what we might call “disposable thoughts” --- thoughts which express a reaction to the moment, 
but contradict the conditions of free political discourse --- and coin them in the iron of everyday life. 
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Nor are man’s actions limited to what he perceives either as his own will-full act, or as 
the actions, willed or involuntary, of others. We are not interested in man primarily as a 
craftsman, good or ill, but, first of all, simply as a biological organism.  Rather, they 
include all the physical interactions of his individual particles among themselves and with 
the outside world, the chemical processes within him, the actions of his musculature, the 
firing of the neurons in his brain and throughout his nervous system.   
Not a single one of these systems of activity, we see, is completely incapable of 
interacting with man’s sonorous language. Light striking our eyes allows for visual 
experiences that we then translate into speech. And sounds reaching us through the ears 
enter into complex relations both with our bodily movements and speech, and may even 
immediately effect bodily functions over which we normally have little or no control. 
Even ultra-violate radiation, beyond the scope of our vision, causes disruptions at a 
molecular level of our skin, provoking the production of pigment or causing skin cancer -
-- and in either case becoming subject to our words.   And so too with the movement and 
feelings produced within our muscles or through our sense, or with the agents that affect 
our body chemistry.  And finally, the firing of our neurons join together into mental 
events that strongly influence both our perceptions and our actions, and also guide the 
interaction of words and sound-patterns within our head, and indeed, when we dream, of 
all our sensory experiences.     
Sonorous language allows for all these manner of action to interact, and thus it 
brings the world, as it reaches us through our senses, and through the interior of our body, 
into a commune with our own inner configuration.  And indeed, if we extend sonority to 
include all forms of vibrations, including light and electro-magnetic radiation, as well as 
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the vibrations of particles, we might then conclude that, in this sense, all language, all 
interaction, is sonorous language; and that nothing exists outside of vibrating patterns.  
But such speculations do not concern us.  All that is important, for our purposes, is that 
we begin to understand human sonorous language itself as the medium that allows for the 
broadest scope of interactions between different systems, within and without his body. 
Sonorous language is simply a sound-stage, where all of these different forms of action 
join together and relate to each other.  It is not, indeed, the only forum where this is 
possible; a deaf person, for example, may develop a purely visual and motive intercourse.  
And everyone may act without the mediation of word-formed thoughts or sounds.  Yet 
for most people, most of the time, sound provides the most versatile go-between among 
all the different systems, and thus provides insight into the nature of consciousness as a 
whole, which is itself nothing else than the totality of fields of convergence and 
interaction.26 
                                                          
26 What I am getting at, here, is an account of consciousness that is radically functionalist, and yet should 
put to rest the entire question of reductionism.  There is no essential difference between the actions possible 
through consciousness as a whole (free will, creativity, language usage, and so forth) and the individual 
actions (neurons firing, cellular functions, molecular and submolecular processes) that compose a given 
individual, or the actions of nature as a whole. The very concept of action and evolution forbids such an 
essential differentiation; in essence, there is no essence.  But one system of action can never be reduced 
another, since its form of action consists in an organizational structure that, precisely because its works, is 
the kind of action that it is, through its organization, could never be expressed through a different kind of 
organization.  All action is perspectival, and all perspectives active; and perspectives are irreducible by 
definition.  Consciousness, then, might by thought of as an organizing perspective that emerges out of all 
the actions of the body, and allows for certain forms of interaction, and also exerts a more positive pressure 
in some case, actually guiding the interaction.  It is, as it were, the simplest expression of the unity between 
complex, and non-hierarchically arranged, systems. If we follow this line of reasoning, there need not be 
anything mystifying about the concept of free will.  If a series of organizations are not arranged in a clear 
hierarchy, but, as it were, stand in a circle, it is necessary for their interaction to assume a free form.  Free 
will, is itself, in other words, but one form of free political activity; the former should be understood 
through the latter, and not visa-versa.  But what do we do with that sense we have of being aware of these 
things.  This is the most difficult and obscure aspect of the philosophy of the mind, and one where I believe 
my approach will prove most illuminating. For once we realize that there could be no simpler freely 
interactive organization of the different converging systems than precisely this felt experience of being 
aware of things in relationship to themselves, to our body and its sensations, and to our thoughts, then the 
veils of mystery begin to dissipate.  Just think of it this way; how else could all our different forms of 
experience be present to ourselves such that we could act the way we do than in the form of consciousness 
that we are aware of.  This is not merely a vague psychological intuition, but suggests what may, one day, 
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    To understand man’s sonorous language is to realize that it stands in an 
extraordinarily complex relation to what we might, roughly speaking, call the 
individuality of human consciousness.  Individuality is not the same as subjectivity; 
whereas subjectivity refers to the extent to which physical events are organized 
biologically, and thus may operate at the level of an individual organism, species, or 
across several species, individuality, on the other hand, indicates the centralization of an 
organization around a specific body and nervous system.  Since this body is a real 
system, individuality means nothing less than reality, non-ideality.  An action is 
experienced individually to the extent that it remains resistant to ideality.  The real 
expression of ideality is memorability; an event of a given level of complexity is 
memorable within a given real system to the extent that it can be repeated, thus passing 
into ideality.27 We already spoke of the word, in its ideality, as a trans-individual, though, 
--- as we now see --- nevertheless subjective, phenomenon.  Yet to the extent that 
sonorous language is more than just word-language, we must make out, if only roughly, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
be understood mathematically;  that human awareness is the simplest mathematical model for the 
organization that emerges out of the confluence of inputs and outputs of all the complex systems of the 
mind.   
27 This ideality can take many forms; there is ideality of the muscles, called muscle memory by dancers and 
athletes, involving the ability of the muscles to return to certain configuration, without specific conscious 
volition.  There is also a ideality of feelings which occurs through the repetition of the more-or-less similar 
sensations, and which, for the most part, depends on recurrence of similar states within the body and 
similar situations in relation the outside.  There is also an ideality of perceived colors, which depends on 
the stability of our visual apparatus and the repetition of certain configurations within our perceived 
environment.  But there is also a voluntary and involuntary occurrence of mental events that no longer have 
a direct relation to our bodily experience, but seem to come and go on their own, and which, at most, are 
motivated by other events, but where a clear relation of causality --- responsibility, in other words, --- is not 
forthcoming, almost as if they resulted from a general mental discombobulation or commotion, but not 
from anything specific action that took place.  These may involve sounds, colors, feelings, pains, words, 
word-strings, ideas, or even inarticulate thought-sensations.  Finally, we since memory refers to a real 
system in general, and not specifically the human body, the term may be applied to larger political 
institutions --- one may speak of a historical memory that is not concentrated in any individual or text but 
only involves through the intercourse of individuals ---, and indeed to any kind of organization.  A rotating 
body may be assigned a very simple kind of memory and ideality, just as a far more complicated sort might 
be said to belong to a complex ecological system, with its recurrent cycles and complex equilibrium, or 
even a species as a system of genetic materials. 
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the different degrees of individuality or privacy. Or in other words, we must try to 
conceive human sonority as a gradual transition from reality to ideality. 
 Our sonorous experience as such consists of three components; hearing, sound-
memory, and vocalization.  While we can respond directly to sounds with bodily motions, 
or to visual, tactile, olfactory, or gustative sensations through sounds, the interaction of 
these three specifically sonic systems of action allows for auditory events that are 
perceived in nature, and that may or may not repeat themselves in their real context, to 
acquire a higher degree of ideality, no longer bound to specific real conditions of 
interaction between man and his environment, but either taking on a life of their own 
within his memory (the individual, real form of consciousness in its ideal extension), or 
exchanged as a kind of common currency.  According to this three fold distinction, we 
can produce the following list of the different levels of ideality within human language.   
i) sounds from nature (or the human body) we hear without retaining in memory. For example; 
noise in the back-round that is effectively filtered out. 
ii) sounds that we here, and to a degree retain in our memory, but which we cannot even 
approximately render through our vocal facility. (One might argue whether a category exists --- 
but we can at least allow it as a hypothetical category.) 
iii) sounds that are not fully articulate, to a degree conventional though with extreme individual 
variations, and which most people have a command over (cries, screams, laughter, pouting, and so 
forth) 
iv) sounds that we hear and can approximately imitate with our vocal facilities, producing a sound 
that can then be approximately imitated by another. 
v) sounds that approximate phonemes or strings of phonemes, but involve an accentuated length 
and an extreme extension of the mouth.(“ooh”, “ah” and so forth)28 
vi) a system of phonemes that can be strung together according to certain rules.  
vii) words; a set of distinct combinations of phonemes.  
 
                                                          
28 Often very subtle difference come into play in actual interaction.  Consider the difference between 
“hearty laughter” and “belly laughter” --- laughter that it genuine, welling up from inside --- and “Ha Ha” 
laughter intended either sarcastically or meanly, and all the minute gradations that lie in between.  
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We will stop with words, since these involve, for reasons that we have already 
suggested, the highest degree of ideality.  But we might also mention several other 
systems which are less directly relevant to our purposes, and don’t stand in any clear 
relation to the given ordering, but nevertheless are important aspects of man’s sonorous 
language as a whole.  These include; 
a) Sounds created through musical instruments. 
b) Sounds created through a special vocal facility in imitation of noises made by animals. 
c) Sounds created through recording media. 
d) Singing. 
 
Returning to the first list, we must mention, to begin, that we do not wish to 
suggest that human word-language originates with the imitation of the sounds of nature.  
This might or might be true; but whatever the case may be, it involves a kind of empirical 
claim that lies completely outside our intentions.  When we speak of evolution, here as 
always, we refer not to the real genesis of one form out of another, but rather of a 
progression of increasing ideality.  Thus, if we speak of approximation and imitation of 
noises and sounds from the outside, we mean nothing more than an ideal potential that is 
contained within the innate faculties of our sonorous language.  Imitation, as we 
understand, involves either a mental act or physical act that expresses, to some degree, 
the pattern of a sonic event that reaches us through our sense.  Strictly speaking, one 
cannot speak of a true or false here, but only of degree, although it stands to reason that, 
since aural perception involves innate capacities for pattern recognition, we readily grasp 
some imitations as correct, and others as incorrect.  
The imitation of nature, in other words, interests us not as an event in the natural 
history of speech acquisition, but rather as an ideal possibility of non-private, vocalized, 
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communication.  Leaving aside the nature of aural perception, the real condition of this 
ideal possibility is the simple fact that the mouth and nature share the same acoustic 
medium and the same basic laws of physics.   Our voice box partakes in some, though not 
all, of the processes that are at work in both inorganic and organic nature; it involves the 
disruption of the flow of a gas through a resonating object, causing vibration at a certain 
frequency, the passage of air through a cavity articulated into various shapes, and the 
contact of hard and moist surfaces.  For this reason, we often find that the same word 
applies to both human and natural noises; the wind and the mouth both blow, the reeds 
and the lips whistle, the lips and air-filled sacks pop, teeth and hard objects grind and 
chatter, the throat and a stream bed gurgle, and man and the sea alike roar.  Human 
vocalization, in this sense, is an imperfect microcosm, just as was the body in relation to 
the activities of nature. It is able to repeat, in miniature, some of the sonic events of the 
world around us, and in this way --- and this is the important point --- brings them into 
new kinds of circulations.  Often, for example, we see people almost instinctively 
imitating natural sounds, and deriving a great deal of pleasure doing so. They echo 
thunder claps, and bark back at dogs, meow at their cats, moo at cows, hiss at snakes, 
even beep at automobiles, as if they had to answer nature back at every turn.   
The approximation of natural sounds and noises tends to involve extreme actions 
of our vocal capacities; it is necessary, above all, to create an effect of distortion, 
approaching, in this way, the more chaotic generation of sound patterns. Or, in some 
cases, it is necessary to create volume through the physical action of the articulators, 
rather than by the strength of one breath and the resonation of the body cavity.  As a 
result, it temporally places it in a condition where it is impossible to realize other 
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potentials.  Between one action and another, a transitional period is necessary.  And while 
this may be only amount to a second, or a fraction thereof, it is long enough to render a 
flowing, fluent chain of sounds impossible.   
Because, in this way, these extreme actions remain simple, unable to combine 
either simultaneously or consecutively, they represent the fewest, most elemental 
possibilities of human vocalization, and each appears, as it were, as a single event, unable 
to join with its fellows into more complex organizations.  While each may be infinitely 
varied, these variations will tend to reflect to unique qualities of a particular occurrence.  
This, in turn, may be imitated by another, and so forth, but it remains unlikely that any 
such sound would attain the degree of ideality necessary for it to become a recurrent 
feature of political life.  Rather, each, like the natural events they approximate, are given 
over to the moment from which they arose, with the language they invoke tending 
towards a simple binary responsiveness.   
 What we ordinarily think of as human speech, in contrast, consists not in mere 
isolated tones and their echoing, but of a complex and infinitely varied, but nevertheless 
patterned, and not merely random, enchainment of sounds.  Even if we had no access to 
the meaning of words, and could only parse the sounds we hear into recurrent patterns, 
we would nevertheless discover an organizational system of a new order of complexity.  
To begin, we discern a fairly limited set of more-or-less similar sounds that combine with 
each other in a series, and with a certain regularity determining individual combinations; 
not every sound pattern is followed by every other, but each seems to impose certain 
restrictions on it subsequent combination.29  And these sounds themselves, we would then 
                                                          
29 We are speaking roughly here.  According to the principles of contemporary Linguistic theory, a 
phoneme is not given a purely phonetic definition, but is defined as the smallest lexically significant unit of 
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notice, appear in a far larger set of recurring clusters, and these, in turn, display new 
regularities in their sequential ordering.  
So it strikes us; speech is a dance; a fluid, linked passage through a series of 
sounds, circling from like to like through an entire range of possibilities, and describing 
new forms of patterns at ever higher levels, thus bringing the most basic elements into a 
system of circulation.  Within each clause, nouns, pronouns, and adverbs tend to 
congregate around verbs, articles and adjectives around nouns, and adverbs around 
adjectives. Or in a language where the grammar is determined more by morphology, 
recurrent patterns emerge among the different forms of a given words, and within a given 
clause, we often notice the repetition of the same morphological index.    
This dance does not spring from nowhere, but like every ballet, orbits around the 
body and its specific potentials.  If it is possible for these sounds to enter into such fluent 
commerce, endowing speech with a high degree of ideality, it could only because the 
mouth, in the act of vocalizing, allows for their enchainment.  Or rather, the extreme 
actions of before must be mollified into gentler sounds, passing one to the other without 
the interruption of transitional moments.  Its elemental sounds become steps, movements 
towards a new set of possibilities. Fluency in speech and dance alike forbid that one 
break off the series of movements in order to regain one’s composure. A phoneme is not 
simply a sonic event, nor an abstract representation of the most basic set of linked 
characteristics that differentiate words, but an action that continually restores the mouth 
to a physical state in which new actions are possible.  Speech, we might even wager, is 
                                                                                                                                                                             
speech. This means, in other words, that two sounds (phones) are to be distinguished as different phonemes 
if and only if they actually serve to distinguish one word from another.  Each phoneme includes different 
allophones --- individual representations of a single phoneme determined by their context in relation to 
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not so much the movement of the mouth as its continuity. Left to its own, the muscles of 
the mouth are subject to disturbances, jerking wide open into a yawn, gnashing the teeth 
together, flapping the tongue about --- all the actions, in other words, that serve its first 
and most basic task, the consumption of food.  Talking brings these into a more graceful 
circulation; it is, as it were, the first step towards its quiescence, towards keeping one’s 
mouth shut.  
The fluent language of the body, as we saw, expresses the preservation of our 
center of gravity.  The fluidity of speech, in contrast, requires not only a smooth linking 
of the movements of the articulators --- the organs that change the shape of the vocal 
cavity --- but also a continuous flow of air resonating at a certain frequency.30  Contoured 
into vowels through the shape of the mouth and lips and throat, or into fricatives through 
an interference produced by the friction of air passing over the mouth opening, or into 
nasals, or even briefly interrupted through the popping sound of plosives, the breath is the 
element through which sounds join together into a single stream.   Thus, the flowing, 
continuous breath is the medium through which the extreme elements of nature, 
expressed through the imperfect microcosm of human vocalization, enter into a new kind 
of flowing circulation; it is the stream where nature’s sounds eddy.  Breath in this respect 
is analogous, above all, to the liquid and oily media of painting; and the communion of 
nature’s colors in painting to that of its sounds in speech.  If before they had known only 
                                                                                                                                                                             
other sounds (in English, for example, the aspirated and non-aspirated P sounds) --- and also allows for free 
variation.   
30 Compare with Lucretius, p. 194: “These voices, therefore, when from deep within 
 Our frame we drive them forth, and send them on 
  Straight through the gateway of the mouth, forthwith 
  The nimble tongue, artificer of words, 
  Doth shape apart, and in their turn the lips  
  By molding give them form.” 
 167
strife, meeting only through the altercation of partial perspectives, now they touch 
peacefully; they are at ease. 
Dance, as we saw, cultivates the movements of the body, and classical ballet, in 
turn, creates a fluent and expressive system of somatic language.  In quite a similar 
fashion, singing and operatic technique develop vocalization towards the fluid intercourse 
between an ever increasing scope of actions.  Through great coordination of the lungs, 
larynx, the cavities of the chest and head, and the tongue and other articulators, it 
becomes possible not only to far extend the tonal range and volume, but also achieve 
nuances of timbre and expression unknown to the spoken voice. At the heart of this is the 
control of the breath.31    Through a rigorously cultivated technique, it becomes possible 
to sustain a fluent continuity of notes for so long that the function of respiration itself 
seems without bearing; the breath seems to come free of the body, becoming, as it were, 
purely spiritual.  Just as the dancer, through the proper understanding of gravity, looses 
its tether, the operatic singer gets such a hold on his breath that he no longer has to catch 
it.   
Opera and ballet, however, differ in one crucial respect. Whether singing began 
with speech, or speech with singer, they remain always at cross-purposes.  The phonemes 
of speech lie in a narrower circulation, and as the expressive range of the voice is 
expanded and its actions brought towards the periphery, the articulation of sounds into 
syllables is obscured to the point of incomprehensibility.  At the same time, the increased 
volume and continuity of breath either forbids or overwhelming the plosives and 
fricatives.  Dance, in contrast, does not know of any such conflict; the maximum 
expressiveness is realized at its periphery, through both an increase in the lyrical subtlety 
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of movements, and the range of its vocabulary.  It does not collude with words only to 
betray their trust in the end, but approaches them with the quite cultivation of sure-
footedness.  
All of this is an aside, though.  For now, let us return to the thrust of our 
argument. Every spoken natural language, modern linguistics suggests, involves a set of 
phonemes with combinatorial rules functionally discrete from the words that they 
compose. Thus we are able to recognize a nonsensical combination of phonemes as 
nevertheless a possible word in our language, not through some vague sort of family 
resemblance, but according to a rule that is acquired along with all the other parametric 
conditions of our native tongue.   At the basis of each language, in other words, is its own 
unique dance of phonemes.  Following our evolutionary method, we could say that these 
individual phonemes survive only in cahoots with their fellows; their mutual commerce 
provides a mutual environment. These could then play into each other into an infinity of 
combinations without ever assembling together into recurrent words. Each new group of 
sounds would seem like a word, but repeating only haphazardly if ever,  it would 
dissipate in the instant, a wave crashing on the beach.  The action of language, like that of 
inorganic nature, would remain cataclysmic.     
How do phonemes become words? How do they acquire the ideality that belongs 
to spoken language as a language of words, and involves, at minimum, the regular 
appearance of a limited set of phoneme-chains?  The first answer is simple, and 
tautological --- they just need to be repeated, over and over.  Such a chance recurrence, 
however, is in and of itself extraordinary unlikely, and also defies our experience of 
human language.  As our method thus dictates, we must explain an individual set of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
31 {As the Italians say, “he who knows how to breathe can sing.”} 
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phonemes is able itself to survive --- not, of coarse, referring to some kind of will on its 
part, but merely to the natural conditions of survival that its very existence, once we have 
wholly banished the last vestiges of creationism, implies.  To say that this happens 
because “people use language,” the response that guides the pragmatic approach, is to 
beg the question. For as we have already seen, people, as practical agents, are but one 
rather limited perspective on the particularly human forms of political agency invoked 
through verbal and somatic language.  
Instead, developing our earlier remarks with greater tenacity, we must begin to 
explain how words themselves gain the particular form of responsibility that is the 
groundwork for all free, human, political life.  Before we listed some of the different 
organizations that give a home to words. Now we might speak more generally, and say 
that, in every case, every word-event --- meaning, simply, the regular recurrence of a set 
of phonemes --- requires the regular recurrence of some other activity.  This is not to 
suggest any sort of relation of direct causality.  It is not as if one pattern were persistently 
provoked by another pattern by a crass empirical determinism of the speaking individual, 
but rather that every pattern develops in, and as, a responsiveness to other patterns.  To 
speak here of simple causality would be to make human beings no more complicated that 
the swirling eddies which form of the surface of a stream --- which is already far too 
complicated a process to be fully comprehended by existing mathematical models.  Nor 
do we wish to suggest that the patterns of language refer to or depict recurrent structure 
out in the world; this may be true to a very limited degree --- few things, at least in 
philosophy, are ever completely false. But the impression of referentiality is only a 
consequence of a far more complicated, subtle, interaction. In short, we have no 
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pretensions of giving any explanation about how the pattern of a word became interlaced 
with an outside, but merely wish, on the one hand, to insist on the necessity of such an 
interweaving, and on the other hand, take the first steps towards a fuller picture.   
Relevant to our present purpose, in fact, is two consequences of such a conception 
of verbal language.  
On the one hand, it suggests that words only gain their ideality as words through 
a certain affiliation with other circulations of parts, other perspectives.  The entire system 
of human language would build itself up out of such affiliations, working its way into the 
processes of the human mind, conscious and unconscious, bodily feelings and motions, 
sensual perceptions, as well as into the circulations of nature that present themselves to us 
through our mind and body and the political life as a whole that binds us with ourselves 
and with nature, as well as through the languages, verbal and somatic, with which this is 
stitched together.   These circulations, as we already suggested, may be thought of as 
partial perspectives on the whole of nature. When a perspective is concentrated enough, 
when the possibilities it expresses enter into a dense reciprocal relationship, it provides a 
good home for nouns --- pronouns at the lower limit, and proper nouns at the upper.  A 
noun thus comes to express an interrelated set of actions; and tends, in this way, to 
become the center of the orbit of verbs and other semantic elements.  
It is this, above all, that prompts the explicit belief that we live in a world of 
things, or, to put it more precisely, allows for a perspective on political agency to arise 
that conceives of this primarily as the interaction of human beings --- man-things --- with 
the other kinds of things of the world, thus in the end leading to the isolation of politics 
and nature.  Before such a politics can emerge, the language of words must have already 
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become a language of things, primarily nominal in its orientation; it must begin to 
function as if it were primarily governed by the interrelation of things, isolatable and 
unitary forces within a system of interaction.  Perhaps the beliefs in magic and animism 
reflect this condition no less than Aristotle’s Ontology or the tenets of modern Analytic 
philosophy.  In any case, though, it is not a question of either diagnosing or lamenting 
some misstep in the history of human culture or philosophy, but of understanding the 
self-contradictory nature of ideality of word languages. Namely, that words tend to gain 
their ideality by congregating around what we might call realities, real natural 
organizations.    
On the other hand, while words might only gain their ideality by themselves 
circulating through the circulations of the reality with which human beings, as political 
agents, interact, no word, in the end, could ever be absolutely constrained to a limited set 
of relations.32  Since words only gain their ideality through specific interactions, 
possessing their ideality, as it were, as a movement conferred on them by repeatedly 
cycling through the same orbit, --- since, as it were, words possess no momentum in and 
of themselves but only through a trajectory that tends towards its repetition, every word 
would possess, as its outermost potential, an absolute ideality.  Born into rootlessness and 
exile from the moment it was spoken, it is remains always a vagrant, a wanderer, able to 
enter into every orbit, join relations with any other sort of word or activity, and make and 
quit any company as it pleases.   This is not to be confused with the claim that language is 
purely a social construct, or any of the forms of linguistic empiricism to which the 
arguments of Chomsky have already yielded a fatal blow; the orbits of ordinary language 
may be rooted in the a priori operations of the mind, or even some sort of Universal 
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Grammar, or they may represent facts so basic to the construction of a particular 
language as to resist all change.  Rather, it is a fact about words considered simply as 
artifacts, in their outermost political potential. Considered as a combination of phonemes 
that pop almost effortlessly into existence, and know no other continuity than their 
regular repetition, there is nothing that could limit or constrain them in any way, or, for 
that matter, insure their survival. They are weightless, their craft is effortless, and their 
very ease makes them the most precarious of actions. In and of themselves, they possess 
nothing that would weigh them down to the world of things.   
Ordinary language is simply the sum total of all the semantic representations that 
words enter into through such orbits; in the past, present, future, and in every existing or 
even merely possible language. To differentiate a priori between possible and impossible 
meanings, or explain meaning through a specific sort of relation between specific sorts of 
entities, is to explain ordinary language through the mechanisms of institutional 
language, as if one were to expect its phenomenon to justify themselves with a sort of 
clarity that belongs only to artificial, contrived systems.  And semantics, this suggests, is 
not ever simply a property of words, nor of things outside of words, but belongs to the 
extraordinary complex system of interactions that constitutes nature as a whole, and that 
converges in human, though not merely individual, consciousness. Words only provide a 
particularly fluid interaction between the interactions that they themselves participate in -
-- they allow these patterns of interactions to enter into new kinds of relations. Ideality is 
                                                                                                                                                                             
32 Quote the passage from Quine (as cited in Michael Friedman’s article.) 
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not opposed to reality, but merely an offshoot; a new system of organization, a new mode 
of responsibility.33 
Or in other words; we should not think of the semantics of ordinary language as 
an offshoot of everyday life and its forms of life, as if it were somehow produced as a tool 
to allow people to interact, and as if its usage were at once limited and justified in this 
way.  No; ordinary language is itself the gravitation of words away from the purity of 
ideality, and towards its domestication to a narrower , a narrower expression of 
nature of the system of all life.  Each word, we might imagine, is like a steel ball set in 
perpetual lateral motion around the edge of a bowl infinitely subtle in its contours and 
with innumerable worm-holes leading from one place to another; as it slowly descends, 
its fall moderated by the centrifugal force born of its motion, it enters into every narrower 
circulations, changing from one region to another, until, perhaps, it ends up back at the 
edge.   
Yet, as we see, this ideality is not simple, but two-fold.  Ordinary language hangs 
between two poles; the commerce between a set of phonemes in fluid communication, on 
the one hand, and the absolute semantic openness of every word. As they are born into 
their everyday existence as the expression of a narrower set of semantic possibility, 
words also fix the phonetic sounds, microcosmic expressions of the sounds of nature, into 
a working configuration.  No longer gushing into myriad couplings like water from a 
                                                          
33 We must reject the notion that thinking is either necessarily bound to words or to individual conscious 
acts.  Thinking is simply an ideal communication, and all animals (as well as computers) can be said to 
think to the degree that they respond translate real events into cognitive patterns that in turn motivate a 
response.  Words are simply a medium in which this ideality expresses itself in a way that gives it greater 
mobility, allowing it communicate across time (memory) and among individual minds.  And thus, to the 
extent that thinking becomes verbal, its ideality is no longer confined to individual minds, and it itself 
becomes the shared activity of a wider community.  Yet even here there is no essential difference between 
the communicative forms of other animals and the language of man; only a continuum of degrees of 
ideality (and not necessarily coinciding with the real evolution of species).       
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fountain, the sounds repeat with a regularity that reflects the regularity of the meaning; 
they become what someday will be thought of as a mere “phonetic representation” 
corresponding to a meaning.  Their own specific vitality, --- their own two-fold ideal 
organization --- is obscured.  
This ideal organization, like the world of colors, is peaceful.  Sounds couple 
together freely, not in a Dionysian frenzy, as if all vitality were to be compressed in a 
single moment, but with the ease and grace of a Kettentanz.  Words open towards 
infinity, but free of all the pomp and grandeur that, through sheer self-importance, lays its 
claim on the absolute. Crossing in and out of every partial perspective like a needle 
drawn through folds of fabric, they stitch through life at every point, and with the 
slightest tug everything curves back together into a single knot.   
With the slightest tug; for like the world of colors, its own ideality remains yet 
unheard and unseen; it still awaits its realization.  
This is the task of all extraordinary human language, but above all, of poetry.  
* 
 Poetry is both a work and performance, and just as all art is at once both the 
spectacle of nature and the labor of man, these two moments of poetry, existing as they 
do as separate moments, must both divide into two convergent forms of activity.  
Spectacle belongs equally to both performance and fine artisanship, and at its artistic 
height --- one thinks, above all, of the Ballet Russe of Diaghelev  --- dance, music, 
painting, and all sorts of crafts, join hands and share in the applause.34 
 Poetry is, at heart, a word-craft, and all word-craft begins with a form of 
artisanship that is effortless and purposeless and yet still human --- and that involves, as it 
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were, the farthest extension of our political agency.  Thus the opposition between man’s 
activities and nature’s is different than in painting and the other handicrafts.  These are, 
to begin with, ever mindful of their end, and only overcome the constraints of their 
purpose, converging with the spectacle of curves and colors that takes place through their 
medium, by cultivating a rigorous method.  Poetry, in contrast, grows only gradually 
towards an explicit distinction between the two forms of activity; only in the fullness of 
time does their differentiation become a guide to method.35  And so too with the contrast 
between the work and the performance --- while this belongs to the ideality of words as 
such, it is at first concealed in the activity of the poet. 
 To comprehend how poetry realizes the ideality of language, let us  begin by 
asking three questions. How do poems evolve from the medium of ordinary language? 
How does this effortless and end-less artisanship become laborious? And, at last, how 
does the work become a performance?     
* 
 Let us approach the first question. Till now we have spoken mainly of the 
evolution of words and their semantic possibilities, perhaps giving rise to the impression 
that ordinary language is simply a collection of words. Yet, as should already be evident, 
words never exist singly, but only in sentences, paragraphs, conversations, harangues, 
diatribes, and even just in private thoughts.  They live in relation to each other and to 
speakers in a community and in a world. Thus, if we speak of ordinary language as the 
environment for workaday words, we must include grammar as well as decorum.  At the 
same time, if ordinary language involves the transformation from the pure ideality of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
34 Even the making of a tutu, for example, requires great labor. {Perhaps a citation} 
35 Footnote on the strange relation between representational poetry and representational painting.  
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words to a more constrained ideality, this must be thought of as a free activity, guided by 
past usages, but essentially unconstrained, an unfathomable wellspring of ever new 
combinations of words. That either a group of words, or a pattern through which words 
are connected, would itself gel together into a combination that repeats itself ever anew, 
becoming part and parcel to the workaday commerce of words, is, itself, an amazing 
event.  It represents a new artifact of language, a new form of ideality, and the basis of a 
new sort of human politics.  Since the order of ordinary language is the free combination 
of repeated elements, such an event is, simply, extraordinary.     
 We will refer to these repeated word-combinations and patterns as sayings, 
understanding by this not only pithy expressions of encrusted common sense, but any 
way of speaking that lodges itself in a community of speakers.  These are many and 
diverse.   It is important that we speak at once both of word-groupings and grouping-
patterns, since the two are quite closely related, not only in their genesis, but in their 
ideality.  Each, as it were, provides the niche for the other.   



















           A. Connections of Words.             
  
i. social orientations. 
 
        a. names. 
 . names of family member. 
 . proper names.  
b specialization of labor, social divisions, age categories.         
        c.  moral qualities and epithets.  
d.  words that establish relations: swears, promises, vows, coronation formula. 
e.   insults.    
    
ii. natural orientations. 
 
a. descriptions of the relations of spiritual beings, forces. 
b. descriptions of the relations of things that we interact with through techniques. 
 
   .animals and plants. 
       . orientations in space. 
       . orientations in time.  
       . causal sequences.  
       . geometric relations. 
       . algebraic sequences 
       . animals and natural 
       . tools. 
        . consumable goods. 
        . shelters. 
     . clothing. 
        . ritual objects. 
     . sounds. 
     .colors 
     . meteorological events. 
     . features of the natural landscape. 
         . distinctions of natural materials. 
         . language. 
        
iii. political orientations (joining together social relations and natural relations) 
 The connection of words in relation to the connection of events        
 
                .common sense wisdom and sentential. 
     . modes of argumentation. 
    . story telling and narration--- sacred and profane.       
      . jokes.  










B. Connections of Sounds. 
 
 i. according to the sounds of phonemes. 
 
                . onomatopoetic word combinations. 
                . rhymes. 
      . melody, 
      . puns. 
      . diminutives. 
 
 ii. according to metrical schemes.  
       
 iii. in relation to the speaker as speaker. 
 
       tongue twisters. 
 
 iv. in relation to nature. 
 
       spells and incantations. 
      
   
 This list is neither decisive nor complete; these are not meant as categories that 
would exhaustively cover the phenomena in question, allowing them to be grouped after 
their place in the order of things, but only as land-markers, guides that help us find our 
way across the rough terrain of language.  In this sense, all we wish to do is display a 
work that has already been done.  These designations themselves could have only 
evolved in circulation with a set of terms that have entered into a nearer relation to teach 
other, and thus they already express man’s efforts to orient himself within the ever-
evolving medium of language.  And indeed, some of these sayings may have originally 
been united, or stood in a very near relationship to one another.  In a totemic religion, for 
example, animals are brought into familiar relations with communities and individuals. 
And proper names may have reflected the division of labor or even more fluid social 
groupings, changing over the course of a persons life, or as they entered into new sets of 
relationships. Or in an animistic culture, practically everything appears as a spiritual 
force.  Human activities that we nowadays think of a mere techniques may also have a 
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ritual function, entering into an immanent relation to spiritual forces.  Furthermore, 
though, many of these functions may come to combine together, if they were not so 
originally; rhythmic patterns of words and melodies the most obvious example.  
 Considering all these together, however, we might draw a rather fundamental 
distinction.  Some, it seems, are far more crafty --- oriented more directly towards 
political interaction in the broadest sense, between human beings and with nature as a 
whole.  Others, more playful.  And in the general, the sayings listed under A tend towards 
the former, and those listed under B towards the latter, though at the same time A iii and 
B iv both appear to include more transitional forms.  That it should turn out this way 
follows from the nature of ordinary language.  While the words of ordinary language 
acquire their meaning by circulating around narrower perspective, they remain, as 
sounds, close kin to the pure ideality of phonemes. The playful interaction of meanings 
stands at a farther remove from ordinary language, and requires relatively involved and 
belabored forms, such as story-telling.  But as phonetic combinations, words contain an 
almost irrepressible, explosive ideal potency; they are always able to burst into puns or 
alliterations or rhyme --- and of a sudden they simply sound, and sound simple.  Before 
they needed two feet to stand in the world, but now, relieved from the graveness of 
things, they throw up their leg and their toes point obliquely at the ground… and they 
spin; a pirouette, that spots the world.   
 All of these sayings are extraordinary, and all look askance at the graveness of 
ordinary language, tending towards a pure ideality of meanings and sounds.  The 
difference between the crafty and the playful rests only in the time and labor needed for 
spiritual effluvium of language to evaporate off from its particular concentrations. Puns 
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and jokes are like flashes of heat against a droplet of water; story telling, speechifying, 
and argumentation a more tedious distillation.    
The various genre of human language stitch together these different sayings, and 
in this way move towards the truly extraordinary --- the fluid interaction of all words, and 
in every language.   This need not ever appear as anyone’s explicit goal, and yet it 
emerges as the common tendency of all their labors; as when the snow on a high peak 
melts away under the breath of all-promising spring, and gathers into the little rivulets 
that, forcing their passage through the beds of snow and ice, resurface into streams and, 
converging like the branches of a tree as they gather strength and weave between the 
mountain’s shoulders, wend their way to the valley and to the coast, and empty into the 
lakes and seas and oceans, where, among their fellows, they await the rays of a 
rejuvenated sun, and, born up towards the heavens, enjoy at last their freest intercourse. 
* 
 First and foremost among these genre --- we will name and arrange them in due 
time --- is poetry.  It earns its rank not as the noblest, nor as a work of genius, but simply 
on account of its ideality. For not only does it contain the possibilities of all the other 
modes of language that have been worked out, but, as we shall see, also provides a real 
moment of transition.   
 The different sayings that we mentioned all flow together in the coarse of 
workaday life.  Their combinations thus realize a degree of organization and ideality, and 
yet, nevertheless, they remain joined to a context, a real arrangement of activities outside 
of language itself.  This does not mean, as some would propose, that their significance is 
exhausted in the arrangement of phenomena beyond mere words, or that the mere playful 
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fusion of words should be treated as derivative or parasitic; only that more complicated 
confluences of saying seldom appear and reappear without finding some kind of 
environment in extraneous modes of activity.  The most idle, empty talk, in this way, 
tends also towards the most mundane; it circumambulates around either the earth’s 
meteorological peregrinations, the activity of nature that most nearly touches us, or 
around the private lives of other people.   
Talking about the weather, and gossip, are, as it were, the playful limits of 
workaday language, which, even here, is always about something.36 But because they 
emerge effortlessly whenever people’s intercourse is not focused around a specific 
activity, they are also the most ordinary, and common  --- the white noise of daily life. 
Poetry, in contrast, is seldom, rare --- and if it earns it name and its keep, precious.  For 
to begin, let us define poetry negatively, and in contrast to the ideality of workaday of 
language.37  It is simply the potential for an occasionless, though not necessarily 
unoccasioned, fusion of sayings.  Of sayings, we stress, and not simply of words.  The 
free fusion of words --- rhyme and meter, jokes, puns,    --- belongs among the different 
sayings, and, in and of themselves, would produce only random, sporadic linkages. As 
such, it could not explain how an extremely long chain of words --- tens of thousands --- 
is able to repeat itself outside of the context of its provenance.  But this is precisely what 
we must be able to explain; this, simply put, is the particular ideality of poetry, which can 
practically be observed when we consider the after-life of the great works of lyric, epic, 
and drama.38    
                                                          
36 Footnote, Sein und Zeit.  
37 We must vigorously disagree with the claim that poetry came before more prosaic forms of speech… 
38 Footnote, Benjamin on the Nachleben. 
 182
Regarding poetry in its proper mode of ideality, or rather, and better, simply as 
this ideality, we see, first of all, that poetry allows for all of the different sayings to come 
together.  Man’s activity is, as we have seen, bound up with his body and its limitations; 
the body only touches against nature and other bodies through a narrow perspective of 
activity, or rather, it is this perspective.  Expressing itself only through configurations of 
sayings that gel together as we go about our business, busying ourselves with our bodies 
and their needs, human language must itself come to appear fragmented.  Poetry, 
however, if free, if only potentially, of all extrinsic contextualization, must allow for the 
confluence of all of these different forms of saying. The index of this capacity is its very 
ability to outlive its author; poetry, indeed, presupposes the death of its author.  Yet while 
this, ultimately, is a possibility of all words, and belongs to their very existence as 
artifacts, it nevertheless is a possibility that must be realized.  Or indeed, the potential of 
poetry is itself but an extraordinary realization of the ideality of words; and this potential 
must itself be realized, and not without great labor --- as we shall see ---, by the poet.    
 Stitching together all the different ways that people have of speaking about things, 
and thus joining in a single action the different perspectives through which man relates to 
his environment, poetry seems to have the unique ability to represent not merely 
individual feelings, situations, or objects, but an entire world.  And since poetry emerges 
out of a community bound together by a fairly homogenous language --- which is to say, 
a set of common words that flow through the mouths and ears of a fairly large number of 
speakers, who most likely are situated in a given region and time, and drawn together into 
certain common community-sustaining activities --- it seems, moreover, to convey not 
just any world, or the world, but the world of certain historical people.  This has been 
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said, above all about epic, and has almost become a common-place of the German 
philosophic tradition, from Herder, through Schiller and Hegel, to Lukacs and even 
Heidegger.39  And it is, in a sense, true.  But it must be properly understood, and outside 
of all mystifications. It is first of all a function of the ideality of poetry, the free 
commerce that it allows between sayings, and, strictly speaking, it does not involve the 
representation of a reality extrinsic to the language of words, but merely of the potentials 
for speaking that have evolved in communication with such reality, but now, as it were, 
have come into their own.  Thus, while such a work of poetry might only be able to 
emerge through the consciousness of an exceptional individual with a particularly far-
ranging grasp of the interconnectedness of human activity, it is meaningless to speak of it 
as a work of genius, as if the potential were created through some kind of wholly 
extraordinary creative act, and did not already rest latent in language.  And equally 
senseless is the conviction that it expresses the genius of a people blessed with a 
particularly fortunate relation to nature.  There are reasons why such a confluence has 
become almost, if not wholly, impossible in the modern world, but this rests not in some 
kind of “spirit of the people,” a wholly untenable metaphysical abstraction, but rather in 
the institutionalization of society and language.   
 It is also wrong, or meaningless, to say that a work of poetry, or even a given 
language --- as if we could speak of such a thing with any rigor, contains the possibilities 
for the historical life of a community.  The real life of a community reaches far farther, 
and contains infinitely greater details, than even the greatest work of epic poetry, or even 
an entire language at any given point of time, could express.   
                                                          
39 Footnote, if only giving references. 
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 And finally, we should not think that only epic poetry possesses this capacity.  It 
belongs to all poetry, lyric no less than epic. And often, the former proves far more agile 
than its more austere counterpart.  Compare Catallus’s little love songs and praises to the 
joys of the everyday with Vergil’s plodding epic; the first effervesces and overflows with 
life, the latter sits like a heavy scaffold around an edifice already succumbing to the time 
that it protests.     
 If the poem is to disburden the sayings of men from their workaday world and 
join them together freely, and if these freely-linked sayings are to survive to be spoken by 
the mouths of men, it must be playful in its composition.  Not that it need have been 
created without an ulterior motive on the part of the poet --- this, indeed, is neither a 
sufficient nor necessary cause of playfulness.40  Rather, true playfulness concerns the way 
the words and sayings of a poem themselves interact; these must involve within 
themselves limitless and deep possibilities. Every part of the poem, as it were, must allow 
a different, and perhaps multiple, perspective upon the whole; it must forbid any sort of 
synoptic gaze, but like the painting, all its aspects must circulate and pair off freely.  The 
ear, as before the eye, must dance.  For only in this way could a poem outlive its world, 
and even its language, living on into an age where its own words would only be 
understood through the rigorous work of the philologue, perhaps only through the 
evidence that it itself provides.  The hapax legomena; spoken once, heard endlessly, 
brings poetry to the limit of its ideality.41 
 Playfulness is simply the adaptability of poems, and no less objective a fact than 
the endless ways in which an individual organism is able to behave towards its 
                                                          
40 Footnote on Pindar. 
41 The sillyness of denying multiple readings. 
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environment, or the manifold combinatorial possibilities present in the genetic material of 
a species.  And yet poems, unlike animals, are not, first of all, the products of a natural 
evolution, but human artifacts, and thus we must ask how the poet, as an artisan, makes 
his works playful, even if this is not his explicit intention. 
 This playfulness, it would seem, should be the very easiest thing in the world.  For 
aren’t words born naked and frolicking, and doesn’t a free commerce belong to their 
outermost potential, and thus to their innermost being?  Surely.  Yet words must become 
saying before they can be poems; they must be baptized into the world outside, 
gravitating towards narrowed perspectives, before they could congregate to themselves 
and commune in their ideality.   
 And so it is, in fact, the most difficult thing on earth, and the poet’s craft by far 
the most tedious.  
* 
 Embroidered into the Iliad and Odyssey are many tender and loving descriptions 
of human labor and craft.  Yet the most attentive eye rests upon the handwork of women, 
and perhaps there is no image so famous or so beautiful as Penelope unweaving by night 
the labors of the day.  What could be more tedious? It seems to demand an almost 
inhuman patience --- inhuman, truly, for it is to labor as nature labors --- ever undoing its 
own work, running circles around itself.  But aren’t all our doings futile and inhuman in 
just this way?  The labors of the everyday are, in the end, nothing more than a gaily-
colored shroud we weave to cover a corpse --- and, soon, both shall find their home 
beneath the earth.   And so, to unweave what we weave is not only the most tedious of 
labors, but also the most playful.  For it squeezes itself between birth and death, and 
 186
allows life to appear as our own play-time.  Only by submitting to our mortality, and 
becoming as nature, could our life become playful, become life.   
 Homer, no less than Sophocles, knew what all men know; namely, that none of 
man’s ways and machinations could evade death. Here nature's work touches us back 
with an unyielding, yet tireless efficiency.  And where would Odysseus’s twists and 
turns, devises and schemes, have brought him, in the end, were it not for Penelope.  
Patience was, perhaps, her only craft, and yet this alone could crown his hoary years with 
the fleeting joys that had been deprived him by war and wandering.  Undoing his father’s 
shroud, she tugged together the restless squiggles of his life back into a single knot.    
 Penelope’s playful patience is a mirror held up to the poet’s own work; in this 
image the entire poet’s craft is reflected, and yet its polarity reversed. For rather than 
creating playtime from the tedium of the everyday, of man’s limited , the poet 
makes the most effervescent play, the play of words, labored, in order, in this way, to 
overcome the very elaboration to which, on their own, they tend. Let us explain. 
* 
 Before it was suggested that we do not contrive to have words come to mind. 
They simple do.  It should now be clear why this is so.  Because words are, to begin with, 
and of essence, purely ideal, lacking any semantic determination, and existing, as it were, 
only as a phonetic representation, they are empty, involving nothing that would guide 
their intercourse.42  If they gain a degree of stability in their meaning, it is only by 
entering into circulations with other words and real activities.43  In and of themselves 
                                                          
42 This actually contradicts my earlier discussion of words.  I must mention that the first discussion is 
provisional. 
43 I think that this might explain several easily observed phenomena of mental life. First, that it can 
sometimes be so extraordinarily difficult to recall words.  Secondly, that it is almost impossible the flow of 
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they are always . A specific speech or thought situation opens up like a 
vortex in the word-scape of our minds, and more or less appropriate words, bubbling 
forth, pour into it.  This is how all our sayings come about, and institute themselves, 
allowing for workaday language. But if we have nothing specific to do or say, if our 
thoughts wander, words continue to bubble forth, only now with a restless agitation. 
Sitting still, at our leisure, surrounded by nothing, without worry or concern, with nothing 
on our mind, --- nothing pressing against and influencing its activity like a finger on a 
plasma bulb --- this condition becomes almost insufferable; we feel as though we were 
verging on madness.44 
 If poetry were nothing more than madness, it would be easy. Mere wordplay is 
but the restless state of our mind at rest.  Yet poetry, as we know, requires the playful 
confluence of sayings.  How could these be brought forth, without being, at once, pulled 
away towards some particularly activity?   
* 
 Needed, simply, is an opening, a playground where sayings, called into existence, 
could interact amidst themselves without being pulled off into the sphere of extrinsic 
activities, where they could play off, and resonate with, through, and against each other.  
Playful composition, in other words, requires, first of all, a distance from the everyday.  
To a degree, it is irrelevant how sayings are called into existence as long as they are able 
to commerce freely before being composed; above all, in other words, they must simply 
have the room to develop a life of their own. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
words that constantly seems to invade our consciousness.  Thirdly, that non-sense words and bazaar, 
senseless combinations constantly gel together and dissolve. Forth, that our sanity depends not so much on 
the absence of crazy thoughts, as on inhibitions that keep us from saying everything that comes to mind.  
44 Footnote: Karl Philipp Moritz. 
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 How do human communities create such a space?  
We should not think that it must be private and individual. It is quite possible, for 
example, that certain ritualized forms of activity could create a communal playground by 
excluding the more pressing concerns of daily life.  And perhaps, indeed, the notion of 
the sacred, and of sacred, ritual spaces, rigidly separated from a profane realm, might 
even play a role in creating the collective conditions for poetry.  Nor, indeed, need we 
suppose that there must only one possible way of creating such a playground, or that 
there is any sort of straightforward genesis of forms.  Rather, there might be many, 
working either together, or separately, and may include either more-or-less purposeful 
techniques of bodily cultivation, such as meditation, or evolve as an offshoot of human 
labor, or even through purely physiological conditions, such as blindness.   
  But among all these different methods, one has been of particularly decisive 
significance for we ordinarily speak of as poetry.  Namely, meter and verse.  It may seem 
strange even to speak of meter and verse as poetics methods, --- paths, as it were, to 
poetic composition.  Normally, they are thought to belong to the definition of genre.  
Verse is what distinguishes poetry, as a specific genre of literature, from prose, and the 
differing sub-genre of poetry are further differentiated, at least in part, according to their 
metrical conventions.  Meter and verse, in other words, are what allow us to identify 
something as poetry simply through the recognition of a repeating pattern.  They refer 
only to the poem as a finished product, and have nothing to do with its genesis. Such an 
understanding must prove inadequate.  For in effect, it reduces poetic creativity to an 
aspect of its createdness; the rules of versification, as they appear in the poem as a 
finished product, are seen as a limit and constraint to the poet’s creativity.  This sets up a 
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false opposition between formalism and anti-formalism.  In the former, the poet is 
legitimated as poet by following the conventions.  In the latter, they are seen as 
hindrances to a true creativity, which, however, rather than remaining freely playful, 
inevitably submits to some other extrinsic purpose.45 As soon as we regard verse and 
meter not as facts about poems, but as possible conditions of their genesis, this opposition 
disappears, and we can begin to see the mechanism of poetry as a path towards genuine, 
which is to say freely political, creativity.   
 How is it, then, that verse and meter create such an opening and playground? 
Simply by creating a space for words.   
As they appear in sayings, volleyed back and forth in the talk that belongs to the 
everyday, words are without a room of their own.  This is not to say that they are 
crowded together; in fact they circulate throughout the entire outside world, but this is not 
their own space, but the space of an extrinsic activity, --- roughly speaking, the space of 
other things, or even other words.  And thus it does not give them room to mingle freely 
on their own; they are as servants, always shuffling about from one task or another, 
scarcely able even to look askance at each other as they go about their daily routine.  
They do have their own time, yet this orders them one after another, each giving way to 
the next.  While it does allows them to respond to each other, not only through a 
conversation, but within every action of speech, this responsiveness is not yet playful; it 
does not tarry in an ongoing dialogue between words and sayings, but always rushes 
towards the next things, opening towards infinity, and seldom curving back towards what 
was said. 
                                                          
45 Footnore: Dichtunstheorie of the German Enlightenment.  Lessing as returning to Aristotle to provide a 
mediation between the two. 
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Verse and meter transform this restless sequentiality, the ever-needy, thirsty time 
of an endless, never satisfied conversation into a spacious time; dűrftige Zeit into 
geraume Zeit.   
   Through metrification, words are articulated into syllables.  The ideality that 
belonged to the pure commerce of phonemes, we recall, was obscured and forgotten as 
phonemes joined together into words, fixing the sonority around a repeated pattern.  
While a syllable does not yet express potential of a phoneme, it marks a movement 
towards its restoration.  
These syllables, moreover, acquire a temporal-spatial index; they are either long 
or short.  Duration, indeed, always belongs to a spacious time; for it implies a gradual 
progression, rather than the mere one-after-another of moments.  Space itself unfolds, as 
it were, as the time that can always discovered between times, linking together every now 
moment into a continuum. 
Joined together into feet, the long and short syllable open up to the dimension of 
height.  They become either iambic or trochaic; lifting or lilting, and as they flow 
together, they seem as waves, either rising to or dropping from the crest.   
These feet are then gathered together into a single metrical line, and these metrical 
patterns are repeated through versification. Verse, literally, represents a curving-back of 
the linear advance of speech.  By turning from one line to the next, a space emerges into 
which words may fit, and in which they gain a playful proximity to each other.  No 
longer does one word rush on to the next, but it seems almost as if they were all 
communicating with each other at once, reciprocally developing their possibilities.  Their 
collection within the space of verse allows for each to read the other; for the first time, 
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words become legible.  And it is just such a legibility that allows the very composition of 
the poem. Sayings enter into this meandering space of versification and communicate 
with each other; playing off of each other, testing each other out, they enter into ever 
changing configurations.  Some sayings make their exit, while others take their place. 
Through this playful interaction, an arrangement of sayings and words emerge that sound 
off each other with an almost endlessly subtlety.  Every word, perhaps every syllable, 
seems to resonate with its companions; they harmonize.  Such an arrangement is able to 
survive beyond a particular context within a community of speakers; it seems to have a 
life of its own, and needs neither reason nor occasion to be repeated.46 
We might simply think of these playgrounds as environments where poems can 
evolve.  This evolution may simply be the effortless result of a confluence of speakers in 
a community; sayings join together and are communicated from speaker to speaker in 
ever mutating forms, and sometimes, from out of this constant interchange, combinations 
appear that have, as it were, a particularly high degree of resonance.  These become 
relatively resistant to change, and able, therefore, to perpetuate themselves in an abiding 
form.  
Poetry, in other words, is not necessarily laborious.  It only becomes so as the 
work of an individual poet, cultivating a private playground as the soil from which his 
poems will grow.  Moving back and forth across the field opened up by versification, he 
must test every saying against the others, constantly reconfiguring them, and by dint only 
of his own toil, weeding out the less seemly formations. He must, in other words, perform 
Penelope’s work, unweaving by night what he has woven by day, and constantly holding 
his work up to a touchstone to see if it rings true.  Only by laboriously duplicating the 
                                                          
46 The laws of harmony in music serve an analogous function. 
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playful work of nature could the poet create a poem that itself bursts forth with the life of 
nature, the constant, infinitely subtle, interplay of part with part.  Duplication, not 
imitation, is the proper mode of poesis; poetry is the unweaving weaving duplication 
through words of nature’s infinitely involved folds.  
The poet has always striven after immortality through his words, and, sometimes, 
though seldom, these have obliged.  Yet unlike the hero’s far-flung fame, this immortality 
is not gained for the individual, is never his possession, but belongs only to his words 
themselves, in and of themselves.  For it is the ideality that words gain once they have 
divested themselves of their every tether, and have come into their own.  The poet, as it 
were, becomes immortal only by unweaving his own shroud.   
In the words of Hölderlin; 
Denn die Sterbliches nur besorgt, es empfäng sie die Erde, 
  Aber näher zum Licht wandern, zum Aether hinauf 
Sie, die inniger Liebe treu, und göttlichem Geiste 
  Hoffend und duldend und still über das Schicksal gesiegt. 
    
Hopeful, and patient, and quiet --- removed from the screams of men --- the poet tends 











   
             Die Eichbäume 
 
Aus den Gärten komm ich zu euch, ihr Söhne des Berges! 
Aus den Gärten, da lebt die Natur geduldig und häuslich, 
Pflegend und wieder geflegt mit dem fleißigen Menschen zusammen. 
Aber ihr, ihr Herrlichen! steht, wie ein Volk von Titanen 
In der zahmeren Welt und gehört nur euch und dem Himmel,  
Der euch nährt’ und erzog, und der Erde, die euch geboren. 
Keiner von euch ist noch in die Schule der Menschen gegengen, 
Und ihr drängt euch fröhlich und frei, aus der kräftigen Wurzel,  
Unter einander herauf und ergreift, wie der Adler die Beute,  
Mit gewaltigem Arme den Raum, und gegen Wolken 
Ist euch heiter und groß die sonnige Krone gerichtet. 
Eine Welt ist jeder von euch, wie die Sterne des Himmels 
Lebt ihr, jeder ein Gott, in freiem Bunde zusammen. 
Könnt ich die Knechschaft nur erdulden, ich neidete nimmer 
Diesen Wald und schmiegte mich gern ans gesellige Leben. 
Fesselte nur nich mehr ans gesellige Leben das Herz mich,  
Das von Liebe nicht läßt, wie gern würd ich unter euch wohnen! 
 
  
 The garden is, simply, the meeting ground of man’s labors and nature’s. Here the 
two live together, tending each other and tended for in turn.  It is the germ of a political 
community, and stands off from both the noisy screams and chastisements of the one and 
the deranging omnipotence of the other.  Nature and man alike become patient and 
domestic, as he, through his industry, cultivates its growth towards his needs.  And it is 
here too that the poet learns his patient and attentive craft.   Yet poetry is also always a 
movement out of the garden, and towards nature as it lives gaily and freely, a world to 
itself. Stretching between the earth and the heavens, and bringing both into 
communication, the oak-tree touches the two poles between which all earthly nature, and 
man included, has evolved.  And so the poem, approaching the tree’s silent and playful 
labor, approaches nature as it is to itself, thus cultivating man’s own community towards 
the freier Bund, the truly free and open politics that could emerge only when we no 
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longer work against nature, even if reciprocally, pflegend und wieder geflegt, but as 
nature. 
 But how does the poet transform his garden, first into a Hain (grove) and then into 
a Wald (forest)?  
 Because the poet is himself bound by love to a lively society, to the business and 
machinations of the everyday, even if he has cultivated for himself a playground where 
the sayings of men might mingle freely and begin to live a life of their own, his poems, 
like a lovingly gardened apple-tree, will still grow towards human needs. No longer, 
indeed, in their parts, but as a whole.  They will build themselves around an object, or a 
feeling, or an event, or even an idea, or even around Heroes and Gods; around anything, 
in other words, that has precedent in the commerce of men.  And the very quiet and 
restfulness of the poet’s playground makes it all the more difficult to keep the poem as a 
whole from entering into such an orbit.  Or indeed, in this way, through a certain kind of 
occasionality, poets are first able to survive amidst the community of men, and thus their 
ideality is obscured at the very moment of their formation; they have succumbed to the 
same fate that has touched every word.  
 So it becomes the task of the poet: to overcome his love for man, to undo his 
attachment to every narrower perspective through which his labors are entwined with 
nature’s.  Only thus could he become open to nature in its totality, even towards the 
Zeitgeist, the spirit of time, that causes all to crumble (trümmert) and shake, and makes 
vain all our labors.  We are reminded of Zarathustra, … 
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Yet this is the work of the poet, not the philosopher.  Spoken with the words of men, it 
has already become too noisy. It would be better to profess an innocuous love for all 
mankind than enlist oneself to this fearsome task, for falling with the human words upon 
less subtle ears, it could only be misunderstood. And perhaps, indeed, even the poet must 
never hold this for his task, but must suppress it beneath his tongue as he goes patiently 
about his labors. Like Empedokles, he must lose his powers the moment his professes to 
them; that nature serves him --- and that he has become as nature, divine, could alone 
flow forth from the poetic word; it must become purely a question of technique.47   
* 
 As with the dancer, as with the painter, as with the componist, everything rests on 
technique; for it is only through his techniques that man is in the world, and it only the 
techniques of the artist that could outstrip every narrower perspective, and open us 
towards the whole of nature.  To submit the work of art to any other purpose, however 
lofty, is to have titans stand before the court of dwarves.  And yet, technique can never 
become a purpose in and of itself.  Purifying itself of every explicit goal, it must remain, 
simply, technique.   And this is perhaps why even nowadays, as artistic technique, 
buttressed upon thousands of years of patient craft, has reached a truly extraordinary 
degree of purity, it has, at the same time, become ever more subject to the whims of 
heavy-handed and leaden-hearted didacticism; joylessness, at a word.  That art might 
fulfill itself ever anew, and ever more gloriously, simply in the joyful, vital celebration of 
                                                          
47 Nijinsky, too, lost his divinity as soon as it came to word, and his diary, written as the symptoms of 
schizophrenia slowly drew the curtain on a dancing career that had inaugurated this mournful, wayward 
century with so many hopeful sparks, is but a sad testimony to his own death-march towards the aetna’s 
flames.    
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its medium, is a thought that troubles those who measure everything against the things 
they grasp.48 
 The poet’s technique realizes itself, first of all, in the purity of meter.  Brought 
together into a meandering, lulling flow, and granted a free and playful communion, the 
sayings must be measured solely by the interaction of their sounds, and accepted or 
rejected accordingly.  This requires not the strict fulfillment of the superficial rules of 
versification --- these, after all, are just derivative expressions of the creative act of poetry 
--- but an inly, inward appropriation of the fluence, the rheos that opens up the space 
where poetry becomes possible.  Resonating among themselves, circulating around each 
other, bubbling over with the pure life of human sounds, the syllables become fluent --- a 
dance of the mouth, a spectacle that approaches the pure ideality of phonemes.  The 
principle of versification appears not as an obscure artifice built around human language, 
but as an expression of the inner, secret life of words; the sounder existence that they 
forsook when they became meaningful by tarrying amidst the world of things, and that 
they now joyously renew under the cover of the poet’s lucubrations.   For remember: as 
soon as they joined into words, phonemes lost their playful converse.  If this is to be 
restored, it is not enough simply to bring sounds into a haphazard array, suspending all 
order, but rather, one must submit the composition of sayings to the organization of their 
sounds.  Versification concerns syllables only as they appear in words, and words only as 
they appear in sayings. Far from obliterating sayings and words, and reducing human 
language to its sounds, it allows it to express itself through and in its sonority. 
  Even as the playful intercourse of sounds approaches the absolute ideality of 
phonemes, the words and sayings do not, or must not, become meaningless.  Rather, the 
                                                          
48 Kirstein on Georg Balanchine.  
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words themselves mingle ever more freely, ever more playfully amidst themselves, and, 
leaving behind the everyday, approach their own pure ideality.  Such poetry, in other 
words, reaches towards the ideal from both sides, and like two tendons emerging from the 
opposite ends of a muscle, the semantic and the phonetic brace each other, allowing the 
poem to join together each pole with a single, effortless tug.   
* 
 Lucretius was the gayest of the ancient poets. Though wrought with the precision 
of a philosopher, his verse cannot repress its delight; it overbrims with joy at the 
workings of nature.  For nature, he knew, must not be measured against human purposes, 
and thus he dedicated his work, above all, to undoing creed that; 
Not without a power divine in ways 
So nicely tempered to the needs of men 
Could nature bring her changing seasons round 
And rouse to birth the crops, and all beside 
Which goodly Pleasure, guide to life, doth tempt 
Mankind to approach, and with her kindly hand 
Still leading on, doth lure them with the arts 
Of love their generations to renew, 
Lest human kind should perish from the earth.49  
 
De Rerum Natura, indeed, seeks nothing less than to present the spectacle of nature, 
reaching to the limits of its activity, where it least of all resembles the ways of men.  This 
may seem a rather mournful --- tristior, triste, traurig --- doctrine to the multitude, and 
thus needs the palliative of sweet-speaking Pierian song (suaviloquenti carmine Pier).50  
But for poet himself, wandering upon “dim, pathless haunts,” it is a loving, blissful labor.  
“My joy,” and where has joy burst so openly, so naively, onto the page, “it is to seek 
springs yet untasted, and drink my fill.  I long to pluck fresh flowers, and crave top win a 
                                                          
49 Lucretius, II, 167-174. 
50 Lucretius, I, 945-6. 
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glorious coronal to crown my head whence heretofore the holy sisterhood hath never 
wreathed the brows of mortal man.”51   
For Lucretius, the poet’s task is to loose man’s mind (exsolvere animum) from his 
densely-worked tethers (artis religionum … nodis) --- not only the superstitious beliefs of 
institutionalized religion, but all that binds man’s mind to the ways of a more restricted 
circulation of things.  His poetry extricates itself from every narrower vortex --- the 
swirling combination of the primal elements that give things their form, --- and opens 
itself up the primal stream of infinite matter that, through the clinamen, the original 
swerving of atoms, brings birth and death to all things.  And thus its words touch all 
things, that, however darkling, these might shine forth in the light of day. “On darksome 
ways verses so full of light, touching all things with music’s magic charm.”  Truly, his 
words are magic; and their charm, wit, humor, and grace --- their lepos --- is not only to 
touch all things, but have all things touch.  His words are leaping, as it were, and the 
work the most sublime contingency. 
 Not simply depicting the things of the world, De Rerum Natura enacts, through 
the poetic word, the very activity of nature; its topic is not the things of nature, but the 
nature of things, the very contingency and interaction of which they arise --- and thus it is 
always dislocating, deranging, and forbids the guidance of trodden paths or the support of 
a stable ground.  This close bond between the work of words and the work of nature is 
                                                          
51 Lucretius, IV, 1-19. “Avia Peiridum peragro loca nullius ante  
                        trita solo. Iuvat integros accedere fontis 
                        atque haurire, iuvatque novos decerpere flores  
           insignemque meo capiti petere inde coronam 
           unde prius nulli velarint tempora musea; 
           primum quod magnis doceo de rebus et artis  
           religionum animum nodis exsolvere pergo, 
           deinde quod obscura de re tam lucida pango 
                        carmina, musaeo contigens cuncta lepore.     
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evident, above all, in a frequently recurring motif. To explain how selfsame seeds could 
have given rise to an infinite variety of things, Lucretius compares their formation with 
his own versification; 
And oft it mattereth greatly with what sort 
Of other seeds these selfsame elements 
Are linked, and in what order, and again, 
What mutual motions they do give and take. 
For selfsame seeds build sky and sea and earth,  
Rivers, the sun, and likewise the crops and trees 
And living creatures; but they needs must move  
With varied minglings and in various ways. 
Nay, even in my verses everywhere  
Thou must confess that words and verses both  
In sense and ring of sound stand far apart. 
So much can letters do, if we but change  
Naught save their order; but the seeds of things  
Have powers more manifold to bring to bear 
Whereby they can create each several thing.52 
 
Cum tamen inter se versus ad verba necessest confiteare et re et sonitu distare sonanti.  
The translation, while admirable, doesn’t capture the implications of the Latin. To begin, 
we see that the word for thing is res.  This suggests not so much what simply is the case, 
a static fact about nature, but rather what is held to be so; it is derived from the deponent 
verb reor, to hold, deem, suppose.  The res, in other words, is the things of the nature as 
they seem to us, which is to say, as they appear in their configurations as things.  Sonitus, 
on the other hand, is not merely an inarticulate sound, like the sounds of nature, but 
                                                          
52 Lucretius, 817-829.  “atque eadem magni refert primordial saepe  
             cum quibis et quail positura contineantur 
                 et quos inter se dent motus accipiantque; 
             namque eadem caelum mare terras flumina solem 
             constituunt, eadem fruges arbusta animantis, 
              verum aliis alioque modo conmixta moventur. 
                           Quin etiam passum nostris in versibis ipsis  
             Multa elementa vides multis communia verbis, 
             Cum tamen inter se versus ad verba necessest 
             Confiteare et re et sonitu distare sonanti. 
             tantum elementa queant permutato ordino solo; 
             at rerum quae sunt primordial, plura adhibere 
             possunt unde queant variae res quaeque creari.   
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suggests speech and response; it includes both the sonority of man and of nature, indeed 
every form of resonance and responsiveness.  Finally, distare means both to differ from, 
but also, and more literally, to stand off from.  Thus, taking note of the ablative forms of 
re and sonitu, (?) and the emphatic repetition of the root sonus through the dative 
participle, we might translate this passage in the following way; that both verse and 
word, among themselves, stand off from each other, in respect to both the supposed thing 
and the responsive sound, in their sounding.  Verse and word resonate among, and off 
each other, and thus gain distance to each other even as they are brought together; they 
join into a community of responsibility, and only in this way might approach the far 
greater creative powers of nature. 
 Yet this nearing of sonitus and res also marks the limit of Lucretius’s poetry. 
Though organized through the development of its themes and the recurrence of various 
Leitmotif, his work is, in the end, a vast streaming of words; not only deranging, but 
overwhelming.  And in this respect, it duplicates the spectacle of nature that unfolds from 
its page.  In the beginning, the particles of the universe move only in one direction, 
downwards into the depths of the void, and it is only through the slightest deviation from 
their coarse that they strike against each other and begin to coarse around each other, 
entering into the circulations and arrangement and reciprocal interchanges that give birth 
to things.   
 Because the universe is, at first, but one vast downward flowing stream, all things, 
in the end, are brought apart from themselves; they are, as it were, pulled off from 
themselves and towards infinity, submitting, at last, to an only ever slightly deranged 
unidirectly, a onewardness, as we might say.  The declination of nature, like the verse of 
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poetry, is the source of all creativity, curving, and curbing, the straightforwardness of the 
elements.  Such a poetry, and such a nature, could never be comprehended by, and could 
never comprehend, a freely political community.  For even as the agency of man is 
brought into a harmony with the agency of nature, both, at their fringe, veer off into a 
restless flowing.  They are not yet curved back to eternity, but for this to be, they must 
have been curved to begin with.  Rather than the eddy swirling out of the clashing waters 
of the stream, the streams must itself stream out of the eddy.  
* 
 End rhyme is only one of the ways in which the poem’s sonorities, fixed within 
the curving lines of verse, become responsive to one another. And indeed, it may seem 
rather to deaden than quicken the inner life of sounds. For its more striking, if not 
altogether monotonous, repetition easily overwhelms assonance, consonance, alliteration, 
euphony and cacophony, and all the more subtle, unnamed techniques of the poet. Yet 
here, as before, we must not regard rhyme as a mere genre-designation.   Rhyme is, no 
more than meter, merely a superficial form applied either to brake a reckless creativity or 
fuel a barren craft. Rather, it is at once a space in which a new manner of poetic creativity 
becomes possible, and an expression of the inly, intimate sonority of words.   
This new space, this new playground is built upon the groundwork laid by meter.  
This, as we saw, regulates the flow of syllables, the rhythm, in order that the sonorities of 
words might freely interact.  The metrical qualities of the words and syllables thus almost 
disappear behind their sonorities; their feet become as quiet as possible, like the humblest 
waiters bringing food and wine to the king’s banquet, or, indeed, like the feet of 
Balanchine’s dancers.  Rhyme, in similar fashion, has little to do with the sonority of 
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language.  Rather, it covers and sets a table around which the different verses could 
assemble, each facing towards the others, mingling together, some coming, some going, 
until they settle upon the most agreeable company.  The verses, in other words, become 
conversant, and if before they spiraled outwards into an infinite play of sound and 
meaning, now they converge upon the joy of a single moment.  If the poetry of old had 
tended towards the weighty and all-encompassing, now, following the light footsteps of 
Sappho, Pindar, Catullus, it touches at the most ephemeral.  The poet becomes what, 
before, had remained a wish; totum nasum, all nose, breathing in the fleeting scents of 
youth as they waft through the riven air. Yet these transient joys, concentrated into a 
single moment, are at once already curved back into eternity.  Joined together with a 
sparing array of threads, the verses await the tug that will pull them together into a single 
not, folding each corner into the other, like an origami.53 
 Rhyme, then, should never be thought of principally as a pattern of sounds, but as 
an index, almost empty of its own content or qualities, and serving simply to bind 
together, to tabulate the different verses, divide these into strophe, and knot them back 
into a single poem.  Ideally, the end-rhymes should attract no special attention to 
themselves, but must grant a playful and equilibrial commerce amongst all the sonorities.   
{discussion of the canzone) 
 Yet rhyme presents new dangers.  Expressing the eternity of the most ephemeral 
moment, it stands in a near relation to true reason --- the reason, namely, of a free 
politics, that measures man’s actions against the activity of all of nature, and that is thus 
always, in the end, cyclical, expressing nature as a system of circulations.  Yet this true 
reason is easily confused with the mere reasoning of logical argumentation, itself but one 
                                                          
53 Footnote: Tristan vs. Nibelunglied. 
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among many of the forms of saying which join together in poetry.  Such reasoning 
exhibits itself, above all, in the syllogisms of Aristotle’s logic. Bringing a major and 
minor premise together into a conclusion, they assume a tertiary form that is easily 
duplicated by the alternating patterns of end rhymes. It is, indeed, almost impossible for 
rhyme to keep from falling into furrows draw through ordinary language by this narrower 
reasoning.  The rushing onslaught of words caves in the sides of the light patterns that 
rhyme etches into the surface of language, revealing the subterranean labyrinths that 
order our thoughts.   
 Having lost its concentric equilibrium, its roundness and fullness, the poem could 
survive only by having a point.  It becomes a vector, no longer expressing the circle of 
eternity, but only a unidirectional act of reasoning with a more or less clear meaning and 
purpose.  In the extreme case, rhyming poetry collapses into the limerick; a joke with a 
punch line.  Here, the rhyme serves no other end than to articulate an ever-predictable, 
syllogistic structure, and thus appears all the more emphatically, drowning out all the 
other sonorous qualities of the words, and forbidding their freer intercourse.  The poem 
becomes disposable. 
* 
 Walking along the Ilissus, beyond the walls of Athens, Phaedrus asks Socrates if 
he believes the story that Boreas carried of Oreithyia by the stream.  Unlike the wise men, 
Socrates does not disbelieve the myth, and will not try to account for it through a chance 
series of natural events.  Though charming (), such reasoning is too much the 
work of a crafty, pains-taking, and not altogether fortunate man (    
     ).  Unfortunate, since now he must explain 
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the forms of the centaurs, chimera, Gorgons, and Pegas --- a task that would require a 
great deal of leisure ().  Socrates does not have the leisure for all of this.  As he 
explains; 
I am not yet able, as the Delphic inscription has it, to know myself; so 
it seems to me ridiculous, when I do not yet know that, to investigate 
irrelevant things.  And so I dismiss these matters and accepting the 
customary beliefs about them, as I was saying just now, I investigate 
not these things, but myself, to know whether I am a monster more 
complicated and more furious than Typhon or a gentler and simpler 
creature, to whom a divine and quiet lot is given by nature.  
 
, 
‘  ‘,  
.   
Hearing out the resonances of Plato’s carefully crafted words, we might translate: 
whether I chance to be a brute more thickly tangled and more storm-struck than the 
raging storm wind, or a tamer, more everyday, and simpler living being, and having, by 
nature, a share in a divine and storm-less lot.    
This question poses itself to both the philosopher and the poet, yet differently to 
each.  For the philosopher, it is a question that --- so conceived --- could only be 
answered through knowledge of himself, of what he is by nature.  And thus he retreats 
from the mythos, and turns inside himself, concerned only with the nature of man and no 
longer with nature as a whole; and so he confines within the city walls --- as Socrates 
explains to Phaedrus, ’ , 
‘’ . The open spaces of the country and the trees don’t wish to 
teach me anything, but the men in the city do. The limits to his answer are thus marked 
out in advanced, prescribed through the method of his inquiry; for even if he finds 
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nothing at all, having turned from nature and its way of acting, he could never discover 
that he just happens to be. He is barred off from . The poet, on the other hand, seeks 
the answer by stepping outside, and outside himself, beyond the city walls and beyond 
the garden --- entering into a converse with nature and with its actions, and even if it 
means realizing that his own fate is storm-blown. But what is more: the poet understands 
that the answer is never to be found, only invented, worked out laboriously through his 
craft, and is to be sought only where the simplicity of the divine meets with the endlessly-
wrought chaos of the storm-cloud; deus sive natura. 
The poet, in other words, steps towards the tree. ,     
 ’     ,  ‘  ‘. But, my friend, amidst our 
words, was this not the tree to which you were leading us.  And in this way, he comes to 
understand that what nature is, and what man could be, is neither purely simply nor 
purely chaotic, nor half-way between the two extremes, but both at once ---- the most 
highest degree of complexity folded together into a single node.   
Hölderlin, knew, as none before him, to listen to the trees, winds, and streams, 
and even centaurs; and perhaps, we might wager, this is what he meant by a freier Bund. 
* 
 Both Classical meter and Romantic rhyme open man up towards a true, all-
comprehending, politics; and yet, in the end, both lose their grip on the freier Bund.  The 
former, because it opens too wide itself in the chaos () of the open country (), 
and the latter because it becomes too restricting, squeezing words into a simplicity that 
does them violence.  Within the early tradition of German literature, these two poetic 
fates are brought to their disturbing consequence in its two great epics, both of which, 
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standing at the crossroads between Christianity and Paganism, mark out a separate path. 
Turning in the one direction, and falling back into the ever-receding heathen world is Der 
Nibelunge Nôt, whose verse itself marks the transition towards the rhyming forms of 
European poetry.54 The first half is almost joyous in tone; raised amidst nature, blessed 
with its powers, and conversant in its speech Sîfrit, radiates hope across the grim and 
brutal world of men. When, leaning over to drink from a forest spring, he is slain with his 
own spear, the epic, as if divided by a caesura, takes a new path.  With an extraordinary 
tact, the poet at once marks the incomparable sadness of his death, and draws attention to 
the brunne, the Quelle, and origin, from which hero and kind alike draw their life; 
Die Sîfrides tugende     wâren harte grôz. 
Den schilt er leite nider,    aldâ der brunne vlôz. 
Swie harte sô in durste,      der helt doch niene tranc, 
ê daz der künic getrunke;    des sagt er im vil boesen danc. 
 
Der brunne der was küele,      lûter unde guot. 
Gunther sich dô neicte      nider zuo der flout. 
Als er het’ getrunken,     dô riht er sich von dan. 
Alsam het ouch gerne       der küene Sîfrit getân.  
 
Do engalt er sîner zühte,   den bogen unt daz swert, 
daz truoc allez Hagene     von im dannewert. 
dô sprang er hín wídere,     dâ  er den gêr dâ vant. 
er sach nâch einem bilde     an des küenen gewant. 
 
  Dâ der herre Sîfrit       ob dem brunnen tranc, 
  er schôz in durch das kriuze,   daz von der wunden spranc 
  daz bluot im von dem herzen      vaste an Hagene wât. 
  sô grôze missewende      ein helt nummer mêr begât55 
 
Not a wicked deed, but a missewende, a misturn or misstep.  The poem hinges on this 
moment of catastrophe; afterwards, and with a brutal intensity, it declines towards the 
east, where the brothers, marching to their end, bring entire feudal world into their 
maelstrom.  
                                                          
54 “Im rhythmischen Ablauf des Verses neigt der Dichter zu einer gebändigten Freiheit. Die höfische 
Dichtung erstrebt als Ideal den regelmäßigen Wechsel von Hebung und einsilbiger Senkung (Alternation).  
Zu einem starren Gesetz macht sie es nicht.  Kein Dichter verzichtet auf die Freiheiten der mehrsilbigen 
Senkungsfüllung und der fehlenden Senkungssilbe.” (Helmut de Boor, LV-LVI) 
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 Gottfried von Straßburg’s Tristan is animated by a wholly other spirit, and cuts a 
different path.  The mores of courtly life sink away into the distance as this fragmentary 
romance, like the two roses that twine above King Mark’s grave, spirals towards a purer 
and purer experience of the lover’s bliss.  Finally, at the Brunne just outside the 
Minnegrotte that was cut into the mountain rock by a heathen age, the two lovers enjoy 
an idyllic bliss, opening up to the language of nature; 
Des selben morgens was Tristan 
und sîn gespil geslichen dan  
bihanden gevangen  
und kâmen hin gegangen  
vil vruo und in dem touwe 
ûf die gebluoten ouwe 
und ûf das wunneclîche tal. 
gelander unde nahtegal 
die begunden organieren, 
ir gesinde salûieren. 
sie gruozten ie genôte. 
Tristanden unde Isôte. 
die wilden waltvogelîn 
hiezen sî willekomen sîn. 
vil suoze in ir latîne. 
mangem süezem vogelîne 
dem wâren sî dâ willekomen. 
si haeten sich alle an genomen 
eine wunneclîche unmuoze 
den gelieben zwein ze geuoze. 
si sungen von dem rîse 
ir wunne bernde wîse 
in maneger anderunge. 
dâ was manc süezie zunge, 
die dâ schantoit und discantoit 
ir schanzûne unr ir refloit 
den geliben z’einer wunne. 
si einpfie der küele brunne, 
der gegen ir ougen schône enspranc 
und schôner in ir ô ren clanc 
und rûnende alles gegen in gie  
und sî mit sîner rûne enpfie. 
er rûnete suoze 
den gelieben ze gruoze. 
si gruozten ouch die linden 
mit ir vil süezen winden.56 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
55 Das Nibelungen Not, 978-981. 
56 Tristan, 2, 446-8. 
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But here, the poet’s craft seems stretched to his limit.  To describe the paradisic language 
binding nature and man, he must resort to the learned, contrived, or French.  Alone the 
Brunne seems to have found a tongue of its own, speaking simply through its movements 
and sounds; its springing forth, winding, and rûnen. No longer like the labored tongue of 
man, the well speaks a rune.57 
 And in a way, this must be. After the missewende, Der Nibelunge Nôt becomes 
drastic in its intensity --- its episodes, like the overflowing Donau that the brothers must 
cross, gather the elements together and presses on towards its end with an ever greater 
force. Straßbourg’s poetry, in contrast, moves in counter-point to the passion that is its 
theme; for even as it spirals towards the idyllic moment, it at the same time draws Tristan 
and Isolde’s absolute and irrepressible love into the imbroglios of courtly life.    
In a beautiful passage, Tristan reassures himself that no natural force is so great as 
to resist man’s pains-taking labors; 
des Rînes vlieze und sîn vlôz 
der enist an keiner stat sô grôz, 
man enmüge dervon gegiezen 
mit einzelingen vliezen 
sô vil, daz er sich gâr zerlât 
und maezlîche craft hât. 
sus wirt der michele Rîn 
vil kûme ein cleinez rinnelîn. 
kein viur hât ouch sô grôze craft, 
ist man dar zuo gedanchaft, 
man unmüge es sô vil zesenden  
mit einzelnen brenden, 
bz daz es swache brinnet. 
als ist dem, der dâ minnet. 
der hât dem ein gelîchez spil. 
er mag als ofte und alse vil 
sIn gemüete zegiezen 
mit einzelen vliezen, 
sInen muot sô manegen enden 
zeteilen und zesenden, 
biz das sîn dâ sô lützel wirt, 
daz er maezlîchen schaden birt. 
als mag ez ouch mir wol ergân, 
                                                          
57 Check to see: Rhein! rheo. Leibniz? 
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wil ich zeteilen und zelân 
mîne minne und mîne meine 
an maneger dame danne an eine. 
gewende ich mîne sinne 
mê danne an eine minne, 
ich wirde lîhte dervan  
ein triurelôser Tristan. 
Nu sol ich ez versuochen. 
wil mîn gelücke ruochen,  
so ist zît, daz ich’s beginne. 
wan die triuwe und die minne, 
die in ze mîner vrouwen hân, 
die enmag mir niht ze staten gestân. 
ich swende an ir lîp unde leben 
und enmach mir keinen trôst geben 
ze lîbe noch ze lebene.58 
  
Perhaps, here, it is also the poet that speaks. His vast, though playful labor, --- his spil, as 
it were --- is directed against the overwhelming force of nature, and serves only to curb it, 
scattering its force, spilling out the mighty flood of the river into little rivulets.  It is not 
the activity of nature that the romance describes, but rather a belabored technique of 
resource management.  All the myriad rhymed couplets, with each verse restfully circling 
around its mate, are so many einzelnen vliezen in which the force of nature is dissipated 
and becomes of service to man.  Each, as it were, enacts the transformation from Rîn to  
rinnelîn.  Its technique is the diminutive.59  The triurelôser Tristan, the anti-Tristan that 
results would be the undoing of the Gordian knot of tragedy. And here, perhaps, we catch 
scent of a freer air blowing that will blow from Renaissance and through the Baroque and 
Enlightenment, if only to vanish in final chords of Wagner’s opera.   
The next lines, though, bring a different nuance; 
 
â süeze amîe, liebe Îsôt,  
diz leben ist under uns beiden  
alze sêre gescheiden. 
                                                          
58 tristan, 2, 566-8. 
59 Footnote Leibniz. 
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Only because life is already too divided does it become necessary to divide it up 
infinitely if one is to live, unraveling a knot that first drew taught as eternity split against 
itself.  The world is to sêre sêr.60 
* 
Sokrates und Alcibiades          
 
“Warum huldigest du, heiliger Sokrates,   
  Diesem Jünglinge stets? Kennest du Größers nicht? 
       Warum siehet mit Liebe,     
      Wie auf Götter, dein Aug auf ihn?” 
 
Wer das Tiefste gedacht, liebt das Lebendigste, 
   Hohe Jugend versteht, wer in die Welt geblickt, 
       Und es neigen die Weisen  
             Of am Ende zu Schönem sich.  
 
 Plato taught the forms not as an abstract doctrine, but as an exercise in living.  
They took their mold from the , the training of the body that was at the 
center of Athenian pedagogy.  Not that they were not intended as truths, and yet their 
value, as truths, did not exhaust itself in the acceptance of a certain beliefs about the 
nature of things.  For what was essential was the task and goal they pointed towards; the 
cultivation of man’s soul towards contact with the immortal and changeless, towards a 
converse with the gods.  Nowhere is the practice described more clearly, and more 
beautifully, than in Diotima’s speech to Socrates; 
Such is the right approach or induction to love-matters.  Beginning 
from obvious beauties he must for the sake of that highest beauty be 
ever climbing aloft, as on the rungs of a ladder, from one to two, and 
from two to all beautiful bodies; from personal beauty he proceeds to 
beautiful observances, from observance to beautiful learning, and from 
learning at last to that particular study which is concerned with the 
beautiful itself and that alone; so that in the end he comes to know the 
very essence of beauty.  In that state of life above all others… a man 
finds it truly worth while to live, as he contemplates essential beauty.  
This, when once beheld, will outshine your gold and your vesture, your 
                                                          
60 On the meaning of sêre, sêr. 
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beautiful boys and striplings, whose aspect now so astounds you and 
makes you and many another, at the sight and constant society of your 
darlings, ready to do without either food or drink if that were any way 
possible, and only gaze upon them and have their company.  But tell 
me, what would happen if one of you had the fortune to look upon 
essential beauty entire, pure and unalloyed; not infected with the flesh 
and color of humanity, and ever so much more of mortal trash?  What if 
he could behold the divine beauty itself, in its unique form?  Do you 
call it a pitiful life for a man to lead – looking that way, observing that 
vision by the proper means, and having it ever with him?  Do but 
consider… that there only will it befall him, as he sees the beautiful 
through that which makes it visible, to breed not illusions but true 
examples of virtue, since his contact is not with illusion but with truth.  
So when he has begotten a true virtue and has reared it up he is destined 
to with the friendship of Heaven; he, above all me, is immortal. 
 
To cultivate this skill is to becomes spiritual,  --- an enthusiast, or in German, 
a Schwärmer.  And yet while Diotima opposes the man who is  to the 
 --- the fire-worker and mechanic, master of crafts () and handiworks 
() --- nevertheless, , the that brings man into a converse with 
the divine, is himself not only a jack of all trades, but unites the hero’s virility with the 
artfulness of the craftsman, the wisdom of the philosopher, and even a bit of sorcery: 
,  ,    
,, 
, , .   
 Philosophy, like poetry, is a belabored, and crafty playfulness.  Yet whereas 
poetry opens itself up to the activity of nature, the movement of philosophy, this 
suggests, is .  It moves away from the otherness, what is always other than 
itself --- away, above all, from the body in its movement and vitality, with its constant 
circulation and interchange of material: ‘       
‘ ‘ ‘  ,    ,     
       ‘    .  It begins, as it 
 212
were, with the denial of the body in the very activity of the inputs and outputs through 
which it enters into relation with the world, becoming an imperfect microcosm of the 
activity of the world, a node in which the activity of nature as a whole expresses itself.   It 
denies, in other words, the metabolism, the , or in German, Stoffwechsel. 
 As a result, the beauty in its higher manifestations is held to be unchanging. This 
is true not only for the pure and essentially unchanging forms, but also for the beauty of 
the body, which could only be grasped, , as the beauty of all bodies, if one 
looked away from the movements and motions of a particular person in action, and 
considered only the static relation of proportions among the parts.  One wonders, then, 
whether not only Alcibiades’ startling entrance, but also the marvelous images of 
Aristophanes, might serve already as a tacit reproach to this one-sidedness.  For 
Aristophane’s primal humans, with two heads, four ears, four arms, four legs, and two 
genitalia --- wholly round, , in form --- knew a quicker path to divinity; they 
danced.   ‘  ‘  ‘ ‘      
   . Having, then, dared in their strength and 
speed to venture against the Olympian God, Zeus had them cut in two, and so they lost 
their symmetry, their globularity and cubic movement, and became what we are today: a 
mere symbol of a man:‘ ‘.  This is, as it 
became for Tristan, the origin of all piety and humbleness towards the divine.  Strangely, 
it is the comedian, Aristophanes, who should tell the origin of tragedy, for it is just this 
need for humility before the gods that sets the protagonist up for his downfall; kai pro 
tou, ‘ôsper legô, ‘en êmen, nuni de dia tên adikian diôkisthêmen ‘upo tou theou, kathaper 
Arkades ‘upo Lakedaimoniôn.  phobos oun estin, ean mê kosmioi ômen pros tous theous, 
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‘opôs mh kai authis diasxisthêsometha, kai periimen exontes ‘ôsper ‘oi en tais stêlais 
katagraphên ektetupômenoi, diapeprismenoi kata tas ‘rinas, gegonotes ‘ôsper lispai.  alla 
toutôn ‘eneka pant’ andra xrê ‘apanta parakeleuesthai eusebein peri theous, ‘ina ta men 
ekphugômen, tôn de tuxômen, ‘ôs ‘o Erôs ‘êmin ‘êgemôn kai stratêgos.   diz leben ist 
under uns beiden  alze sêre gescheiden. 
 
* 
  Ein Zeichen sind wir, deutungslos, 
Schmerzlos sind wir und haben fast 
Die Sprache in der Fremde verloren. 
   
 It would not be false to think of Hölderlin’s poetry, with its recurrent invocation 
of Diotima, as an ongoing conversation with the Symposium.  At the center of this 
conversation is the group of fragments titled Reflexion, which provide the most 
developed, if nevertheless oblique, treatment of Plato’s text. The extent of this relation 
appears clearly in one of the concluding thoughts ; “Deswegen sollte alles Erkennen vom 
Studium des Schönen anfangen.  Denn der hat viel gewonnen, der das Leben verstehen 
kann, ohne zu trauern.” This, without doubt, echoes the Symposium 211c, and above all, 
the last line:  ,  ,  ‘  ,   
,  ,    .  That life would become , 
worthy of living, or, better, simply something that is to be lived, livable: or that one 
becomes able to understand life without mourning.  These seem to be similar thoughts, 
and yet they also, in a way, stand opposite to one another.  For the one suggests that life 
should become livable through understanding; the other that it should be possible, 
through poetry, to life with understanding.  Plato’s symposium and Hölderlin’s 
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Reflection, as it were, stand at the opposite ends of the history that unfolds, as it were, 
, into Trauer.       
The place where philosopher and poet meet, and the point of departure for 
Hölderlin’s radical transformation of Platonism, appears in the first passage; 
Es gibt Grade der Begeisterung.  Von der Lustigkeit an, die wohl der 
unterste ist, bis zur Begeisterung des Feldherrn, der mitten in der Schlacht 
unter Besonnenheit den Genius mächtig erhält, gibt es eine unendliche 
Stufenleiter.  Auf dieser auf- und abzusteigen, ist Beruf und Wonner des 
Dichters. 
  
The Stufenleiter recalls the  of the Symposium, and as before, it allows 
for the movement and converse between the earthly and the divine.  Yet for Hölderlin, 
passage on this ladder is the calling and bliss of the poet, and no longer, above all, the 
philosopher.  And this changes everything. 
 For Plato’s Socrates, as we saw, there is nothing to learn in the  --- and thus 
the philosopher must ignore the trees and streams and return to the city, and to a 
conversation with humans.  The implications of this missewende appear throughout 
Diotima’s speech to Socrates. Beauty is to be found, to start with, in the static forms of 
the human body and the even greater stability of the human soul --- and is to be reached 
through a process of abstraction that tries to realize the  in its purity, removed from 
its situatedness in the ephemeral world of appearances.  For Hölderlin, in contrast, the 
höchste Poesie is a system in which even the Unpoetische becomes poetic, if, indeed, it is 
said “zu rechter Zeit und am rechten Orte im Ganzen des Kunstwerks.”61  The poetic 
work, in other words, is a system whose parts hang together, interrelating with one 
another, not only in space, but also in time. It is an organization of parts, and everything 
                                                          
61 Hölderlin, p. 502. 
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depends on the way the parts are fitted together.  Within this system itself, the parts must 
themselves vary in the degree to which they are poetic, reaching all the way into the 
wholly unpoetic; but every part becomes poetic through its relation to the whole. The 
beauty of poetry is not thought of as an abstraction from the inorganic, the  of the 
, but as a composition, organization. 
 How is the poet to achieve this? What it requires, above all, is a schneller Begriff  
--- a quick grasp. As he explains; 
Aber hierzu ist schneller Begriff am nötigsten.  Wie kannst du die 
Sache am rechten Ort brauchen, wenn due noch scheu darüber 
verweilst, und nicht weißt, wie viel an ihr ist, wie viel oder wenig 
daraus zu machen.  Das ist ewige Heiterkeit, ist Gottesfreude, daß man 
alles Einzelne in die Stelle des Ganzen setzt, wohin es gehört; 
deswegen ohne Verstand, ohne ein durch und durch organisiertes 
Gefühl keine Vortrefflichkeit, kein Leben.62 
 
This schneller Begriff, is not merely a quick comprehension, the ability to understand 
things in a lesser rather than greater quantity of time, but rather a wholly new idea of 
what the Verstand, itself, is. For here, the Verstand is no longer conceived of as the 
categorical synthesis of the material given through intuition, --- a process which results in 
forms of judgement that stand outside of the temporality of experience --- but as acting in 
a state of quickness, and performing an operation that, as it were, stands in an essential 
relation to time, both with respect to its input and its output.  Not only does it confront 
something that, itself in motion, would not grant the leisure to shyly tarry, but it organizes 
the material that is given, the Sache, in both space and time.   
 The schneller Verstand, in other words, transforms man’s understanding --- rather 
than his reason --- into something that communicates with the divine; it becomes an 
ewige Heiterkeit and Gottesfreude.  Mated with the divine is the part of man’s mental 
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faculties that is most workmanly in operation, operating, like Aristotle’s craftsman, 
according to a rule.  It is at once  and ; no longer do these qualities 
belong to the mediating  of , but rather to the poet himself.   
 With this quickness, however, comes a danger: that one would lose one’s grip, 
and stumble.  If we are to keep a grip on things, our understanding must know its limit, 
and not try to move quicker.  And so it is this limit that limits the degree of Begeisterung 
that must be obtained.  The Begeisterung must remain Nüchtern.   As Hölderling 
explains; 
Das ist das Maß Begeisterung, das jedem Einzelnen gegeben ist, daß 
der eine bei größerem, der andere bur bei schwächerem Feuer die 
Besinnung noch im nötigen Grade behält.  Da wo die Nüchternheit dich 
verläßt, da ist die Grenze deiner Begeisterung.  Der große Dichter ist 
niemals von sich selbst verlassen, er mag sich so weit über sich selbst 
erheben, als er will.  Man kann auch in die Höhe fallen, so wie in die 
Tiefe. Das Letztere verhindet der elastische Geist, das erstere die 
Schwerkraft, die in nüchternem Besinnen liegt.  Das Gefühl ist aber 
wohl sie beste Nüchternheit und Besinnung des Dichters, wenn es 
richtig und warm und klar und kräftig ist.63 
 
That one could fall in two directions, not just down but up, suggests that the poet has 
become as ‘ --- a tumblers, indeed dancers. Likewise, the two forces that 
give the poet a hold on things and keep him sober stand in the nearest relation to the 
physical basis of graceful, fluid, and non-catastrophic movement in dance.  The elastic 
spirit, on the one hand, points to the elastic properties of the muscles, divided into 
agonists and antagonists that, working in a simultaneous opposition, allow the limbs to 
move both up and down with grace and control.  On the other hand, the Schwerkraft, 
which does not so much originate from the earth as lie in the nüchterne Besinnung of the 
poet: his center of gravity, as it were.   And finally, the Gefühl that is richtig and warm  
                                                                                                                                                                             
62 ibid., p. 503. 
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and klar and kräftig hints at a body that, properly cultivated and warmed-up, has becomes 
capable of an extended range of fluid movements.   
 For Hölderlin poetry becomes dance; the ballad, ballet.64  That the Studium des 
Schönen is not the tarrying observation of a fixed beauty, but the dancing grasp of a 
moving, flowing beauty --- a dance around a dance, a pas de deux, as it were --- casts 
light upon all the ways in which he transforms the Platonic tendencies of Symposium.  
For Hölderlin, as we saw, Begeisterung involves a movement not just up, but both up and 
down the latter. In a later passage of Reflexion, this is brought together with a different, 
though related point.  Rather than culminating and in the vision of  “essential beauty 
entire, pure and unalloyed; not infected with the flesh and color of humanity, and ever so 
much more of mortal trash” ( …,,,   
          
), the task of poetry is endless.  If the poet’s feeling, having become sick, is to 
regain its Sicherheit and Konsistenz, it must disabuse itself of notion that it could ever 
grasp everything in the moment;  
Überhaupt muß er sich gewöhnen, nicht in den einzelnen Momenten 
das Ganze, was er vorhat, erreichen zu wollen, und das augenblicklich 
Unvollständige zu ertragen; seine Lust muß sein, daß er sich von einem 
Augenblicke zum Andern selber übertrifft, in dem Maß und in der Art, 
wie es die Sache erfordert, bis am Ende der Hauptton seines Ganzes 
gewinnt. Er muß aber ja nicht denken, daß er nur im crescendo vom 
Schwächern zum Stärkern sich selber übertreffen könne, so wird er 
unwahr werden, und sich überspannen; er muß fühlen, daß er an 
Leichtigkeit gewinnt, was er an Bedeutsamkeit verliert, daß Stille die 
Heftigkeit, und das Sinnige den Schwung gar schön ersetzt, und so 
wird es im Fortgang seines Werkes nicht einen notwendigen Ton 
geben, der nicht den vorhergehenden gewissermaßen überträfe, und der 
herrschende Ton wird es nur darum sein, weil das Ganze auf diese und 
keine andere Art komponiert ist. 65  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
63 Ibid., p. 501. 
64 Footnote on these words.  
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The moment will always be incomplete, for its incompleteness belongs, essentially, to the 
moment.   Abandoning the hope that he might ever reach a single moment of synoptic 
vision, the poet proceeds by overleaping himself at every turn, and in both directions, --- 
upwards as well as downwards --- while at the same time always maintaining his 
consistency and security: his ability to make another move.  The poet’s leaps towards 
higher degrees of enthusiasm must always remain steps; as it were, steps that overleap 
themselves. Sich übertreffen is a constant self-surpassing, a self-overstepping.  And if it 
is the sich that, at any moment, provides the basis of stability, then, at its limits, poetry 
would be a dance of catastrophe; each step overleaps itself and falls into another moment, 
with a new source of stability, and thus with the new possibility of an overleaping jump.  
This leads directly to heart of Hölderlin’s poetic theory and practice; the idea of the 
Wechsel der Töne, of three catastrophes, each of which involves the dissolution of one 
tone into two another, and thus prepares the way for the next catastrophe.  Just as ballet is 
a movement from step to step, poetry is a circulation from catastrophe to catastrophe --- 
and yet remains equally sober.  
 The catastrophic movement of poetry is an expression of what Hölderlin 
elsewhere will speak of as Das Werden im Vergehen; 
Das untergehende Vaterland, Natur und Menschen, insofern sie in einer 
besonderen Wechselwirkung stehen, eine besondere ideal gewordene 
Welt, und Verbindung der Dinge ausmachen, und sich insofern 
auflösen, damit aus ihr und aus dem überbleibenden Geschlechte und 
den überbleibenden Kräften der Natur, die das andere, reale Prinzip 
sind, eine neue Welt, eine neu, aber auch besondere Wechselwirkung, 
sich bilde, so wie jener Untergang aus einer reinen, aber besondern 
Welt hervorging.Denn die Welt aller Welten, das Alles in Allen, 
welches immer ist, stellt sich nur in aller Zeit --- oder im Untergange 
oder im Moment, oder genetischer im Werden des Moments und 
Anfang von Zeit und Welt dar, und dieser Untergang und Anfang ist 
wie die Sprache Ausdruck Zeichen Darstellung eines lebendigen, aber 
besonderen Ganzen, welches eben wieder in seinen Wirkungen dazu 
                                                                                                                                                                             
65 Ibid., p. 502. 
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wird, und zwar so, daß in ihm, sowie in der Sprache, von einer Seite 
weniger oder nichts lebendig Bestehendes, von der anderen Seite alles 
zu liegen scheint.  Im lebendigen Bestehenden herrscht eine 
Beziehungsar, im übergehenden ist die Möglichkeit aller Beziehungen 
vorherrschend, doch die besondere ist daraus abzunehmen, zu 
schöpfen, so daß durch sie Unendlichkeit die endliche Wirkung 
hervorgeht. 
  
We cannot hope to grasp the world of worlds, the totality of every possible world, as it is, 
but only as it puts itself into time; the highest of possibilities appears only through 
temporality, or indeed in the catastrophic transition from one world to another.  This 
thought, strange as it may seem, seems almost simple when one tries to understand it in 
terms of the language of dance. How is it, we might ask, that one not only gains a 
knowledge, but truly feels, inwardly experiences, the possibilities in the body of the 
dancer? Not, we must answer, in the performance of any one step, or even by keeping 
track of all the steps singly performed.  Since every step is only properly executed, is 
only truly a step, when the dancer preserves his ability to perform other steps, then a 
single step, in itself, could never even reveal its own possibility, and the accumulated 
knowledge of single steps could not tell us anything more, but would remain, at most, a 
superficial indication of the dancer’s potential.  Rather, the dancer’s potential expresses 
itself above all in the graceful, fluent transition from one pas to another.  In this moment 
of transition, the fullness of possibilities shines forth; every step seems possible, and thus, 
and here alone, the step appears as step.66  
                                                          
66 It is said, in the world of ballet, that one does not know any single step, unless one can perform in any 
combination.  The step, as such, only exists through the possibility of a fluent combination with other steps.  
Yet this same principle is no less true of the phonemes of a given language, or its words --- though, since 
spoken language is easy to learn when we are young, it is seldom acknowledged, and is more difficult to 
discern.  We could not be said to properly know how to pronounce the German “r,” for example, unless we 
are able to use it in any permissible phonetic combination.  Nor do we know a word (despite what the folks 
at the Educational Testing Service seem to think), unless we could use it in any context.  And it is on 
account of this aspect of language, which, consistent with our terminology, we shall call its expressiveness, 
that makes vain any attempt to conceive of human language first of all as a system of reference .    Words, 
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* 
 Classical meter, as we saw, creates a work-space where sayings could mate freely 
and realize the reciprocal interaction of sounds and meanings.  In this way, and through 
the painstaking labor of the poet, word-combinations could evolve that would express the 
free interaction of natural forces.  Rhyme, in contrast, curves the verse into a relation with 
each other; they assemble together as if around a table set for a festival, and become 
conversant. By transforming the work of poetry into a dancing  labor, Hölderlin is able to 
overcome the separate limitations of both classical meter and rhyme and achieve at once 
a free and playful expansiveness and a cyclical, rounded form.   The work-space and 
festival-space join together to become a stage --- the space of performance, of dance.  
The schneller Geist, as it were, dances through the clearing opened up by meter, and fits 
his material, according to its nature, into this frame-work. And thus he allows his Stoff to 
interact with itself after its own nature, rather than according to the impositions of the 
poet.  If, however, it is to express the temporality of the world, the Werden im Vergehen, 
his dance must always overleap itself, falling down from one catastrophic moment to the 
next --- and so his poetry becomes cyclic, even as it expresses the very openness of time, 
time as pure possibility.   
 The poet, fitting together the words of the poem as he dances through this stage, is 
able to express the way in which the world happens --- the worlding of the world, as 
Heidegger put it.  Consider, again, the opening of Das Werden im Vergehen.   A world, 
for Hölderlin, is a specific Wechselwirkung between nature and man; it builds itself out of 
the way that man and nature interact without each other, and involves neither the one-
                                                                                                                                                                             
sounds, colors, genetic materials, organic substances, animals, chemicals, atoms, particles --- all of these 
have at once a life unto themselves and a life among each other, and all of these lives together express life 
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sided determination of man by his environment, or the environment through man’s labor.  
Man is as much a product of nature as nature is of man. Or, put simple; the world is a 
garden, an : da lebt die Natur geduldig und häuslich, pflegend und wieder gepflegt  
mit dem fleiß igen Menschen zusammen.   
 Such a world or fatherland, as it is also called, consists both in a real and an ideal 
principle. The real principle are the forces of nature considered in and of themselves, the 
mere stuff of nature, --- or what he understands as the aorgic.  The ideal principle, on the 
other hand, is simply the organization that this raw material enters into.   It might seem as 
though this simply repeats the Aristotelian opposition between form and matter.  Yet 
while Hölderlin certainly still thinks in terms of this distinction, as it was inherited 
through Kant, Fichte, and Schiller, and as it was beginning to be rethought and 
reconceived by the Tübinger Stift, he also begins to realize, --- though he was not alone 
in this --- that this very distinction was itself not original, not primary; but rather, 
evolved.  Nowhere is this insight expressed with greater lucidity than in the opening 
paragraph of the Grund zum Empedokles; 
Natur und Kunst sind sich im reinen Leben nur harmonisch 
entgegengesetzt .  Die Kunst ist die Blüte, die Vollendung der Natur, 
Natur wird erst göttlich durch die Verbindung mit der 
verschiedenartigen  aber  harmonsichen Kunst, wenn jenes ganz ist, 
was es sein kann, und eines verbindet sich mit dem andern, ersetzt den 
Mangel des andern, den es notwendig haben muß, um ganz zu sein, was 
es als besonderes sein kann, denn ist die Vollendung da, und das 
Göttliche ist in der Mitte von beiden.  Der orgischere  künstlichere 
Mensch ist die Blüte der Natur, die aorgischere  Natur, wenn sie rein 
gefühlt wird, vom rein organisierten, rein in seiner Art gebildeten 
Menschen, gibt ihm das Gefühl der Vollendung.  Aber dieses Leben ist 
nur im Gefühle und nicht für die Erkenntnis vorhanden.  Soll es 
erkennbar sein, so muß es dadurch sich darstellen, daß es im Übermaße 
der Innigkeit, wo sich die Entgegengesetzten verwechseln, sich trennt, 
daß das Organischer, das sich zu sehr der Natur überließ und sein 
Wesen und Bewußtsein vergaß, in das Extrem der Selbsttätigkeit und 
Kunst und Reflexion, die Natur hingegen, wenigstens in ihren 
Wirkungen auf den reflektierended  Menschen, in das Extrem des 
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Aorgischen, des Unbegreiflichen, des Unfühlbaren, des Unbegrenzten 
übergeht, bis durch den Fortgang der entgegengesetzten 
Wechselwirkung die beiden ursprünglich einigen sich wie anfangs 
begegnen, nur daß die Natur organischer durch den bildenden 
kultivierenden Menschen, überhaupt der Bildungstriebe und 
Bildungskräfte, hingegen der Mensch aorgischer , allgemeiner, 
unendlicher geworden ist.  
   
Man, with his techniques, has evolved, grown out of nature as its blossom, and 
perfection.  He is opposed to nature neither absolutely, nor primordially, but only 
gradually; the entire world, as the reciprocal action between man and nature, consists 
only in gradual stages of increasing organization. Organization is, in this way, always a 
relative term, and properly speaking should be used, along with its contrary, only in the 
comparative; aorgischer.  This suggests that we might even think of man’s arts and 
devices, his Kunst in the most inclusive sense, as being themselves processes of 
organization, and in no way fundamentally opposed to his pre-given faculties. 
 Man is, in this way, the divinity of nature, and the feeling of perfection that occurs 
at the point of their confluence.  This feeling of perfection is not merely a mode of man’s 
subjective being, but an ideal possibility of nature that realizes itself through man; nature 
comes to feel itself and express itself through man.  And yet this feeling is not yet 
recognizable, it is not there for the cognition.  For this to be, it is necessary that nature 
and art separate absolutely from one another, confronting each other in an absolute 
opposition, but then, through the progression of opposed reciprocal interaction, build out 
of themselves a higher unity --- a work that must belong both to nature and to art, or 
rather, must be at once the play and work of both.   
 We now might begin to understand the deeper consequences of Hölderlin’s  
conversation with, and interruption of, the Symposium, and the implications of his 
seemingly Platonic slogan. Deswegen sollte alles Erkennen vom Studium des Schönen 
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anfangen.  Denn der hat viel gewonnen, der das Leben verstehen kann, ohne zu trauern.  
To understand life, and not simply to feel it, is to be rented apart by the division between 
Kunst and Natur --- whose sundering appears in both the Der Nibilungene Not  and 
Tristan as the origin of Trauer, of the life which is  alze sêre gescheiden67  To understand 
life ohne zu trauern is to build these two back together, or --- since this could never be a 
question simply of human artifice --- to live a life that has been built together out of their 
separation.  In the two German epics, as we saw, the inability of man to speak nature’s 
tongue is at the heart of life’s mournfulness; even when man has come closest to his 
idyllic condition, and nature seems to speak to him, its speech remains a rûnen; 
murmuring, mysterious, rueful.   For the one who has overcome this Trauer, not only 
naively, as Sifrît, but with a grasp on things, the language of nature again becomes 
comprehensible.  As he writes of Empedokles, “bei ihm und für ihn [ist] das Sprachlose 
Sprache.”  
 And yet Empedokles remains a tragedy, even if, for a moment, the philosopher-
poet had overcome the mournfulness of life.  That, even for the poet, life could be tragic 
has two causes, both of which both come together in Hölderlin’s drama.  On the one 
hand, there is a thought that reaches back to his first writings, and which follows as a 
logical consequence of his understanding of nature and man68; namely, that poetry would 
rest on a Naturzustand, and thus, ultimately, on shear luck. The poet’s virtues are 
dependent on the grace of nature, and they can be taken away.  On the other hand, there is 
an idea that is fully worked out in Grund zum Empedokles, and that presents a radical 
conception of the concept of tragedy.  Empedokles, Hölderlin will claim, is sacrificed to 
                                                          
67 Tristan as a “man of twists and turns.” 
68 Check to make sure this is correct.  
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his time; the antagonistic forces that constitute his world --- the hostile reciprocal 
interaction of nature and art --- and concentrated itself and individualized itself in his life, 
which thus comes to appear as a solution to their strife.  But only, indeed, a temporary 
solution, for through his down-fall, the merely temporary and seemly quality of this 
solution is revealed, while at the same time, through his individual catastrophe his world 
and time is dissolved, allowing for a new, and higher configuration, to appear in its place.   
Thus, precisely become Empedokles, above all men of his age, struggled with the 
problem of fate, his life is itself, in the end, submitted to fate.  As Hölderlin explains;  
So ist Empedokles, wie gesagt, das Resultat seiner Periode, und sein 
Charakter weist auf diese zurück, so wie er aus dieser hervorging. Sein 
Schicksal stellt sich in ihm dar, als in einer augenblicklichen 
Vereinigung, die aber sich auflösen muß, um mehr zu werden.69      
 
And  further down; 
Die Probleme des Schicksals, in dem er erwuchs, sollten in ihm sich 
scheinbar lösen, und diese Lösung sollte sich als eine scheinbare 
temporäre zeigen, wie mehr oder weniger bei allen tragischen 
Personen, die alle in ihrem Charakteren und Äußerungen mehr oder 
weniger versuche sind, die Probleme des Schicksals zu lösen...70 
 
Yet even this tragedy does not belong, inevitably, to the nature of things.  Precisely 
because man and nature stand in a reciprocal interaction, man is at once given over to the 
fate of the world, and yet at the same time, able, even through his fate, to create a new 
world. This possibility is suggested, most clearly, in the last paragraph of Reflexionen.  
Here he explains how it would be possible for the Schöneren, Vortrefflichen to have an 
effect on the Barbaric, Inferieure: namely, it is necessary that the former “die Distanz, 
die zwischen ihnen und den andern ist, bestimmt und leidenschaftslos erkennen, und aus 
                                                          
69 p. 550. 
70 p. 551. 
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dieser Erkenntnis wirken, und dulden.”  Needed is a politics that recognizes the 
differences in the degree of organization throughout the world, and patiently works 
towards overcoming these differences.  Such Wirksamkeit is truly transformative --- it is 
free political action in the highest sense; it does not act within the possibilities that have 
been given through one’s world, but in the furthest and deepest sense, works to transform 
the world precisely by overcoming the differences that make such Wirksamkeit 
impossible. Or in other words, its work is to create the possibility of effective, freely 
political action. This cultivation is the task, above all, of the poet; not that he 
enthusiastically dreams up an impossible ideal, but that he patiently brings the elements 
of the world closer.  The poet only becomes a tragic figure when he loses his patience, 
and, like Empedocles, rushes to bring about a reconciliation that is not yet in his craft. 
* 
 In classical meter and romantic rhyme, the labor of the poet still stood in 
opposition to his play.  The playful interaction amongst the sounds and meanings of 
words only grew out of the labored combination and recombination of sayings.  And 
while, indeed, rhyme set up a playground, the space of festival and conversation on the 
groundwork of meter, the poet remained, as it were, a servant --- if only to Minne itself    
--- shuffling words in and out of place, a labor that takes place more in time, and is closer 
to a performance, a yet remains tedious; the host awaits his own Feierabend, apart his 
guests.   For Hölderlin, in contrast, the work of the poet is itself a play, a dance, which 
must be executed in a performance space that, as it were, bends the work and play space, 
day and night, Kunst and Natur, back into one.   
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 Just as his poetry reconciles work and play, or at least entrusts the poet with the 
task of their reconciliation, he always brings about a deeper unity between the ideality of 
sounds and meanings.  While the metrical poet sought the ideality of word-meanings 
through the ideality of sounds, he could not help losing a grasp on the circulation of 
sounds as his words approach the open-ended and chaotic ideality.  Sounds became so 
free and resonant in their interaction that their dance itself approached, like the ballerina’s 
peripheral gestures and mimes, the sequentially unfolding and infinite potentiality of 
meanings.  The rhyming poet, on the other, while treating the ending sounds only as an 
index, nevertheless brought them back to a circulation, and, in this way, also brought 
meanings into a centered and rounded, --- which is to say conversational --- intercourse.  
But as a result, the world of meanings lost its proper ideality and collapsed into the tropes 
of argumentation; linear fragments of a circular reasoning.  With Hölderlin, however, this 
conflict disappears, or at least its disappearance first becomes possible. On the one hand, 
his sounds find a balance between a too great freedom and a too great restrictedness.  
Even if the Wechsel der Töne is not itself applied consistently to sounds, nevertheless, by 
giving the poem a rounded-ness that does not depend on the monotonous repetition of 
end rhymes, it makes this balance possible.  On the other hand, the infinity of word-
meanings is curved back without being curbed, and without collapsing into mere 
rhetoric.71   
 With this perfect union, the poem achieves what, in a certain way, and as we 
suggested before, is the outer limit and fulfillment of poetry: the playful work creates the 
                                                          
71 In Reflexion, for example, he explains: “Man hat Inversionen der Worte in der Periode. Größer und 
wirksamer muß aber dann auch die Inversion der Perioden selbst sein.  Die logische Stellung der Perioden, 
wo dem Grunde (der Grundperiode) das Werden, dem Werden das Ziel, dem Ziele der Zweck folgt, und die 
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ideal possibility of its performance.  Before, the performance of the poem had faltered on 
the very discrepancy between its laborious creation and playful reenactment.  Since the 
labor that went into it functioned negatively, the poem always appeared simpler than the 
process of its production; like a weeded garden, one could only enjoy it as the work of 
nature, and not as the result of the gardener’s toil.   Or, on the other hand, the poem 
appeared too labored, too overworked --- and, like an overfinely-wrought arabesque (?) 
its performance always remains haunted by the poet’s lucubrations, and could never grow 
wings and alight from the page;  but rather, it falls back upon the eager hands of the 
learned, becomes literature.  Literature or folk-poesie; the Charybdis and Skylla (?) that 
so few poems have successfully cleared on their way to eternity.   
 With Hölderlin’s poetry, in contrast, the labor becomes playful, nimble, and quick 
--- a scheller Begriff --- and thus it can burst into life with every performance.  This does 
not mean, of coarse, that the speaker or hearer will come to feel as he did, but only that 
none of the details of its creation need be lost to time.  Nor does it suggest, in the least, 
that the poem was created instantaneously; the actual experience of the poet and his 
rhapsodists and admirers is irrelevant --- all that matters is the ideal potential of the poem.   
For the first time, the poem truly is a remembrance of the time of its fashioning.  It recalls 
a play-work-time, the time of divinity, and the details that unfold from the moment when 
man and nature work together, wechselseitig, and when man, his one-sidedness 
overcome, is again rollicking, and ventures against the Gods.   Precisely analogous to this 
is the spectacle of dance; it is not that we experience the vast labors that went into the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Nebensätze immer nur hinten angehängt sind an die Hauptsätze, worauf sie sich zunächst beziehen, --- ist 
dem Dichter gewiß nur höchst selten brauchbar.” 
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performance, but that these labors play out before as details that, without ever becoming 
tedious, are nevertheless the work of men. 
 Through such a prosody, in other words, the human language of sounding words 
reaches its highest degree of ideality; the word, as artifact, combining a semantic and a 
phonetic representation, could now be repeated without one collapsing into other; without 
the sound disappearing into the meaning, or the meaning into the sound.  And thus, in a 
sense, only with Hölderlin does the word first become a word.  Yet this fulfillment should 
not be understood teleologically, but as the result of a creative evolution; the potential 
that is realized does not belong to word as such as some sort of essence, but is nothing 
more than the highest possibility of the word event repeating itself.  It is this repetition, 
moreover, that transforms the poem into a political action; for the ideal world, das 
Mögliche, the worlding of the world that the poem captures through its creation, is now 
passed on to the future, open to its infinite repetition as the model of free political action, 
of a politics based on the reciprocal interaction of man and nature.  The poem becomes, 
in the words of Schiller, a Münze that the present coins for the future, as the model of true 
freedom.72 
 Or rather, we might say: the word, fulfilling its ideal potential through a playful, 
evolved and human labor, becomes writing. Or for the first time, true writing appears as 
the political possibility of a purely human agency. Earlier, the written word was, before 
all else, the holy script.  For only this was able to preserve perfectly the relation between 
sound and meaning. Every other form of human word-language could only function 
referentially, and arbitrarily, referring to meanings through sounds, but without any 
ultimate rhyme or reason, and thus writing, to the extent that it preserved this merely 
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arbitrary relationship, was given over to time and decay, losing its vitality and force as 
the original tongue became moribund.  Only revealed script, whose perfection was 
guaranteed by a divine origin, could live onto all ages and do the work of politics; thus 
free political action was, of necessity, messianic, and the messiah corrupted into the “Son 
of God,” and so, barely out of its swaddling clothes, it came into contradiction with itself.  
The freest work of man, his very ability to create possibilities for himself, was torn from 
his hands; and if this contradiction revealed its deepest absurdity Luther’s resurrection of 
Augustine’s anti-pelagian doctrine, one need not look far back into the history books to 
see its gruesome wages.73    
 True writing, as the possibility of freely human agency, preserves language as a 
living language; through the perfect balance of meanings and sounds, the words is no 
longer arbitrary, indicative, but expressive --- and yet without expressing anything but its 
pure ideality, its very ability to be repeated.  Language expresses eternity, and without 
reference to anything beyond itself.  It is ideally repeatable as a living possibility, though 
its repetition is not secured through any ground outside of itself, but, rather, is always 
simply the repetition of its ideality.    
 This suggests the answer to our third question: how does the work of poetry 
become a performance? The answer, it seems, is through writing --- which is nothing else 
than the ideal possibility of poetry as a playful work. 
* 
 For the first time, Messianic politics has grown into a fully human, and fully free 
possibility --- a politics of human agency that encompasses the whole work of nature, the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
72 Cite the passage from Schiller to which this refers. 
73 Footnote on the Science of Judaism.  
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worlding of the world, and realizes its openness to new possibility, or that, indeed, 
grasping the whole of its possibilities, even if only in the moment of demise, hints 
towards a new world.  Human creativity has evolved into its most radical potential.  
 And yet, this politics remains precarious.  
 On the one hand, because it is rooted to poetry it remains limited to a certain 
group of phonemes, and thus is always tainted with the danger of nationalism.  For the 
mother tongue does not consist in a set of words --- these, indeed, can be passed fluidly 
from one language to another, and are always cosmopolitan at the moment of its birth.  
Nor in rules of grammar.  These, to the extent that they could be identified, are already 
abstractions that could be learned by anyone willing to put in the time. Rather, the root of 
every mother tongue is a set of sounds that can enter into a fluent commerce with one 
another.  And since these sounds tend to be the common trade of a group of speakers 
situated in the same plot of land, the mother tongue is almost invariably Vaterländisch.  
 On the other hand, the two realms of poetry, sounds and meanings, having 
realized their proper ideality, are now perfectly independent. And likewise, through the 
rigorous technique of the painter, the world of colors come into a free commerce, 
becoming a world unto itself, and nature’s curves also come into their own.   Colors, 
sounds, curves and words all remain unto themselves, each expressing the bound freedom 
of the universe as a whole, but in each case as a separate universe.    While the poet’s 
language, through its playful work, involves a perfect correlation between sound and 
meaning, this correlation is utterly groundless and inimitable; it remains, as it were, a 
mere hint of the unity that binds the different realms together.  The higher unity of nature, 
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upon which every earthly messianic politics must depend, remains obscure, and 
unsubstantiated; it is incapable of surviving beyond the poem that first offers it as a hope.   
 The poem’s listeners, trying to make sense of the unity that they hear as if for the 
first time --- a unity that seems to be without precedent in the natural world outside of 
them --- are tempted to attribute it to its author. Correctly realizing that the poem’s 
playful vitality could never be the work of man as mere craftsman, and yet lacking a 
higher conception of what man’s potential could be, they imagine the poem to have been 
the work of a special sort of maker, possessing of a super-human creativity. The poet as 
an individual, as a creative personality, thus comes to be understood as a Genius, and if 
his accomplishments still seem to defy understanding, his genius is graciously attributed 
to an entire people.  The term genius need not be abolished from aesthetic and poetic 
discourse, but properly, it should refer to what every human being, indeed what 
everything in nature is; namely, a partial perspective through which is responsible, to a 












Wie beim Turmbau zu Babel die Völker, als 
ihre Sprachen sich verwirrten und ihre 
Verständigung unmöglich wurde, sich 
schieden, um jenes seinen besonderen Weg 
zu gehen: so schieden die Kunstarten, als 
alles Nationalgemeinsame in tausand 
egoistische Besonderheiten sich zersplitterte, 
sich aus dem stolzen, bis in den Himmel 
ragenden Bau des Dramas, in welchem sie 
ihr gemeinsam beseelendes Verständnis 
verloren haben. 
 
     Wagner, Das Kunstwerk der Zukunft.74  
 
 These two dangers both come together in Richard Wagner’s conception of the 
Gesamtkunstwerk, the very boldest attempt of any artist to explain the ultimate unity of 
the different languages.  What Wagner sought was nothing less than that each of 
performing arts --- namely, Tanzkunst, Tonkunst, and Dichtkunst --- and each of the 
formative art --- Baukunst, Bildhauerkunst, Malerkunst --- surge together into a single 
expression of human life and its compulsive yearning, its Drang.  Each of the single art 
forms most its stubborn independence and dissolves in love for the others.  Echoing the 
Liebestod, he writes; 
erst wenn jede sich selbst nur in der anderen zu lieben vermag; erst 
wenn sie selbst als einzelne Künste aufhören, werden sie alle fähig, das 
vollendete Kunstwerk zu schaffen; ja ihr Aufhören in diesem Sinne ist 
ganz von selbst schon dieses Kunstwerk, ihr Tod unmittelbar sein 
Leben.75  
 
The seed of this Zusammendrängen is the union between the feminine principle of music 
and the masculine principle of poetry; the true Gesamtkunstwerk begins with their 
mating, and what allows for their perfect erotic union is their original unity, and the 
perfect correspondence of their content.   Both the word-language of the poet and the 
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75 Wagner, VI, p. 97. 
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tone-language of the musician share a common origin and source; the overflowing inner 
feeling and Drang --- the inner-most expression of human life.         
 Confronted with impressions caused by objects outside itself, this inner Drang 
tries to differentiate itself that it might clearly discern the different objects working 
against it from the outside and communicate to others about these objects --- not, 
however, for the sake of objective knowledge about the world, but in order to make its 
own compulsion to communicate comprehensible to itself.  Impressions from the outside 
are merely the occasion for this inner compulsion towards expression to express to itself 
its own need for self-expression.  At first, this compulsive self-expression takes the form 
of a pure Tonsprache, the most immediate and least arbitrary expression of the 
externally-agitated inner feeling.  This consists purely in the varied and continuous 
transformation of vowel sounds supported by gestures; “mannigfaltigste Hebung und 
Senkung, Ausdehnung und Kürzung, Steigerung und Abnahme der tönenden Laute.”  Yet 
this language is capable only of expressing the variations of the inner feeling, and is 
unable to differentiate between and indicate things outside of itself.  Thus the Tonsprache 
weaves a clothing for itself from out of the consonants that enclose things on both ends in 
just the same way as the things are themselves separated off from each other through 
their skin and casements.76   In the passage from Tonsprache to an articulate language, a 
one-sided feeling --- a compulsion arising from an inadequacy to itself   --- expresses 
itself through a myriad of rounded words, each of which indicated a rounded thing.  And 
in the transition from a mere world-language to word-poetry, these words are pressed 
together, verdichtet, into a point.  Yet the poet’s words and work remain a mere yearning 
and unfulfilled intention; a one-sided, purely masculine act that awaits redemption 
                                                          
76 Wagner, VII, p. 219-20. 
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through the female principle, the Tonsprache.  The words, having emerged from musical 
tones, must again rediscover themselves in these, and at the same time, the concentrated 
content of the word-poem must be unfolded into its vollem Gefühlsinhalt.77  This voller 
Gefühlsinhalt requires in the end nothing less that the expression of the primordial 
kinship between all tones; the all-encompassing unity of the world of feelings; 
Der Tondichter had nun die Töne des Verse nach ihrem 
verandtschaftlichen Ausdrucksvermögen so zu bestimmmen, daß sie 
nich nur den Gefühlsinhalt dieses oder jenes Vokales, als besonderes 
Vokales, kundgeben, sondern diesen Inhalt zugleich als einen allen 
Tönen des Verses verwandten, und diesen verwandten Inhalt als ein 
besonderes Glied der Urverwandtschaft aller Töne dem Gefühle 
darstellen.78 
 True drama, for Wagner, is an expression of the overcoming of man’s one-
sidedness --- a one-sidedness that emerged when, for the first time, man felt himself to be 
in opposition to nature.  Language, music, and poetry --- indeed all human life --- emerge 
from a feeling of one-sidedness, of Unabhängigkeit.  Or rather, man’s feeling is this one-
sidedness --- and thus compulsive and restless.  Knowledge begins with this error, and 
redeems itself by coming to understand the necessity of all appearances.  With this higher 
knowledge, human life comes fall circle --- only now he experiences nature consciously, 
through reason, gaining an explicit awareness of the unity that binds together man and 
nature.79   
 Wagner’s philosophy of art and politics develops towards the idea of a truly free 
political action, and yet this idea is corrupted, --- and in a way that will prove 
extraordinarily dangerous --- through the presumption of the artist to comprehend 
through his art the unity of the different languages.  These language are all rooted in the 
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human body and its feelings, and do not possess an ideality of their own.  Or indeed, to 
the extent that they do develop independently, and acquire a semantic system that refers 
primarily to itself, and expresses above all its own combinatorial possibilities, they have 
become rootless and artistically barren. Tanzkunst and Dichtkunst, lacking an adequate 
inner principle, must remain in a state of incompleteness and yearning, awaiting their 
redemption through the Gesamtkunstwerk of drama.  They stand at the outermost 
extremities of the human body, which need to be united together through its inner organs, 
its heart. As he explains; 
Das Meer treent und verbindet die Länder: so trennt und verbindet die 
Tonkunst die zwei äußersten Gegensätze menschlicher Kunst, die Tanz 
– und Dichtkunst. Sie ist das Herz des Menschen; das Blut, das von 
ihm aus seinen Umlauf nimmt, gibt dem nach außen gewandten 
Fleische seine warme, lebenvolle Farbe, --- die nach inne strebenden 
Nerven des Gehirnes nährt es aber mit wellender Schwungkraft.  Ohne 
die Tätigkeit des Herzens bliebe die Tätigkeit des Gehirns nur ein 
mechanisches Kunststück; die Tätigkeit der äußeren Leibesglieder ein 
ebenso mechanisches, gefühloses Gebaren.  Durch das Herz fühlt der 
Verstand sich dem ganzen Leibe verwandt, schwingt der bloße 
Sinnenmensch sich zur Verstandestätigkeit empor.80   
Likewise, Tanzkunst itself --- the art form that gives flesh to music and poetry --- is 
understood as the expression of the varied life of the inner sensations through an 
infinitely varied movement.  The subtly-differentiated inner life of the more nobly 
cultivated (edlere gebildete) person expresses itself through rich and multifarious 
transitions from one movement to another; but in every case, there is a correspondence 
between the movement and the expressed sensations.  Dance is rooted in man’s pulsating 
inner life.  
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 The body, for Wagner, is the locus of feelings, of life understood as affect, and is 
incapable of acquiring any authentic expressive possibilities beyond this; languages 
cannot be cultivated --- the true cultivated person simply speaks a more refined version of 
the same language, expressing subtler variations of the same primordial feeling.  And 
thus, by reducing all human languages to somatic languages, he at the same time restricts 
the expressiveness of dance to mere affect; the language of dance mimics the limits of the 
Wagnerian body.  
 At the root of Wagner’s notion of Volk --- the fateful basis of his politics --- is this 
limited body and its language.  The Volk is not bound together by shared statehood and 
civic organizations, nor even by a common history, but rather by a gemeinschaftliche Not.  
Like the human body, it is united through a shared affect that pulsates through the whole 
and that enforces itself with necessity. Any Bedürfnis that lacks the Kraft der Not --- a 
bloßes Bedürfnis der Erhaltung des Überflusses --- could never serve as the foundation of 
the folk, and indeed, those who feel it must be regarded as its enemy.81 For a feeling to be 
common, however, it must be communicated through words, and thus a shared language 
is the necessary basis of the folk.  Yet the expressive potential of words, however, lies not 
in either the referential value, or any even more independent form of ideality, but rather is 
rooted in the affective life of the body, which conveys itself through Sprachwurzeln.  
Only through these primordial word-roots is it possible to communicate feelings, and 
thus, above all, the feeling of a gemeinsame Not.  Those languages where the root-
meanings have become too far obscured, incapable of expressing themselves through 
poetry, could never become the basis of folkhood.  
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 Truly free political action and Wagner’s aping of Messianism differ from each 
other as the balletic body differs from Wagner’s body.  Like the array of Blutwurst at the 
Metzgerei, the Wagnerian corpus politicus expresses one feeling in enumerable 
permutations and colorings --- but remains in every case indigestible. The body of the 
true dancer, in contrast, cultivates itself towards an ideal language that attains 
independence not only from the inner life of the body, but, in a way, from all earth-bound 
necessity; it becomes light, ethereal --- mocking and spotting gravity and catastrophe.  
Nor, however, is it limited to one language, one set of expressive possibilities.  The 
gestures at the periphery need not bring more central movements to a greater degree of 
articulateness, but might even stand in a dissonant contrast.  Or indeed, this dissonance 
may even appear more centrally as, for example, in the arabesque pencheé --- where the 
absolutely vertical line of the legs contrast with earth-bound drooping of the port de bras.   
And because its languages are multiple and complex, and their ideality not tied down to 
inner feelings, it is capable of true dialogue.  Whereas Wagner’s duets, and above all the 
Liebestod, could only express a shared inner necessity, ballet is able to convey the 
manifold forms of interaction; the different ways that one agent could act towards or 
against another.  Compulsion, falling in love, acting up, resistance, violence, mechanical 
movement, organic growth, even spasms and convulsions, even, perhaps, explosions  --- 
all forms of activity that constitute the universe as a system of forces.  Yet at the same 
time, other forms of activity, such as the language of color and words, remain at the 
periphery of the dancing body, which makes no claim to grasp these for its own, but, at 
most, only to touch upon them. 
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 The ballet dancer’s body is a node; it touches upon everything, and, to a degree, 
expresses the different ways in which things touch, and even enters into a dialogic 
interaction with these things. But it does not try to grasp everything within itself or lay 
claim to every form of expressiveness.  And thus it is, as it were, the premonition of a 
truly free political life; of the human body that understands itself as the spectacle of the 
universe, as a part through which the whole feels and expresses itself as a whole, but 
without ever being comprehended in its totality.  Not exactly a monad, for it is not merely 
limited by a lack of clarity, but a knot which is part of the world-knot, and expresses its 
knottiness without finding release, without being loosed, erlöst.   
 Or in other words; the dancer’s body expresses the collaboration between all 
beings, but above all, humanity and nature --- a co-laboring that runs through the 
universe, and is the origin of all things.  Not surprisingly, the Gesamtkunstwerk of ballet 
should itself arise not from a single overriding creative will, but as the common work of 
set designers, composers, choreographers, dancers, libretticists and musicians --- a 
process that blossomed, above all, in the spectacles of Diaghilev’s Ballet Russe.  As 
Andrew Wachtel explains in his introduction to Petrushka: Sources and Contexts, neither 
Stravinsky, Fokine, Boison, or Nijinski --- let alone Diaghilev himself --- either agreed or 
the ultimate meaning of the work that they were creating, or claimed some sort of master 
code that would justify the interrelation between music, dancing, visual displays and 
costumes, and the various themes and folkloric content invokes through the libretto.   If 
they were able “to find a common language and … perceive a common symbolism,” it 
was only through the long process the artistic collaboration.  Just as meter and rhythm 
opened up a space in which the sayings of human language could gel together into a 
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poem, the stage unfolds into the arena of collective labor; here, the artist’s different 
languages could communicate, and, through a creative dialogue, find ways of resonating 
with each other, if only through their dissonance.  More a visionary than an artist, 
Diaghilev opened up a space in which a true spectacle could evolve, --- as the spectacle 
of nature collaborating with man evolves --- yet without claiming to encompass it. 
 Truly, the spirit of an open, comprehensive politics breathes through Diaghilev’s 
Ballet Russe  --- among its last breaths before the outbreak of World War I.  In his well-
known letter to the London Times (?), published July 6th, only a week after the Serbian 
nationalist Gavrilo Princip assassinated Francis Ferdinand and the duchess of Hohenberg, 
Fokine explains how the “new Russian Ballet” differs from both the staid 
conventionalism of the Bolshoi and Kirov as well as Isadora Duncan’s modernist 
principles.  The latter no less than the former, he suggests, restrict the language of dance, 
and its expressive potential, to a narrow idiom; 
Every form of dancing is good in so far as it expresses the content or 
subject with which the dance deals; and that form is the most natural 
which is most suited to the purpose of the dancer.  It would be equally 
unnatural to represent a Greek Bacchic dance with ballet-steps on the 
point of the toes, or to represent a characteristic Spanish national dance 
by running and jumping in a Greek tunic and falling into attitudes 
copied from paintings on ancient Greek vases.  No one form of dancing 
should be accepted once and for all. Borrowing its subjects from the 
most varied historical periods, the ballet must create forms 
corresponding to the various periods represented.  In the course of the 
ages man has repeatedly changed his plastic language and expressed his 
joys and sorrows and all his emotions under a great variety of forms, 
often of extreme beauty.  For man is infinitely various, the manifold 
expressiveness of his gestures cannot be reduced to a single formula.82   
Against Wagner, and against Isadora Duncan ---his 20th century avatar, Fokine 
understands all developed somatic language as conventional, possessing an ideality of its 
own.  This does not exclude that there might be a certain underlying affective basis 
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common to all people, or that there could not be a universal comprehension of the 
expressive language of movement --- without this assumption, Fokine’s spectacles would 
remain incomprehensible to the audience.  Yet a given culture’s somatic language does 
not exhaust its authentic expressive possibilities in this natural substrate; the feelings of 
the body are only the beginning, not the beginning and the end, of dance.  
 For Fokine, ballet was to be, above all, as we might say, the spectacle of history; 
its first rule was “to create in each case a new form corresponding to the subject, the most 
expressive form possible for the representation of the period and the character of the 
nation…” The choreographers and dancers were not just to recombine the possibilities of 
a pre-existing conventional idiom, let alone merely coax out the natural language of the 
body.  Rather, they were to reinvent a new language, not for the sake of novelty, but to 
remember the past and the wonderful diversity of human life.  A new language is to be 
created for the sake of remembering the manifold expressiveness of man’s gestures.  The 
art of ballet as whole is nothing else than a system capable, in this way, of ever 
reinventing itself into new idioms.  Through an ideality cultivated by a rigorous, and at 
time brutal regime of training, it would become able to express the infinite freedom of 
man’s body-language.   
 Like Wagner, and Duncan, Fokine advocates the expressiveness of the entire 
body.  This expressiveness, however, is not rooted in an underlying feeling and thus 
limited to the individual body, but rather, it opens up towards dialogue, and even the life 
of the crowd.  Echoing, if unwittingly, the words of Diotima, Fokine explains attitude of 
the new ballet towards groups and ensemble dancing;  
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In the older ballet the dancers were ranged in groups only for the 
purpose of ornament, and the ballet master was not concerned with the 
expression of any sentiment in groups of characters or in ensemble 
dances.  The new ballet, on the other hand, in developing the principle 
of expressiveness, advances from the expressiveness of the face to the 
expressiveness of the whole body, and from the expressiveness of the 
individual body to the expressiveness of a group of bodies and 
expressiveness of the combined dancing of a crowd. 
Ballet, as it were, climbs on a ladder, with each rung a broader sphere of expressiveness    
--- and yet the movement is not of an abstraction and induction, , away from the 
body, but a passage through the body, and each of these broader spheres contains all the 
expressive possibilities of those that proceed it.  Unlike the traditional corps de ballet, and 
unlike Nietzsche’s dionysian chorus, which realized its individuality only through 
conjuring up the masked tragic hero, the crowd never becomes faceless: and it would not 
be too much to remember in Fokine’s ballet, sadly lost to time --- but this is a sad 
necessity of every art work that, like Achilles, lives in time --- as an apotropaic defiance 
against the crassly manipulative mass politics that would blight humanity in the years to 
come, that blights it still.   
 These are the first and fourth principles of Fokine’s new ballet.  The second and 
third concern the proper use of mimetic and conventional gestures.  The first however, 
summarizing the spirit of his choreography, and the Ballet Russe as a whole, concerns the 
proper relation of the arts to one another; 
The new ballet, refusing to be the slave either of music or of scenic 
decoration, and recognizing the alliance of the arts only on the 
condition of complete equality, allows a perfect freedom both to the 
scenic artist and to the musician.  In contradistinction to the older ballet 
it does not demand “ballet music” of the composer as an 
accompaniment to dancing; it accepts music of every kind, provided 
only that it is good and expressive.  It does not demand of the scenic 
artist that he should array the ballerinas in short skirts and pink slippers.  
It does not impose any specific “ballet” conditions on the composer or 
the decorative artist, but gives complete liberty to their creative powers.   
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An alliance between the arts, based on the condition of their complete equality: 
Hölderlin’s freier Bund --- or Chomsky’s anarchosyndicalism.  The all-mastering genius 
banished to Germany to choreograph Hitler’s festivals --- as if the path towards the Greek 
harmony of body and spirit had taken a detour through Acheron, drunk of the waters of 
Lethe, and joined the kingdom of the shades. 
 Sparkling forth from Fokine’s words is nothing less than the most human 
tendencies of the German Enlightenment.  And we are reminded of nothing so much as 
Moses Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem, an obscure and seldom understood text, and too little 
appreciated --- for like all the works of those striving after a true dialogue between 
Germans and Jews, it shatters against the impossibility of its task.   Perhaps no German 
thinker accepted with such consequence the possibility that human languages cannot 
understand each other, but exist in a state of babble. This was implicit in his rejection of 
Lessing’s idea of historical progress, and in his arguments against any politics or religion 
based on the need for unity of belief.  Because the words that people use in their 
commerce with each other are tied to individual, private sensations, there is no way that 
we could ever be sure of our agreement about any of the terms we use in discussion, let 
alone the vaguest and most open of all of these: “God.” And thus, rather than seeking 
unity of belief as the condition of a civic, and civil political life, --- an approach that, 
fatefully, Fichte will take in his piece on the French Revolution, and in order to exclude 
Jews from the national community --- Mendelssohn will advocate the need for an endless, 
and open conversation.  In this way, indeed, he justifies Judaism, not as a set of beliefs, 
but as a strange, seemingly inexplicable, and yet absolutely binding ritual law; this law 
was given to the Jewish people that they might begin to question why they are 
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performing these ritual, and thus, that they would seed the conversation about God that 
would spread throughout the earth.  This, ultimately, provides an answer the theodisic 
question that underlies Lessing’s Erziehung des Menschengeschlechte, and that, nearly 
forty years later (?), Schelling will again address in his own Philosophie der 
Offenbarung; namely, why God would not have united all people through one religion 
from the beginning, holding them together in a peaceful communion through a common 
tongue and shared beliefs, but instead, would allow for different, and divergent, 
revelations to come to pass.  The answer, for Mendelssohn, does not rest in a dialectical 
conception of history, of history as the circumtuitous return to a higher unity, but in 
ongoing dialogue. 
 In similar fashion, Fokine confronts the babble of man’s somatic languages --- the 
different body languages of the peoples of the earth.  Politics, as we saw, is above all a 
question of sharing space --- not only a plot of land, but the air, water, the bodies of 
animals, and even, indeed most of all, the space of the body itself, whose violation is the 
subject of all reproduction, and the beginning and end of all war --- to the extent that it 
remains, in some way, a human institution, and not merely the conditions of survival of 
the military-industrial complex.  An infinitely nuanced and infinitely varied language of 
physical interaction is at the heart of all political intercourse, providing the underlying 
foundation upon which is built the language of words.83 And thus, the problem at the 
heart of Fokine’s choreography   --- the diverse ways in which human cultures express 
themselves physically --- is serious; for here, our hatreds are most deeply entrenched. 
Even if people might come to understand each other through their words, even if they 
                                                          
83 The impossibility of politics ever to free itself from metaphors drawn from the body… 
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disagree, their bodies may still rise up and shatter all hope of concord.  Fokine’s 
choreography, we might say, was the first step, among many and diverse first steps, 
towards the realization of a body-politic that encompasses all of humankind, and all of 
nature --- a universalism large enough for the universe.  Just as the art of painting casts 
our eye upon the more peaceful world of colors and curves, just as poetry realizes a free 
and playful, and frolicking, communion of both meanings and phonemes, just as, finally, 
Schönberg’s Harmonienlehre will herald the liberation of tones from their dependence on 
the habituated ear of the listener, giving dissonances rights equal to consonances --- so 
the new Russian Ballet liberated the expressiveness of the body from the limits of earth-
bound politics.  In each case, the ideality of a language is realized by freeing it from the 
orbit of things. And in each case, the orbit of things itself orbits around the human body 
and the inputs and outputs through which it communicates with nature.  And so too, the 
labor of the dance and of the dancer --- the ever so gradual development of technique at 
the barre, and the almost tedious development of the art of ballet itself --- is a labor 
against the graveness and gravity of the human body and the limits it puts to political life.  
And yet; with the other arts, the liberation towards ideality of its own language could not 
avoid an abstraction from, and forgetfulness of, the other languages.  The modern 
technique of painting, truly the most concrete in relation to its own proper medium, is 
unavoidably abstract in relation both to things of the world and the other artistic 
languages.  And likewise, atonal music, while often blossoming into the most marvelous 
worlds within itself, has found it almost impossible to shake off the impression of 
coldness and sterility that it leaves on the uninitiated.   By correlating the open-ended 
ideality of meanings with the circulating dance of sounds, poetry is to able surmount the 
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danger of abstraction; and yet even with Hölderlin, it could not explain or justify their 
connection, but let a tempting and dangerous uncertainty linger in the air.  With dance, 
however, the labor against the human body is always, and in equal measure, a labor 
towards the body --- freeing from the body nothing else than its ideal language. Freeing 
itself from the necessity that bound it to the its affects, its pain and joy, it becomes able to 
express these, as well as every other possibility of somatic communication, as a free 
possibility.  Whereas Wagner, sensing the precarious isolation of the ever more ideal 
forms of artistic language, tried to unify them by enslaving them all, through his 
Gesamtwerk, to the one feeling of the situated, blood and earth-bound corpus, the new 
ballet of Fokine liberates the expressiveness of the body from its situation, --- from its 
bondage to the earth, and from all the strife that arises as we divide up the earth to serve 
our flesh.  Without tyrannizing and compelling the other arts into its service, the liberated 
body would provide a center for their communication; the center of a spectacle in which 
they all, if only gradually, and not through any master-strokes of genius, become 
conversant with each other.  The dancer touches all things without wishing to grasp them 
or curb them to his power; through him, them alight into spectacle, just as dancer, and the 
audience delight in them. The dancing body is a dilettante, as, in way, was Fokine.   
 The spectacles of the Ballet Russe anticipate a truly free, informed, 
comprehensive and creative human politics --- a politics in which humans would relate to 
each other and to nature as human beings, through their bodies, through all the emotions 
and affects and all the ideal possibilities that make of us what we are, and yet…without 
the strife that come from earthly limits.  Not because we would refuse these limits and 
escape to a spiritual domain, but because, at last, we would accept these as they are, and 
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what they bind us to --- for if ever we were all to understand what it means that the earth, 
the universe, --- indeed, that all life, --- is round, and rounds back upon itself, we would 
see; the time is past when man could stand against man in strife… there is nothing left of 
time or world to squander.  War was the mother of all things, and every thing was a rung 
on the ladder we climbed to realize that all is one, and each thing the expression of one of 
the infinite number of languages woven together into the universe.  Now that we see this 
spectacle from above, --- and now that we realize, must realize that there are, in truth, no 
things --- we must make an about-face.  No longer can our earthly doings stoke the fires 
of the war that blazes through nature, and that created the world outside and within 
ourselves, indeed made all that we are.   Instead, they must conserve, preserve, maintain -
-- cherish; our politics must become a politics of remembrance. Every action that turns 
away from this is a Missewende, a faux-pas, towards oblivion.84  
                                                          
84 And the how fresh the winds of the Ballet Russe, in contrast to the stink of Isadora Duncan’s 
Wagneriana. As she writes in “I See America Dancing,”  “It seems to me monstrous for anyone to believe 
that the Jazz rhythm expresses America. Jazz rhythm expresses the South African savage. America’s music 
will be something different  It has yet to be written.  No composer has yet caught the rhythm of America --- 
it is too mightily for the eras of most.  But some day it will gush forth from the great stretches of earth, rain 
down from the vast sky spaces of stars, and the American will be expressed in some mighty music that will 
shape its chaos to Harmony.  Long-legged strong boys and girls will dance to this music --- not the 
tottering, ape-like convulsions of the Charleston, but a striking upward tremendous mounting, powerful 
mounting above the pyramids of Egypt, beyond the Parthenon f Greece, an expression of Beauty and 
Strength such as no civilization has ever known.  That will be America dancing.   And this dance will have 
nothing in either of the servile coquetry of the ballet or the sensual convulsion of the South African Negro.  
It will be clean…” That peculiarly German form of idiocy --- to seek to define oneself against French over-
refinement and African savagery, at least as a temporary solution before one has wrapped them both 
together into the Jew --- seems to ape itself through Isadora’s words.  And one wonders what would be left 
of America once it had been wrested from everything French and African.  --- Little more than the Rocky 
Mountains; but perhaps she hoped to repopulate with the German’s exiled from the Europe which, by 1927, 
they had already made good strides towards destroying in their quest for national dignity.  While one may 
justly credit Isadora Duncan with freeing up dance from artificial conventions and moving towards a 
realization of the expressive potential of the whole body, just as one may justly credit Wagner with opening 
new possibilities of composition by challenging the traditional principles of harmony, we must see the 
limits of her vision, and criticize, above all, her inability to see these limits herself. Of special significance 
are those inherent in her notion of the nature that is, in her eye’s, the basis of all true dance.  In 1903, when 
she seemed more Rousseauian or even Schillerian than Wagnerian, and still credited the savage with 
movements that are “unrestricted, natural and beautiful,” she named Darwin as one of her “most revered 
teachers.”  And yet the nature of which she then spoke seems peculiarly static, unevolving --- and free of all 
relation to human activity.  “A woman once asked me why I dance with bare feet and I replied,’Madame, I 
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* 
 It would be senseless to speak of a linear historical development in Jewish 
thought and culture. As Abraham Geiger noted, each moment of the Diaspora has 
imposed unique conditions and given birth to new ways of being and thinking.  To eyes 
shaded by historicism, he knew, Jewish history could appear only as a geological cross-
section --- layer piled upon layer.  Still wishing, however, to hold on to the idea of a 
unitary and continuous tradition, Geiger struck upon a fortunate image; the tree --- here, 
the organic and geological, living and dead, become one.   
 With the Shoah, an epoch of the Jewish Diaspora came to an end. What was 
living at its periphery is now dead, and a new growth has begun to form around the old, 
cordoned off by an ashen barrier.  So now, and perhaps for the first time, we can look 
back with eyes sobered by hindsight, and wonder what was the meaning of this age and 
its struggles.  Perhaps, as Scholem believed, there never was never a true dialogue 
                                                                                                                                                                             
believe in the religion of the beauty of the human foot.’ The lady replied, ‘But I do not,’ and I said, ‘Yet 
you must, Madam, for the expression and intelligence of the human foot is one of the greatest triumphs of 
the evolution of man.’ … ‘I refer you to my most revered teachers, Mr. Charles Darwin and Mr. Ernst 
Haeckel.’ If we seek the real source of the dance, if we go to nature, we find that the dance of the future is 
the dance of the past, the dance of eternity, and has been and will always be the same… The movement of 
waves, of winds, of the earth is ever in the same lasting harmony.  We do not stand on the beach and 
inquire of the ocean what was its movement in the past and what will be its movement in the future.  We 
realize that the movement peculiar to its nature is eternal to its nature.  The movement of the free animals 
and birds remain always in correspondence to their nature, the necessities and wants of that nature, and its 
correspondence to the earth nature.  It is only when you put free animals under false restrictions that they 
lose the power of moving in harmony with nature, and adopt a movement expressive of the restrictions 
placed about them.  So it has been with civilized man.  The movements of the savage, who lived in freedom 
in constant touch with Nature, were unrestricted, natural and beautiful. Only the movements of the naked 
body can be perfectly natural.  Man, arrived at the end of civilization, will have to return to nakedness, not 
the unconscious nakedness of the savage, but to the conscious and acknowledged nakedness of the mature 
Man, whose body will be the harmonious expression of his spiritual being.”  Fokine, in his letter, did not 
make pretentious allusions to Darwin and Haeckel, perhaps he knew little of their work, or was against it, 
as many artists of the times; and yet he understood some of its deeper implications, and above all, that the 
natural possibilities of the language of the human body themselves consist of evolved conventional forms. 
From here, it is only a short leap to realizing that the evolution of man, in all its forms, is but a part of the 
evolution of nature --- and that human creative freedom is itself but a form through which evolution 
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between the Jews and Germans, --- yet we might wonder if there has ever been true 
dialogue anywhere for as long have human have tread upon the earth.  For this may itself 
be only a messianic expectation, a dream, as long as the world remains alze sêre 
gescheiden; since even the intimacy of flesh, love or friendship offers no surety for 
understanding.   But there was at least a dance; of words, of ideas, of sounds, of visions, 
and, at last, of bodies and of ash --- and if, in the end, it was only a Todesfuge and danse 
macabre, still, extraordinary and wonderful ideas were born into the world, as sparks fly 
off a flint. And perhaps now, when finally rustling leaves of springtime growth have 
settled to the ground; --- now, when the noisy clang of words has perished in the winter 
air, it is our task to lovingly recollect these and bring about their converse.   
 This dance began with Spinoza --- the first Jew to burst into central Europe at the 
beginnings of the modern age --- and ended with Freud.  And what a strange beginning 
and end; between blessedness and gaiety blossomed a tradition guided above all by 
messianic impulses, if only from beneath, as by Benjamin’s hunchbacked theologian.  
Yet with Spinoza and Freud, these messianic impulses seem at their minimum; not only 
is human history subsumed within nature, and without any God-given meaning or 
justification, but there is little expectation of or hope for any sort of progress.  In Spinoza, 
this cynicism follows from the belief that true knowledge can never be the possession of 
more than a blessed few.  For Freud, on the other hand, it is sad experience that he must 
                                                                                                                                                                             
becomes possible; thus, that nature itself, as a whole, is always on the make, and that it is meaningless to 
speak of the essence of things.   
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make towards the end of his life, as he sees barbarism erupt throughout Europe, either 
mated to progressive ideas, or, as in Germany, completely unalloyed.85  
 Thus educated by the times in the precariousness of progress, Freud explains his 
decision to send out the third part of Der Mann Moses und die monotheistische Religion.  
As he states in prefatory notes written before the Anschluss, he has the boldness 
(Verwegenheit) of one who has nothing to loose.  And if he was without hope before the 
thirteenth of March, afterwards, no longer under the protection of the Catholic Church, he 
also has nothing to fear.  And so, feeling neither hope nor fear, an absolute desperado --- 
he gives to the world his most ambitious, and strange, assault on the problem of history 
and religion. And yet it would be wrong to think that this work stands in no positive 
relation to the explicitly Messianic tradition of Geiger, Cohen, Rosenzweig and 
Benjamin.  For perhaps such writings, always prophetic in intention, take shape in 
accordance with the measure of hope and fear that the times present to their author; 
perhaps even the term “God” is a variable that conforms or diverges with nature 
according to a hidden calculus.  If so, we might understand Freud’s Moses as itself but 
another attempt, made in the most desperate, and thus most needful hour, to impress upon 
the human race a promise, or at least a possibility, given it by history. 
                                                          
85 “Wie leben in einer besonders merkwürdigen Zeit.  Wir finden mit Erstaunen, daß der Fortschritt ein 
Bündis mit der Barberei geschlossen hat.  In Sowjetrußland hat man es unternommen, etwa 100 Millionen 
in der Unterdrückung festgehaltener Menschen zu bessern Lebensformen zu erheben.  Man war verwegen 
genug, ihnen das ‘Rauschgift’ der Religion zu entziehen, und so weise, ihnen ein verständiges Maß von 
sexueller Freiheit zu geben, aber dabei unterwarf man sie dem grausamsten Zwang und raubte ihnen jede 
Möglichkeit der Denkfreiheit.  Mit ähnlicher Gewalttätigkeit wird das italienische Volk zu Ordnung und 
Pflichtgefühl erzogen.  Man empfindet es als Erleichterung von einer bedrückenden Sorge, wenn man 
vorgeschichtliche Barberei auch ohne eine Anlehnung an irgendeine fortschrittliche Idee vor sich gehen 
kann.” 
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 That Freud saw no hope of progress in the history of religion is clear from the 
following, almost ironic remark, which concludes a discussion of the “cultural 
regression” of Christianity; “Und doch war das Christentum religionsgeschichtlich, d.h. 
in bezug auf die Wiederkehr des Verdrängten, ein Fortschritt, die jüdische Religion von 
da ab gewissermaßen ein Fossil.”86  The progress of religion is always a progress 
backwards, towards the ever more explicit revelation of the original trauma. To the extent 
that this revelation is not mediated through science and consciousness, but occurs 
unconsciously through individual and collective neurosis, one could only expect every 
more dangerous outbreaks of the original brutality.  While this does allow for a cultural 
progress independent of religion, religion remains the far stronger force, and thus cultural 
progress always exceedingly precarious, and ever at risk of falling into an alliance with 
its opposite.  Nothing concerns Freud so much in Moses than this alliance, already spoken 
of in the preface to the third part.  His confrontation with the history of Judaism is 
nothing less than an attempt to free the sparks of progress embedded in the very husks of 
barbarism that have granted them passage into our own age. 
 Two-fold are the sparks embedded in the Jewish religion. On the one hand, the 
Sun-religion of Ikhnaton; not so much on account of its spiritualism its universalism and 
its anticipation of scientific enlightenment --- recognizing in the sun the source of all life 
on this planet, and thus first turning attention towards what, once the principles of Darwin 
have been accepted, must be regarded as the alpha and omega of earthly life.  On the 
other hand, the free union of the Brüderbund.  In his recapitulation of the theory of 
human prehistory from Totem and Taboo, Freud describes how the sons, banding 
                                                          
86 Freud, Moses, p. 95. 
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together in order to kill their father, first hit upon the principle of political equality, the 
origin of all “morality and law,” all the institutions upon which civilization and civility 
depend.  As Freud explains; 
Es entstand die erste Form einer sozialen Organisation mit 
Triebverzicht, Anerkennung von gegenseitigen Verpflichtungen, 
Einsetzung bestimmter, für unverbrüderlich (heilig) erklärter 
Institutionen, die Anfänge also von Moral und Recht.  Jeder einzelne 
verzichtete auf das Ideal, die Vaterstellung für sich zu erwerben, auf 
den Besitz von Mutter und Schwestern. Damit war das Inzesttabu und 
das Gebot der Exogamie gegeben.   
 According to Freud’s account of the origin of monotheistic religion, Moses, --- an 
Egyptian priest who attached himself to Semitic tribes enslaved in Israel in order to lead 
them and indoctrinate them in the religion of Ikhnaton --- is murdered by his minions, 
who thus realize a measure of equality among themselves. At the origin of Judaism, in 
other words, is a repetition of the original moment of all human civilization  
  The two sparks of progress in Judaism are the religion and politics of the Sonne, 
and of the Söhne --- a sun and son religion.  But each is, from the very beginning, 
interwoven with repression, compulsion, and barbarism; the sun-religion, because it is at 
once a means of Enlightenment and of political repression, serving to consolidate the 
imperial might of the Ikhnaton and humiliate and weaken the temple priests.  And the 
son-religion, because it is tainted, from its very inception, with the stain of murder as well 
as the guilt that is thereby incurred, and that will be passed down from generation to 
generation through neurotic patterns of behavior.  The murder of Moses, however, plies 
these two separate complications together to create the constellation that will rule over 
human history in the ages to come.  For as a result, the very hope of scientific 
enlightenment and universalism, --- an understanding of man as an outgrowth of nature, 
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rather than a participant in God’s creation, --- will be wedded to a guilt for the father’s 
murder.  After Moses’s murder, the Enlightenment idea could only be restored through 
the resurrection of guilt; and thus it must assume the form given it by the prophets, with 
their untiring focus on a life in truth, peace and justice, though based on the belief in a 
monotheistic God, unique and separate from his creation, as the father was distinct from 
his sons, and Moses from his minions.87  And at the same time, the equality of the 
brothers came to be entangled not only with the guilt at the father’s murder, but with the 
absolutist ambitions of Akhenaton and the regal ambitions of Moses --- and ultimately 
with the absolute lordship of God.   Regarded in terms of its origin, and as a concrete 
historical phenomenon, the Monotheistic religion of Moses involves a fateful paradox; it 
presents the seeds of a world-view that grasps humanity as a part of nature and of an 
ethics based on the universal equality among all men, --- and ultimately, perhaps, all 
humans --- and yet these seeds of progress could only plant themselves among men 
through a trauma whose origin is in the absolute might, and right, of the father.  The 
equality of the son-, and sun-religion and politics was only able to replicate itself through 
the father’s absolute lopsidedness. The very insight that no force rules monarchically in 
heaven or on earth was thus woven into the fabric of history through the coarsest, thickest 
of regal thread.   
 In this way, we now begin to see how Freud’s Moses presents the last voice in the 
already-fading tradition of German-Jewish Messianism.  For Herman Cohen, the strength 
of the Jewish messianic tradition lay in the idea of a God that, through a unity that 
excluded all that was not of his Being, provided the anchor of human ethical life and the 
                                                          
87 Freud, Moses, p. 74.  
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socialist ideal.  God’s absolute monarchic privilege, his unrivaled lordship over all things, 
was itself the guarantor of the equality of all human beings; humans could only be equal 
before God.  The idea of Monotheism, he believed, was the evolved idea of a creator 
God; a precarious configuration that could only be made coherent through Kant’s 
sundering of ethical and natural law.  Freud, in contrast, could only regard the sundering 
of God from nature, and nature from ethics, not only as the greatest weakness of the 
Prophetic tradition, but also as a distortion wrought against an originally egalitarian 
potential.  Yet, at the same time, it follows from this that his relation to the tradition of 
Judaism is no different, and no less Jewish than that of the prophets, as well as all those, 
who, in later times, have tried to awaken and strengthen the Messianic tradition.  For like 
them he returns to a secret tradition in order to awaken Judaism’s purist tendencies, just 
as, indeed, and as he admits, his scientific attitude is itself a Jewish, which is to say 
Egyptian heritage.  And in certain sense, he could not but regard himself as possessed of 
a “gift for religion,” no less than Paul;  “Er war ein im eigentlichsten Sinn religiös 
veranlagter Mensch; die dunkeln Spuren der Vergangenheit lauerten in seiner Seele, 
bereit zum Durchbruch in bewußtere Regionen.”  Without these dark traces of the past in 
his soul, Freud could not possibility account for the insights which guided his empirical 
method. Yet whereas Paul, and all the other founders of religions, allowed themselves to 
be controlled by these forces without understanding them, Freud will try to bring them to 
the surface with the sobriety and awareness of the scientist --- yet even this sobriety 
remains in part an inheritance from the past. 
 Freud sought nothing less than to cleanse the theologo-politics of the sun and son 
of every trace of the father’s inequality; a final and lasting catharsis from both the “tragic 
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guilt” and authoritarianism that has blighted humanity.  A religion of the son, like 




                  Empedocles 
 
 The ballet we speak of is not something over and done with, a particular idiom 
and system of steps; an art form that, however your opinion may sway, reached its 
pinnacle with Taglioni and Essler, Cecchetti, Bournonville, Petipa, Diaghelev, or 
Balanchine.  Rather, it is a possibility, a spark of progress and hope --- just as was the 
sun- and son- religion, the Freier Bund, for Freud.   Progress, for him, is not a question of 
specific beliefs about the nature of reality, but of a functional interaction towards the 
world.  In a similar manner, ballet is the discipline of movement, cultivating the body 
towards the proper relationship towards itself, other bodies, and nature as a whole.  And 
just as Freud’s theories work towards the embodiment of reason --- showing, above all, 
that the language of words and symbolic reason, though possessing its own, irreducible 
form of ideality, develops out of the original drives, whose energy, through cathexis, 
comes to inhabit linguistic signifiers --- the discipline of ballet strives after the 
reasonableness of the body.  Rather than serving towards immediate gratification, or 
expressing the immediate impulses of feeling, the body’s movements are brought towards 
an autonomous, and open language, capable of expressing the political interaction of 
different bodies.   
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 Thus, both Freud’s naturalized, Darwinian messianism and the evolving art of 
ballet return to a goal set by Spinoza --- the first and purest modern exponent of a truly 
naturalized, scientific ethics; namely, the realization of the correlative power of the mind 
and the body, and of a community of all minds and bodies, through the overcoming of 
titillation, the concentration of pleasure in one part of the body.  Pleasure, for Spinoza, is 
an expression of the power of the body, and this bodily power, rather than its 
renunciation, must be the basis of ethical life; and yet, when this pleasure is concentrated 
in specific parts of the body, its strength comes into contradiction with itself --- the 
pleasure of one part may bring about the ruin of the whole. Yet through the shared, and 
unfinished labor of Freud and the ballet --- the convergence of the embodiment of reason 
and the enreasoning of the body --- a communion between the two emerges that defies 
the dichotomization of Spinoza’s attributes; each loses its privilege --- expressing the 
universe, in their stead, are countless languages, real and ideal, concrete and abstract.  
None of these could encompass the whole, yet, nevertheless, some are more expressive 
than others, and the most expressive are those whose possibilities can combine free from 
the sway of dominating forces either within or without; released, in other words, from 
titillation, now understood in the most general sense as every form of submission to the 
necessity of the parts.   
 Just as the ideals of equality and scientific reason first appeared in an ambiguous, 
even self-contradictory form, so too the ballet; for at its grand debut into European 
culture, it was escorted by no one else than the father incarnate --- Louis XIV, le grande 
monarque, le roy-soleil.   And no other form of art stood in so near a relation to his 
imperial ambitions, or so perfectly displayed both the promise and the failure of the 
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baroque. If as a youth, still under the Tutelage of Cardinal Mazarin, he was content to 
play the role of Apollo at the court balls, in his later years, after he had claimed the 
exclusive right to rule and reduced the French Aristocracy to sycophantic courtiers, the 
ballet itself became the expression of a political life that revolved entirely around the 
person of the king, and was orchestrated through the etiquettes of courtly life; a politics 
that at once had become a body-politics, while at the same time, was held under the 
absolute sway of one single, and ever heftier body.  Thus, if it was with the failed 
absolutism and sun-religion of Amanhotep IV, in the fourteenth century of B.C., that the 
ideas of egalité, liberté, fraternité first entered the minds of men, it is in the successful 
absolutism of the sun-king that these entered, and became a possibility of, the body; and 
it was left as the task of ballet to realize the potential contained within its paradoxical 
origin.  The spiritual history of Judeo-Christian civilization, for Freud, began with the 
trauma of Moses’s law, and his murder; spiritual history, was from the start, neurotically 
guided by the retained memories of the body.  With the danse d’ecole (?), in contrast, 
both the barbaric brutality and the monarchic lopsidedness were always a function of the 
institutions through which they, of necessity, perpetuated themselves; for while the 
underlying language of ballet, from the beginning, contained the seeds of a freely 
interactive body politic, it has only been allowed to uphold itself through institutions that, 
beyond the unequal distribution of nature’s blessings, replicated and accentuated the 
groundless inequalities determining social relations as a whole.   
 The history of ballet must be understood in terms of the real institutions that have 
allowed the cultivation of the balletic body, and give a home to its spectacle --- 
institutions that, in general, will reflect the relations of productive forces in a given 
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society.  We do not wish to suggest that all human phenomena could be thus understood, 
or that any develop in a perfect correlation with politico-economic organization; to do so 
would contradict our insistence on the irreducible ideality of different languages. All 
languages, including the language of dance, enjoy a great deal of autonomy in their 
development towards ideal possibilities, --- or indeed, are capable of developing towards 
an autonomy, even if, at their origins, they are deeply embedded in shared forms of life.  
Yet for the most part, the body can only be cultivate through establishments that subject 
the individual body to some kind of wider scrutiny, and it is best cultivated beginning at a 
young age, before the individual possesses either enough maturity or self-reflection to 
understand what is being done to him.  And likewise, the cultivated body can only 
display itself, and make its virtues known, in public spaces and through spectacles whose 
prohibitive cost make them directly dependent on the existing centers of power and 
wealth.  Thus, the history of dance, and ballet, indeed, of all the forms of cultivation of 
the body in general --- sports, gymnastic exercises, military training, and religious rituals 
--- provides a unique insight into the changing ways in which political life, without 
necessarily resorting to direct physical coercion, nevertheless creates the conditions under 
which the human body is able, as it were, to exercise itself.  Yet at the same time the 
history of ballet, in particular, gives insight into how --- even in the wake of ever greater 
degrees of institutionalization --- truly free and expressive possibilities are able to 
emerge, the seeds of a truly free politics.88     
 There have been untimely and solitary poets, philosophers, artists, and even, 
though to a lesser degree, musicians; wandering upon untroden paths, they were able to 
                                                          
88 Explain relation to Foucault. 
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see a world different than that which struck the eyes of other mortals, and their works at 
time even enjoyed the luxury of slumbering through years of latency and obscurity before 
they found an age that would understand them.89  The art of dance, however, is almost 
wholly given over to its age; for it has only the present to realize itself, and if it fails at 
this, it has failed completely.  Thus the dancer either expresses his age, or is sacrificed to 
it.  
* 
Nun, mein vortrefflicher Freund, sagte Herr C, so sind Sie im 
Besitz von allem, was nötig ist, um mich zu begreifen.  Wir 
sehen, daß in dem Maße, als, in der organischen Wel, die 
Reflexion dunkler und schwächer wird, die Grazie darin 
immer strahlender und herrschender hervortritt. --- Doch so, 
wie sich der Durchschnitt zweier Linien, auf der einen Seite 
eines Punkts, nach dem Durchgang durch das Unendliche, 
plötzlich wieder auf der andern Seite einfindet, oder das Bild 
des Hohlspiegels, nachdem es sich in das Unendlcihe entfernt 
hat, plötzlich wieder dicht vor uns tritt: so findet such auch, 
wenn ide Erkenntnis gleichsam durch ein Unendliches 
gegangen ist, die Grazie wieder ein; so, daß sie, zu gleicher 
Zeit, in demjenigen menschlichen Körperbau am reinsten 
erscheint, der entweder gar keins, oder ein unendliches 
Bewußtsein jat, d.h. in dem Gliedermann, oder in dem Gott. 
         Kleist, “Über das Marionettentheater” 
 We could trace the history of the ballet through the court of Louis XIV, where it 
still served as the pastime of Aristocrats, to its development as a theatrical artform in its 
                                                          
89 We should not think of the “lonely poet” as a specifically modern creation, rooted in the isolation and 
alienation of the individual. For as we have shown, meter and rhyme, like the artist’s canvas and paint, or 
the composer’s notation, allow for a private stage of creativity. The poet-philosopher Empedocles had lived 
an active life among humans, yet even so, a tremendous, almost incomprehensible loneliness speaks 
through the few fragments of his that remain.  He understands himself to be a , who, because he 
trusted himself to mad strife, has been banished from God and forced to “assume all the possible forms of 
mortal beings that wander life’s tedious paths.”  Alone among mortals, he greets the earth with tears and 
distasteConsider Fragment 118 (Diels) “.”  Or 121: 
“           
   ‘     ” It is also not surprising that as the entire 
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own right. This was a long process, that even now is far from finished, and within this 
history there is little that is without significance. The employment of commoners as 
professional dancers, Noverro’s (?) attempt through the Ballet d’action to place theatrical 
dance on a solid footing, the systematic codifications of Blasis and Cecchetti, the 
development of point technique, the feminization of the ballet in post-revolutionary 
France and the revigorization of male dancing in Denmark and Russia, the subsidy of 
dancers through prostitution --- all of these stand in a vital relation to the liberation of an 
art form that, despite its vast expressive potential, can never bear fruit without an alliance 
with the real forces and conditions, and even the barbarism, of the present day.  But we 
will skip forward to that moment when the possibilities of the ballet, long in the working, 
suddenly sparkled before the world; the Ballet Russe of Diaghilev. 
 Capturing the imagination of the spectators as never before, and gathering around 
itself the creative work of artists from every field --- Stravinsky, Debussy, Satie, Cocteau, 
Bakst (?), Boisson (?), Picasso --- as well as the most marvelous dancers and 
choreographers of the time --- Pavlova, Fokine, Massine, and even Balanchine   --- the 
Ballet Russe not only exhibited as never before the possibilities of dance, but, indeed, of 
all the word-less art forms. Each of these artistic languages become a prism through 
which the others were reflected and enhanced, and like the facets of a diamond, the whole 
appeared in its glory only through the division into parts.  Sound and spectacle coursed 
with life and energy, and became meaningful in a world so overfull of idle words.  And at 
the same time as the outward spectacle of the ballet blossomed, its inner core --- the 
discipline of dancing itself --- acquired a new systematic unity and rigor.  Enrico 
                                                                                                                                                                             
political character of philosophy changed, and as it became so firmly rooted in Athenian political life, the 
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Cecchetti, who instructed Nijinsky at the Imperial Russian Ballet, and later taught with 
Diaghilev, brought a hitherto unknown unity to the movements of the ballet, and 
developed the systematic interrelation of the different parts of the instructional regime.  
Whereas Diaghilev and Fokine were concerned above all with creating a new kind of art 
form, Cecchetti discovered in the art of ballet an antique, classical beauty.  Yet while he 
identifies this beauty, above all, with Ancient Greece, it is not rooted to a specific culture, 
body-type, language or clime, but is, simply, la beauté mervielleuse du corps humain.  
Ballet is not only neither vain nor decadent, but stands outside of movement of history, 
the rise and decay of civilization, and offers the constant hope of the rejuvenation of its 
ideals.  Thus, at a time when the much of Western Europe cowers in fear before the 
barbarian Asiatic hordes, the aged Italian, a star at La Scalla, would write;  
Encore moins est-elle décadente. Terpsichore, exilée des temples de 
l’antique Hellade et plus tard passagère dans les salons de la France et 
sur les theaters de d’Italie, elle a trouvé de nos jours en Russie des 
Templiers, ses Vestales, ses défenseurs les plue dévoues.  Ranimée 
d’un nouveau soufflé de vie, elle réjouit encore par sa beauté l’esprit las 
des humains.                                                                                           
Nulle autre joie ne me touché dans mon automne de vieil artiste que de 
voir sur de jeunes tiges refleurir éternelle la fleur de cet art.90 
The Muse of Dance, Terpsichore, a god in exile and Heimatloser Sänger, travels, like the 
wind that breathes new life into her, from one land into another, and, giving new blossom 
to the marvelous beauty of the human body, rejuvenates the human spirit. The grave 
illusion of decay is suspended by rediscovering a beauty that is, at every moment, ready 
to reawaken.  And in this way, moreover, we see that Cecchetti’s extreme classicism --- 
of vast influence for modern methods of instruction --- and Diaghilev’s revolutionary 
modernism do not contradict, but complement each other; it is only through the one that 
                                                                                                                                                                             
dialogue, and later lectures and esoteric prose, replaced meter as the philosopher’s medium. 
90 “A Manual of The Theory and Practice of Classical Theatrical Dancing (Méthode Cecchetti). 
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the other is able to blossom.  Theatrical dance is, indeed, capable of extraordinary heights 
of exstasis, yet this remains where, by name and nature, it should remain; at the 
periphery.  The roots and trunk remain sober, and it is only through this steadfast core 
that the highest degrees of expression, and enthusiasm, are possible.91   
                                                          
91 Here, as everywhere, this might be explained at a much more technical, physical level; the most exstatic 
elements of classical dance, those which seem most to defy gravity --- with woman, work on pointe, and 
with men, the grand leaps of virtuoso technique, --- depend on maintaining the most contact of the feet with 
the floor; without a well-articulated foot that properly feels the floor during the plies which initiate even 
simple jumps, it is impossible to effectively communicate the energy of the body into a verticle movement.  
But this, in a more general sense, it was is so remarkable --- and fascinating --- about dance, and what 
makes it appear frivolous to the initiated and uncomprehending.  Because all his work is in, with and 
against the graveness and gravity that is natural to the body in its relation to the world, the dancer could 
have no more difficult, serious or lofty goal than levity, joyousness, even frivolity.  The spectacle of 
frivolity --- of peripheral movements that are so light and airy that they seem to evaporate into the air at the 
moment of their birth --- is perhaps its most difficult accomplishment.  And indeed, because the purely 
frivolous itself appears as the receptacle of such an extraordinary quantity of labor, even as it graciously 
sacrifices itself to the moment --- it allows for the simultaneous experience of intense joy and intense 
mourning.  --- This gay mourning, I believe, is the mode of the tragic proper to our age. Hölderlin and 
Kleist pointed us towards this, but perhaps it is even suggested in the Gnostic and Kabbalistic idea that the 
earth consists but of shells in which divine sparks have been imprisoned --- making the destruction of the 
flesh necessary for the liberation of the divine, and leading, as Buber suggests, ultimately to the religious 
nihilism of the Frankish sect.  Yet, in ballet, the dissolution of the body does not stand in conflict with its 
possibilities, but is its very highest degree of activity, self-possession, and constancy.  The body is 
disembodied, freed from the dominion of gravity, only by most being itself.  And thus, whereas past, 
mystical incarnations of this joyous mourning conceived of God as a transcendent cause of the world, and 
in their purest, oldest forms --- Zoroasterism (?) and Manicheanism --- began with the presupposition of an 
absolute dualism between the light and darkness, the spirit and the flesh --- in its new manifestations, and 
above all, in balletic spectacle, this opposition dissolves; the world itself, in its totality, appears as the 
interwoven labor of man and nature, and in the moment of joyous mourning we at once comprehend the 
absolute unity of their work, and its beauty, but also its precariousness --- and, above all, its neediness --- 
that it would not exist without us, without our observation, our enjoyment, our pleasure, our sadness --- that 
it is, in every sense, our spectacle.  This joyous mournfulness and mourning joy is also what we might call 
true sentimentality.  True sentimentality has little to do with a cloying attachment for family, children, and 
fatherland; in fact, it is most purely felt towards those things that are least like oneself and furthest from 
one’s everyday concerns --- and above all, towards inanimate, and even disposable objects.  Perhaps its 
simplest expression is the immense responsibility that children feel towards the objects that they possess; 
they feel guilty if they neglect their stuffed animals and dolls --- even after they have fallen out of their 
favor.  Such children, I think, are not merely projecting their own fears of abandonment; rather, they 
realize, if only, of coarse, in a very instinctive way, that the things of the world exist and have life through 
their grace alone.   No one better understood this emotion, its power, and its significance, better than the 
Danish poet Hans Christian Andersen; and it is for this reason that while his stories speak so directly and 
immediately to children, they also contain depths that our own age can no longer afford to ignore and 
trivialize.  Sentimentality, with him, --- as we will see --- becomes a way of comprehending the world as a 
totality, and is as far as can be from all mere nostalgia.  And in the story “The Tin Soldier,” he combines 
the purest and most mysterious expression of true sentimentality with an understanding of the strange unity 
that binds the constancy and frivolity of ballet.  
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 All of these various tendencies converged and found themselves anew in the brief 
career of Vaslav Nijinsky.  Not only was he an unparalleled master of the somewhat 
dowdy classical technique taught at the Imperial Ballet School in Petersburg, but he 
seemed to become at once both the music and his characters, expressing their qualities 
not through the artifice of mime or some kind of stereotyped “national character,” but 
purely in the medium of dance; the language of the body became expressive in its own 
right, and he commanded all its registers --- from spasms and contortions to the most 
extraordinary grace.  And in his famous leaps, it is said, he seemed to pause as if 
suspended in mid-air; as if the laws of gravity were themselves, if only momentarily, put 
on hold. And through all of this, off-stage he remained a blank; laconic, expressionless, 
without outward charm.  While he, like Fokine, was deeply influenced by Isadora 
Duncan’s revolutions, he was, in many ways, the very opposite of her; for as, as Lincoln 
Kirstein notes, whereas Isadora could only dance herself, and her entire life was one 
single act of self-presentation, Nijinsky had no life outside his dancing, and knew none of 
the artifices of personality beyond the roles that he became, absolutely. He seemed to 
exist on a different plane.  
 The dancer lives and works in a medium that cannot stand the test of time; or only 
though the betrayal of this medium, which is to say, of time itself.  Even if we had films 
of him dancing, or if more of his choreography had been preserved, this would not 
change anything; the dance can only be experienced through the common space of 
theater, the dancer must appear in the flesh --- for above all, we must experience the 
suspense of every moment, the possibility of catastrophe, and the tension of one body 
touching up against another.  Dance is incomprehensible outside of the shared moment 
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and shared space; every recording is only a shadow, and abstraction of movements.  
Thus, what remains of Nijinsky’s dance are only the sparks that it threw off from itself --- 
the testimonies of enraptured spectators, colleagues, and even, perhaps, the words of his 
own diaries, written as he passed over into madness.   And what we wish to do by 
speaking of Nijinsky, is only to point towards the immense hope that appeared through 
his dance and that sparkled over into these testimonies --- a hope that, like every true 
hope, points far beyond the narrow confines from which it emerged.  
 One of these testimonies is especially revealing.  Cyril Beaumont writes, “I have 
seen no one approach Nijinsky’s rendering of Petrouchka, for … he suggested a puppet 
that sometimes aped a human being, whereas all the other interpreters conveyed a dancer 
imitating a puppet.”  If other dancers had presented the world and its gradations of being 
– from the mechanical doll and puppet to divinely graceful sylphs --- as extreme modes 
of being human, Nijinsky presents humanity itself as an act of becoming; as the 
precarious project of the human race.  And in just this same way, he was able to present 
the divine not after the model of the merely, and all-too human, but as an unheard-of 
possibility, --- and something that can be striven for.  Born into the rigid hierarchies of 
the Russian Empire, and raised in both the Catholic and Eastern Orthodox faith, he 
became at once the first dancing pantheist --- the other side of Spinoza --- and realized 
pantheism, as had Nietzsche --- as a process of evolution rather than emanation.   
 The names of Darwin and Nietzsche, and the thought of evolution haunt 
Nijinsky’s diaries.  While he opposes the idea that man is descended from an ape, he does 
not oppose evolution per se, --- only the reduction of the essence of man, and his spiritual 
nature, to the essence of an ape.  And indeed his diary --- written on the verge of a tragic 
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decline into mental illness that we do not wish to romanticize --- suggests the hope of a 
higher conception of evolution --- one that does not limit man to the bestial, reducing all 
his actions to some kind of principle of survival, as many evolutionary biologists are still 
wont to do, but that opens mankind up towards a more all-encompassing way of being.  
Consider, for example, this passage, with which the first part of his diary, titled “On 
Life,” ends; 
My soul is sick. I am suffering. I am suffering. I know that Kostrovsky 
will feel me, but I know that everyone will feel me.  I am a man and not 
a beast. I love everyone.  I also have faults.  I am a man and not God.  I 
want to be God, and therefore I try to improve myself. I want to dance.  
I want to draw.  I want to play the piano.  I want to write poetry.  I want 
to compose ballets. I want to love everyone. This is my aim in life.  I 
know socialists will find it easier to understand me, but I am not a 
socialist.  I am God. My party is God’s.  I love everyone.  I do not want 
war.  I do not want state frontiers.  I want Wilsonism, which will 
improve the whole terrestrial globe.  I am the whole terrestrial globe. I 
am the earth.  I have a home everywhere. I live everywhere.  I do not 
want to have property.  I do not want to be rich.  I want to love, love. I 
am love, and not brutality.  I am not a bloodthirsty animal.  I am a man. 
I am a man. 
God is within me, and I am within Him.  I want Him. I seek Him. I 
want my manuscript to be published, because I know that everyone can 
read, but I hope for improvement.  I do not know that is needed for that, 
but I feel that God will help all who seek. I am a seeker, for I feel God. 
God is seeking me, and therefore we are finding each other.  
Beast, man, and God are not isolated and separate essences, but are connected through 
striving, and each, in a way, represents something that is striving for, an act rather than a 
being.  Throughout his diary, Nijinsky cycles through these separate possibilities, and 
describes, in a dazzling and complicated fashion, their interwovenness. It is in this way, 
above all, that his pantheistic tendencies seem to touch upon his dance, suggesting, if 
only in a tortured and painful way, what was so gracefully, even joyously expressed on 
the stage.  At the same time, though, becoming God is identified with mastering all of the 
different arts, all the different languages of art. Elsewhere in the diaries, Nijinsky will 
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claim mastery through feeling of every form of communication; he can understand what 
people are saying without speaking their tongue, or teach the violin without knowing 
how, and understands everything about the earth without the concepts of science.  The 
unity of all languages is an ongoing obsession.  Yet unlike with Wagner, this unity of 
languages is not rooted in the single feeling of the human body, but rather in a unity of 
feeling that encompasses all of the world, the entire terrestrial earth, and expresses itself 
through peace rather than the hostilities of one body-politic towards another.  Thus, the 
striving to become God is nothing else than the struggle to feel and be felt throughout all 
of nature, and it is motivated, above all, by a premonitory feeling of God as the unity of 
all things. 
 While these notions only come to word as Nijinsky’s schizophrenia became 
manifest, they should not be treated merely a symptoms of mental illness, or as residua of 
his earlier conversion to Tolystoian religious philosophy.  Rather, they express a humane 
and revolutionary tendency that followed him throughout his life, and that inhabited his 
creative work; even as a student he insisted, against standard practice, in addressing the 
younger grades as equals. And after Diaghilev broke off relations with him, and he took 
his own touring company abroad, he tried, unsuccessfully, to institute democratic reforms 
and further undermine the star system of which he was himself, in a superficial sense, the 
beneficiary. Yet these tendencies could not bear fruit; the ballet could not be liberated in 
his time, and Nijinsky remained unfelt, and thus misunderstood.  And perhaps the reason 
is this; even after the Russian ballet, and with it Nijinsky, had liberated itself from the 
decaying Imperial bureaucracy with its prudish conservatism, it remained an institution   
Capitalist, indeed, rather than imperial, and open to amazing creative possibilities; yet 
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even the collaboration of artists and their languages nevertheless depended on an 
organizing moment, pure vision and administration, without any real creativity of its 
own. A Diaghilev, in other words.  Even before he went insane, Nijinsky was unable to 
survive as an artist without the Diaghilev whom, for many reasons, he despised, and 
whom he remains obsessed with throughout his diary.  The unity of artistic languages 
was itself only possible within the empty organizational space opened up by the 
visionary.  We may now recognize the need for this visionary moment, and the 
impossibility of the artist, or, indeed, any kind of creative labor, to exist without it, as the 
real condition of age in which Nijinsky danced, the age to which he was sacrificed --- and 
which would, soon after, give birth to the Soviet Union as well as Hitler.  
* 
Du maa vide, at ligesaa snart Kongen og alle 
Haffolkene flytte herind til Byen, saa lobe 
Bolmsterne strax fra Haven op paa Slottet og ere 
lystige.  Der skulde Du see! De to allersmukkeste 
Roser sætte sig paa Thronen, og saa ere de Konge og 
Dronning.  Allle de rode Hanekamme stille sig op 
ved Siden, og staae og bukke, de ere Kammerjunkere. 
--- Saa komme alle de nydeligste Blomster, og saa er 
der stort Bal, de blaa Violer forestille maa Søcadetter, 
de dandse med Hyazinter og Crocus, som de gamle 
Fruer, de passe pass, at der bliver dandset net, og at 
det gaaer pænt til.92 
The king has vacated his castle, and, beyond the sight of human eyes, the flowers gather 
themselves from out of the garden, where they existed only to serve the pleasure of 
others, and begin a dance of their own.  Arranging themselves only after their Smuk, their 
                                                          
92 Anderson, p. 27. “As soon as the king and his courtiers move into town, then the flowers move up to the 
castle.  There they live a merry life; I wish you could see it.  The two most beautiful roses sit on the throne; 
they are the king and the queen.  The big red tiger lilies are lords in waiting; they stand behind the throne 
and bow.  Then in come all the most beautiful flowers and the great ball begins. The blue violets and 
midshipmen.  They dance with the hyacinths and the crocuses, and call them Miss. The tulips and the big 
yellow lilies are the old ladies, they see to it that everyone behaves and dances in time to the music.” 
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beauty and decoration, their colors, once dedicated to the symbolisms of courtly life, now 
join into a free converse; they even spring away from their petals and begin to fly. “for 
naar de ville, saa kunne de flyve.Har Du ikke nok seet de smukke Sommerfugle, de røde, 
gule og hvite, de see næste ud som Blomster, det have de ogsaa været, de ere sprungne af 
Stilken høit op in Luften, of har da slaaet med Bladene, ligesom de vare smaa Vinger, og 
saa fløi de.”93   
 The charm of this image, it might seem, rests simply in the privilege of fantasy 
over the understanding.  Yet while this Romantic opposition survives into Anderson’s 
poetry, it is not as decisive as it may at first seem; the fantasy remains only a means of 
access and openness to processes that lie outside the poet.  Rather, it has a deeper, and 
stranger significance; the dance of the flowers, their blossoming, is the moment where the 
vertical becomes horizontal --- or indeed, where the two axi of movement are join 
together in their original, organic unity.  The vertical growth of the stalk unfolds into a 
loving embrace of the outward-flowing rays of the sun.   
 This moment is captured perfectly in an image from the Den lille Havfrue (The 
Little Mermaid).  Here, the sun is its described as a flower; “I Blikstille kunde man øine 
Solen, den syntes en Purpur-Blomst, fra hvis Bæger det hele Lys udstrømmede.”94  And, 
at the same time, the little mermaid builds a garden that itself looks like the sun; “men 
den yngste gjorde sin ganske rund ligesom Solen, og havde kun Blomster, der skinnede 
rode som den.”  This mutual embrace of the blooming sun and blooming flowers, this 
                                                          
93 Anderson, p. 26; “When flowers want to, they can fly.  You have seen butterflies.  Don’t they look like 
yellow, red, and white flowers? That is exactly what they were once.  They are flowers who have jumped 
off their stems and have learned to fly with their petals;  and when they first get a taste for it, they never 
return to their stems, and their little petals become real wings.” 
94 P. 53. “When the sea was calm, the sun appeared like a crimson flower, from which all light flowed.” 
 268
confluence of vertical and the horizontal, heaven and earth, and even labor and growth, 
itself only points towards the original unity of paradise itself.  For even here, in the 
mermaid’s garden, the furthest rounding of opposites is experienced through sadness  --- 
as a weeping willow; “Hun plantede ved Støtten en rosenrød Grædepiil, den voxte 
herligt, og hang med sine friske Grene udover den, ned mod den blaa Sandbund, hvor 
Skyggen viste sig violet of var I Bevægelse, ligesom Grenene; det saae ud, som om Top 
og Rødder legede at kysse hinander.”    
 And verily, in paradise itself, this same sadness intrudes and causes its fall.  In a 
story called “The Garden of Eden,” Anderson tells of a learned prince who laments the 
disobedience of the first man, and is sure that, were he in paradise in Adam’s stead, he 
would not have committed original sin.  Carried to paradise by one of the four winds, he 
is given a chance to prove himself --- and fails, of course.  While inside the palace in the 
Garden of Eden, itself formed of a giant flower, he disobeys the orders that had been 
given to him; leaning over the princess of the garden, and seeing her tears, he pities her 
own pity for him and touches his mouth to hers. This moment is described in a passage 
reminiscent at once of Goethe’s Faust and Nietzsche’s Zarathustra (check the dates);  
‘Are you crying because of me? Do not cry, fairest, most beautiful 
woman! Now I understand the happiness of paradise.  It flows with my 
blood through my veins into my brain, my thoughts.  I feel the strength 
of the angels’ eternal life within my mortal body. Let everlasting night 
come, the riches of one moment like this are enough for me.’ He kissed 
away her tear, he kissed her eyes, and his mouth touched hers. 
A fearful clap of thunder was heard, deeper, more frightening than any 
ever heard before.  The fairy vanished and the garden of Eden sank into 
the earth; deep, deep down.  The prince saw it disappear into the dark 
night like a far distant star.  He felt a deathly coldness touch his limbs; 
his eyes closed, and he fell down as though he were dead.95 
                                                          
95 English, p. 143. 
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Eternity, as it were, blossoms between, and unfolds out of the furthest extremes, and yet 
it cannot allow these extremes to touch.  For if earlier Trauer was experienced as the fall 
away from eternity, the dismemberment and shattering of an original well-roundedness, 
now mourning itself belongs to the eternal --- for it exists only as a circulation, and can 
only be felt as such, --- flowing with the blood, --- as a movement and communication 
that takes place throughout the whole, and yet could never realized in a single instant.  
And thus even paradise is not without tears, since its dance --- ‘Now begins our dance,’ 
whispered the fairy --- implies the very impossibility of realizing a moment of absolute 
unity.  
 Even within paradise, the horizontal and vertical movements do not know of any 
higher, logical reconciliation --- there could be no such thing as an “intellectual intuition” 
--- and yet they join together in a moment of transition, a curving from one movement to 
another.  After the fall, however, they are sundered completely, and each, as it were, sets 
out on its separate way.   On the one hand, an errant path across the face of the world; 
man becomes a wanderer --- the fate that Death pronounces to the fallen Prince; “In a 
coffin I shall put him, but not now.  Let him first wander about the earth atoning for his 
sins, becoming good if he can.”  On the other hand, though, nature itself comes to exist 
only in the vertical plain, only as a ceaseless striving towards the sun.  In the words of the 
pine tree; “To grow, to grow, to become tall and old; there’s nothing in the world so 
marvelous.” And it is at the moment where these two movements, trying to twist back 
together into one, clash the most, that Anderson’s own historier take place. 
 The way in which these two moments contrast and conflict appears most clearly 
in “Skuggen,” (The Shadow). While traveling in the Mediterranean, where “the sun really 
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know how to shine” (der kan rigtignok Solen brænde!), a young scholar catches a 
glimpse of Poetry as she stepped on to her balcony to water her well-tended flowers and 
then hurried back indoors.  In the evening of the next day, the scholar, still captivated by 
the sight of Poesy, notices that his shadow, shy of the light, has stretched all the way into 
the her apartment, and so he encourages his shadow to investigate, on the condition that it 
return to him. This, however, was not to be.  The shadow sneaks across into the 
apartment; “but then there happened something that no one say.  The shadow went 
through the half-open door of the other balcony, while the scholar went into his own 
room and closed the drapes behind him.”96  It is only many years later that the shadow 
will return to the scholar and tell him what it learned amidst Poetry.   
 The scholar, having grown a new shadow, has now returned home and become a 
philosopher; “Saa kom den lærde Mand hjem og han skrev Bøger om hvad der var Sandt 
I Verden, og om hvad der var Godt og hvad der var Smukt…” Writing about what is true, 
good, and beautiful, he stands directly under the Platonic forms; or in the famous image 
in the Republic, directly beneath the light of the sun, --- his thought, as it were, is purely 
vertical and without shadows, a simple ascent on Jacob’s ladder.  And so, also, he is 
unable to communicate to others, or make himself understood, and as his life progresses, 
and as he ascends ever higher towards the pure forms, his material condition becomes 
ever worse; “Sorg og Plage fulgte ham, og hvad han talte om det Sande og det Gode og 
det Skjønne, der var for de Fleste ligesom Roser for en Ko!”97  And in the end, wasting 
away of sickness, his friends describe him as “a mere shadow of himself.”  The shadow, 
                                                          
96 English, p. 336. 
97 P. 190, “Sorrow and misery followed him, and what he told about the true and the good and the beautiful 
was for most people like a rose before a cow!” 
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on the other hand, moves purely on the horizontal plain --- as indeed, such purely 
horizontal movement belongs of essence to a shadow; he is a wanderer, a traveler, 
wealthy and famous.    But above all, the master of words; for this is what he learned in 
the anterooms of poetry, who herself also dwells in the dimension of the horizontal, 
though surrounded by so much lamp-light that the shadow could not approach her 
directly, but had to remain in the entrance room of her court.  Afterwards, having become 
like a human through his proximity to poetry, the shadow gains his substance and fame 
by wandering through the earth, and bribing people by reporting to them their evil deeds -
-- in the trade of words, in other words, --- gossip. “If I had written a newspaper, 
everyone would have read it.”  And indeed, the gossiped, common, uegenlig (check) 
word is itself a shadow;  
‘Vær ganske rolig!’ sagde den lærde Mand, ‘jeg skal ikke sige Nogen 
hwem Du egenlig er! Her er min Haand! Jeg lover det og en Mand et 
Ord!’ 
‘Et Ord en Skygge!; sagde Skyggen, og saaledes maatte jen tale.98  
In the end, the philosopher becomes the shadows shadow, and together they travel to a 
health resort, where the shadow meets, and wins the love, of a princess who suffers from 
too much discernment; she is able to see through everyone, just not the shadow.  Finally 
threatening to reveal the shadow for a shadow and the marriage for a fraud, the 
philosopher --- now, officially, as it were, a shadow --- is murdered under the cloak of 
secrecy; 
‘Stakkels Skygge’ sagde Prindsessen, ‘han er meget ulykkelig; det er en 
sand Velgkerning at frie ham fra den Smule Liv han har, og naar jeg 
rigtig tænker over det, saa troer jeg det liver nodvendig at det bliver 
gjort af med ham in al Stilhed!’ 
                                                          
98 p. 186. 
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‘Det er rigtignok haardt!’ sagde Skyggen, ‘for det var en tro Tjener!’ og 
saa gav han ligesom et Suk. 
‘De er an ædel Characteer!’ sagte Kongendatteren. 
Om Aftenen var hele Byen illumineret, og Kanonerne gik af: bum! Og 
Soldaterne præsenterede Gavær. Det var et Bryllup! Kongedatteteren 
og Skyggen gik ud paa Altanen for at lage sig see og faae nok en Gang 
Hurra! 
Den lærde Mand hørte ikke noget til Alt det, for ham havde de taget 
Liven af. ---   
While not all of Andersen’s writings possess such crisp brutality, the despair of this 
ending repeats itself throughout his work.  Indeed, many of his stories might be thought 
of as prisms that separate out these two movements --- the horizontal and vertical --- from 
the white light of ordinary life, and allow them to appear distinctly and in their 
contradiction.  Yet this negative task is also complemented by a positive; the 
remembrance of the “small piece of life” {check the Danish) that is lived only vertically, 
only towards the sun.  Because the narrow, small, and simple life points upwards with 
such stubborn resolve, it is unaware of its fellows, incapable of communicating; dumb.  
And thus, to be remembered, it must be forcibly occupied by the horizontal life of words, 
and in this way brought into a communication with its surroundings, with itself, and with 
the reader.  In order to remember the idiotic simplicity of its life, its own ceaseless 
striving must be overshadowed with the melancholic recollection of that which, in its 
striving, it has forgotten, or indeed never knew.  The language through which things 
speak and think --- and through which they become accessible to us --- is, as it were, the 
mirror image of its own small life.   
 Nowhere is this technique applied with such force as in “The Fir Tree.”   What is 
most remarkable about stories such as “The Fir Tree,” the “Snow Man,” or the “Tin 
Soldier” is that while Andersen endows inhuman things with a human language, they are 
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not granted even the slightest degree of human agency; they do not act against the world 
and towards themselves as humans do, but remain, in their actions, the things that they 
are, subject always to the conditions that are imposed by their nature and their material.  
And accordingly, their striving must not be confused with the striving of humans; they do 
not wish for things that they could gain through purposeful actions, but rather, --- and this 
is what is so peculiar --- only for what they become.  Their striving, as it were, is a simple 
expression of their essence.  And yet this essence is not itself either simple, or actively 
self-determining, but is subject to transformation from the outside.  Thus the fir tree 
begins as a merely natural being, growing upwards towards the sun, and is transformed, 
through human labor, into an artifact, --- a Christmas tree.  Surrounded by presents, 
decorated with gold and silver tinsel, hung with sweets and golden apples, illuminated by 
hundreds of candles, and crowned by a golden star, the pine tree becomes a symbol of the 
Garden of Paradise, and itself points towards eternal life.  Its striving remains purely 
vertical, towards growth, but now it has itself become the human striving for eternity and 
God’s light.  The existence of the fir tree, as it were, exhausts the entire range of vertical 
movement; from natural growth towards the sun, to human growth towards eternity.  Yet 
this pure verticality, is, as we suggested, wordless; it is only able to speak of itself 
through its opposite, the melancholy recollection of what was forgotten before it was ever 
known.  For even the very fact that the tree’s transformed nature communicates itself as 
striving already implies the language of melancholy; or, indeed, all language is merely 
horizontal, merely recollective and rememorative, --- filling in the void of what has 
already happened with mournfulness.   
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 It this story, we see, the negative and positive gestures are closely intertwined; the 
mourning of a fallen world, where the vertical and horizontal movements have hopelessly 
diverged, and the melancholic recollection of a life that could never have been lived.   
Perhaps it is owing to the conflict in mood between these two moments, and the very 
different demands that they make on the reader, that Andersen has often been accused an 
over-indulgent sentimentality.  Indeed, if we are to properly understand his work, and 
defend their spirit against vulgarization and misunderstanding, we must realize the very 
necessity of what might, at first, appear sentimental.   
    
 
 











her court;   
I was in the entrance hall.  That’s what you sat looking at all the time, 
the vestibule.  There was no lamp in there, and that’s why from the 
outside the apartment appeared dark.  But there was a door.  It opened 
into another room, which opened onto another, which opened onto 
another.  There was a long row of rooms and anterooms before one 
reaches the innermost where Poetry lived.  And there were ablaze with 
more than enough light to kill a shadow, so I never saw the maiden up 
close. I was cautious and patient, and that is the same as being 
virtuous…Everything was there! Of course, I never went all the way in.  
The twilight of the vestibule suited me better, and from there I had an 
excellent view.  I saw everything and I know all. I was at the court of 
Poetry, in the entrance hall… You could not have stayed there and 
remained a human being, but it made a human being of me! I quickly 
came to understand my innermost nature, that part of me which from 
birth can claim kinship to Poetry.  When I lived with you, I didn’t even 
think about such things.  You’ll remember that I was always larger at 
sunrise and at sunset, and that I was more noticeable in the moonlight 
than you were. Still, I had no understanding of my nature; that did not 
come until I was in the vestibule, and then I became a human being.99   
 
in the light-giving energy of the sun and the death-absorbing, yet ever rejuvenating earth, 
and thus is submitted absolutely to the law and cycles of nature.  And if the flowers are 
able to dance, it is not through a fanciful flight from their mortal condition, but only 
through its complete acceptance.  As they explain, not to Ida, but rather to her doll ---; 
“Du skal have saa mange Tak, men vi kan ikke leve saa længe! Imorgen ere vi ganske 
døde; men siig til den lille Ida, at hun skal begrave os ude in Haven, hvor Kanarifuglen 
ligger, saa voxe vi op igjen til Sommer og blive meget smukere!”100  The dance of the 
                                                          
99 English, p. 339. 
100 P. 30; “It is most kind of you, but our life is short.  Tomorrow we shall be dead.  Tell little Ida to bury us 
out in the garden where the canary is buried; and next year we shall come to life again and be even more 
beautiful than we are now.” 
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flowers, their free union, is the sideways turn of a life lived wholly on the vertical axis, as 
a filament stretched between the earth and the sun, darkness and light; the inorganic and 
the absolute.   
 This utopian moment, described with such childlike ease and simplicity, is at the 
heart of Andersen’s poetic work; it repeats itself, for example, in the violent ending to 
“the Tinderbox” --- where the king, queen, and royal council are, literally, overthrown at 
a public execution --- as well as in the more despairingly images of the “The Garden of 
Eden,” and also, in “The Little Mermaid,” through the strange correlation between two 
kingdoms --- one under and the other above the sea.   Yet we should not think that 
Andersen simple repeats the typically Romantic idealization of “fantasy” over 
“understanding” and “cleverness.” 
 Art does not develop through the linear advance of history.  Rather, it blossoms.  
We have already discovered this thought in both Hölderlin and Cecchetti, and turning to 
the works of Hans Christian Andersen, we shall find it anew --- only now with 
illuminating rays cast on the relation between the language of nature, the language of 











This spiritual nature is descended from God, and God; or, perhaps one could say, man’s 
spiritual privilege consists in being identical with   --- grasping and comprehending, or 
rather, feeling --- God as the whole of nature.101  But such attempts to weave a halfways 
coherent doctrine out of Nijinsky’s diary would be futile; what is important, above all, is 
that the pantheistic and panentheistic tendencies are so strongly pronounced, and that 
they are appear in a form that has peculiar resonance with his dancing career; in his 











In Dorethea Schlegel, Heine, Lasalle, Marx, Hess, Geiger, Zunz, Cohen, Rosenzweig, 
Benjamin we discover a politics defined, above all, by hope and by the openness of 
history.  Just not in Spinoza and Freud --- for them, indeed, history  ; in Spinoza’s 
Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, the history of revelation becomes merely an indication of 
moral righteousness, but expresses nothing about nature’s essence. And in Freud’s Der 
Mann Moses und die monotheistische Religion --- historical time is revealed as the time 
of trauma and neurosis.  To live without neurosis would be to live outside of history --- in 
a relation to one’s natural surroundings free of all the maladapted notions rooted in the 
development of the individual and of mankind.  Yet if Freud and Spinoza          
 
{Freud and Moses Mendelssohn (and Spinoza) as the beginning and end of the messianic 
tradition in Jewish-German literature… And yet in a certain sense, they are its deepest 
exponents…What Freud sought was to realize free the religion of the sun, and the son 
from the top-heaviness of the father --- 
From the sun-king to Nijinski --- Ballet describes a similar trajectory. 
Nijinski --- compared with Hölderlin’s Empedokles.} 
                                                                                                                                                                             






















  For the circle to be complete, the procreative semen (zeugende Samen) of the poetic 





These enclosed and clothed vowels become the Sprachwurzeln; the roots of Wagner’s 
theory of musical poetry.   
124 
219 –Entstehung der Sprache. 
 
Allowing for this unification is, at once, the genius of the artist as a creative personality, 





{The genius as the one who thinks he knows how these different world relate to each 
other. 
Wagner’s Gesamtkunstwerk as the danger of Genius, nationalistic poetry.       
Adalbert Stifter in contrast:} 
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The Gesamtkunstwerk of Diaghelev, in contrast.  Different creative artists brought 
together… } 
{Judaism: the world as God’s creation.} 
 
  
ii) The needs for politics --- poetry as political; as creating the possibility of beings a 
poet.  
iii) The need to build a bridge between mythology and science; that this suggests the 
nature of the Trennung. --- Writing. 
iv) That this brings us back to the question: how do the work and performance separate. 
 
 
Elsewhere, indeed, he contrasts the schnelle Verstand with an understanding that is 




            
  
 
i. Schneller Begriff not simply ... 
ii.  Comp. with Plato’s Eros. 
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iii.  The danger of its Schnellness; the need for sober enthusiasm. For keeping 
once balance. 
iv. Poetry as a dance. 
v. Thus: poetry moves up and down, and is endless, cannot grasp the whole. 
vi. Poet as a dancing Handworker. 
vii. Solution to the problem of Rhyme/Meter. 
  
 
   
i. The poet is open towards all of nature --- not just towards the beautiful. 
ii. How is the poet able to do this:  
the poetic spirit must be schnell. 
that it cannot encompass all at once. 
that it must be infinite. 
iii. Begeisterung und Nuechternheit. 
In short:  the poet must dance.    
 
Beginning from 
                     obvious beauties he must for the sake of that highest beauty be ever 
climbing aloft, as on the rungs of a ladder, from one to two, and 
                     from two to all beautiful bodies; from personal beauty he proceeds to 
beautiful observances, from observance to beautiful learning, and 
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                     from learning at last to that particular study which is concerned with the 
beautiful itself and that alone; so that in the end he comes to 
                     know [211d] the very essence of beauty. In that state of life above all others, 
my dear Socrates,' said the Mantinean woman, 'a man finds it 
                     truly worth while to live, as he contemplates essential beauty. This, when 









Poetry becomes writing: the murmering, flowing, of nature, becomes a rune. 
 
, and   with  And on the other hand, Gottfried von Strassburg’s Tristan, where a 
monotonously repeated takes over.   The former, taking shape from the heroes’ senseless 
march towards the heathen east, and ending in chaotic bloodshed and   
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A philosophy, it follows, might first be understood as a set of words that find their 
niche by expressing the interaction of things and words among themselves and with each 
other. Words like  or  or Subjekt and Objekt survive as specialized 
philosophical vocabulary through the very ability to express at a high level of generality 
actions that take place throughout the perspective on nature expressed through human 
language.  And it would be absolutely senseless to criticize these as abstract or 
metaphysical, and limit the proper use of language to words that obey certain narrow 
conditions of empirical reference.  Empirical reference is either the condition of all words 
(its otherly, allegorical, interaction, as we might say), or it is a technique that involves 
certain procedures (pointing at a thing, using a bubble chamber), which, to the extent 
usage becomes rigorously dependent on them, belong to a institutional language, and no 






























 We are concerned here not with evolution of species, but just with the emergence 
of ever more patterned relations of sounds.  There may be a fairly good correspondence 
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between sonorous complexity and the complexity of organisms, but this is not relevant in 






Information about this topic in other articles 
{Painting as simultaneously an act of nature and a human activity. 
The development of paintings may be understood in an evolutionary way; 
Moving away from purposes that rule painting as an activity, and above all the 
purpose of creating either formal beauty or imitating objects. 
As the assembly of an every more fluid interrelation of curves and colors --- 
Thus as the coming to expression of nature itself. 
This also applies to music and dance and also, as we will see, poetry; yet  
In each case in different ways.   
In painting, the opposition between work and play is most extreme; in dance, they 
Are most close to interwovent. } 
{The extraction of colors from the natural surroundings; and through chemical 
processes.  The material of painting thus involves a real relation to nature;  the ability to 
reproduce the colors of nature can in no way be taken for granted.} 
{Colors and curves as prefiguring the circulation of the whole of nature} 
{Goethe’s Farbenlehre --- Impressionistic painting} 
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 But don’t we experience time as linear? Even if we were to understand historical 
time as cyclical, isn’t there an ineradicable linearity to our everyday life?  Don’      
It cost scientists great labors to gain even the first insight into these processes, let 
alone develop mathematical models that could explain even the simplest cases of these 
operations, and this work, indeed, has only just begun.   
We, of coarse, are not scientists, and do not pretend to say anything scientific. We 
wish only to lay the first root of the tree that will join our language and theirs.       
 translates the physical event into a limited number of possible symbolic 
representations—computers, we will see, are real institutions, which translate an analog 
event into a digital event --, and then processes these according to fixed rule,       
{There are two limit cases in the definition of an artifact; on the one hand, that 
which involves a tremendous investment of labor in relation to its use. --- This is the 
aesthetic object; just as in the case of dramatics, we had to undo the prejudice that placed 
spectacle in the position of least rank, and ultimately tried to assign a purpose to drama, 
now we must undo the prejudice in aesthetics that treats obscures the significance of 
decoration. Decoration is the investment of last value into an artifact through labor that 
serves no end; decoration is not merely a bound, unfree version of an aesthetic pleasure 
that involves, as it were, a kind of pure aesthetic pleasure, the experience of abstract 
freedom as such.  Rather, decoration is the act of endowing objects as the centers of 
political life, by working in labor.  So-called pure art is merely the extreme case of 
artisanry, and it differs only by the degree of details --- and if the uniqueness of the 
“creative personality” of the artist is an issue, it is only because it makes this expended 
labor even more precious.  Genius is a wholly derivative category, and only serves the 
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erroneous idea that the art-work allow for the experience of freedom, even if it also 
stands at the limit of this.  
Aesthetics, in other words, creates a world of extraordinary detail; dramatics is the 
experience of the world as a world of details. 
One of the marks of the real contradiction of freedom is that the world becomes 
ever more flat and bland --- the complexities of this process will become apparent when 
we discuss the role that institutions play in this {there are institutions which create a 
certain kind of refinement --- namely computers}.  The world, simply put, becomes ugly 
and disposable.  What replaces decoration is design, form follows functions --- expresses 
the function in its purity, and thus attains a kind of limited beauty.  
The genre of the sentimental as a resistance against the disposability of things.}  
* 
 A community involves the activities of man with the activities of nature, and is 
cultivated not only through the creation of people of character, but also the manufacture 
things of substance. Non-human nature must itself be transformed so that it will 
communicate its potential for activity to man; and is substantial according to the degree 
of its stability and potential. Such transformations are brought about using different 
techniques, which, as stated, extend human language by bringing about a real 
communication with the action of nature.  
 It its original and pristine state, nature tends towards one of two extremes. It is 
either too volatile --- rich in potential but unstable. Examples are foodstuffs and fuels; in 
short, everything that contains some form of bonded energy. Or it is too inert --- 
extremely stable but without active potential. This term applies to metal ore, rocks, water, 
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and the like. Techniques, likewise, are of one of two sorts. Either they make what is too 
volatile more stable, or they make what is too inert richer in possibilities. With this in 
mind, we now turn to the four techniques --- shelters, tools, agriculture, and technologies, 
consider which category each falls under. 
 {This also characterizes the difference between aesthetics and dramatics --- the one 
begins with a material that is too inert, the other with a material that is too volatile.} 
{Free political action is action within a community that maintains or expands the 
possibilities of the community) 
 i. The codification of steps. 
 ii. The principle of fluidity. 
 iii. The syntactic arrangement of steps.  
  a) linear connections nevertheless limited in time and space. 
  b) the progression up and down ladder of being. 
 iv. The scenario.  
(vista opens upon “aesthetics” --- poetry vs. ballet as expressions of political action. 
Poetry makes language rhythmic. Ballet makes movement verbal. Ballet expresses the 
essence of movement; the constraint of movement to space, exemplifies fluidity, and 
develops the system of steps into something with a complexity and expressive potential 
approaching verbal language. Ballet also allows for a syntactic ordering of steps, without 
the violation of fluidity, through the “scenario.” Ballet is the movement from fluency to 
freedom. The syntactic order of steps expresses the movement up and down a series of 
gradations of freedom. Poetry, in contrast, approaches the mechanical from freedom.)  
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 Nor can the involuntary use of an expressive physical language be said to play less of a 
role in free political discourse. Quite to the contrary, what makes somatic expressiveness 
so essential to free political discourse  
{Tools as extensions of bodily motions; the relations of tools to politeness … weapons, 
the only tools that act against people as people, rather than as slaves… that weapons, 




 While tools distinguish between a mere tool, and technology. A tool serves only as an 
extension of human powers, and works by directly translating a mechanical movement 
produced by the muscle action of human beings into different kind of mechanical 
movement. A stone, for example, becomes a tool when it thrown; when the movement of 
the hand and arms and body translated into a projectile motion. A knife allows the 
thrusting motion of the arm to cut through flesh. Some tools can be quite complex  
Because of this human, freely creative input --- because the individuals involved work 
through human language and in ways that depend on the full range of their capacities --- 
creative real  
The model for an institution, its perfected form, is a computer; in a computer, physical 
events (a finger striking a keyboard, a signal sent over a key board, a light reflected off of 
a mirror from a laser beam, a electromagnetic pattern created by a magnet moving across 
of rotating metal drum) are translated into digit signals that are then manipulated through 
the circuitry, in an entirely discreet process, yielding output signals that are then 
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translated back into physical events. As in a perfect institution, a computer’s interface 
with the outside world merely serves to create a content that then takes on a life of its 
own. This interface may, to various degree, involve the use of the forms of human 
language; yet these are only appropriated in order to serve the translation from one event 
into another, and to this extent, they are essentially derivative. They do not involve the 
infinite potential and creativity of natural language, but only a specific set of 
combinations used to describe a range of possible states-of-affairs outside of the 
institution and then translate these into terms used within the institution. Computers and 
companies speak to us in remarkably similar ways; just as a computer can only, as yet, 
present us with a finite set of operations, --- an input that is processed through its own 
internal routine, --- the tendency of companies is likewise only to communicate through 
choices; be this in the multiple choice surveys that they use for “market research,” or the 
selection of wares and options that they offer to the market place, or in automated phone 
services. Advertising and sales may seem to proceed through a still-human language; and 
while indeed salesmen evince the subtlety and creativity of language in their words than 
any one else, and while it would be impossible, as yet, to replace them with computers; 
and while, likewise, advertising is often extraordinarily creative in its conception, in the 
end, all these forms of speech boil down to an act of communication that can no longer be 
counted as freely political. They all assume this form; “buy X / because of Y.” I have 
used the “/” in order to indicate that a caesura to divide the two halves of the expression. 
Through the caesura, what would otherwise be one of the paradigmatic forms of political 
language --- giving reasons for human actions --- is sundered into two forms of agency 
belonging the separate realms and unable to completely unable communicate with each 
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other. “Buying X”, on the one hand, is an action that only has meaning for the 
corporation that sells it, and only because, as a result of it, and through some chain of 
causally linked events, it will gain income in exchange for products or services. The 
terms of this exchange are merely operational variable, inputs and output, that are then 
manipulated within the system in order to come to new choices about how to use their 
capitol. That through “buying a product,” a consumer actually gains possession of an 
object in exchange for their money, or that it is their money that they exchange; or that 
this product will serve some purpose in their lives, or that the money they had handed 
over could have been used to satisfy other needs --- all of this plays absolute no role from 
this side of things; at best these are merely accidental facts about the way the external 
world operates which a corporation must take into account in order to successfully guide 
its actions. “Because of Y,” on the other hand, is only relevant to the consumer, and not 
as a free political agent, possessing moral agency. It is not really a “because” at all; it 
does not provide causes and reasons for the action that it wishes performed, but only tries 
to provoke a certain action on the part of the consumer by activating some facet of his 
receptive nature. 
 What the caesura expresses, simply put, is that the “ideal speech act” of 
advertising --- of language which serves, above all, to constitute a certain kind of 
interaction between the buyer and seller --- involves neither actions or reasons valid to 
both sides. This is so because neither addresser nor addressee are agents in the same way, 
but rather belong, as it were, to entirely different strata of being; a circulation of capital, 
on the one side, and on the other, a bundle of needs and desires. Any speech act that does 
not constitute both addresser and addressee as agents of the same kind, able touch each 
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other through the same kinds of action, cannot be freely political; it undermines the very 
possibility of reciprocal interaction.  
 In terms for different chemicals don’t refer to anything accessible directly 
through our senses, not solely to abstract entities; but rather as abstract entities, 
they gain reference through experimental procedures that isolate and purify 
substances and combine them together and measure the heat produced, or capture 
the products of the reaction. No chemical can be known except in its reactions 
with other chemicals (as is even evident in the case of taste).  
 Or consider a business. A potential or actual customer is not a person, as it 
is ordinarily understood and used as a political term among people to speak of 
themselves in relation to other forms of agency in the world. Rather, the meaning 
of “costumer,” in this institutional context, can only be established through the 
procedures of marketing and sales. A customer is not a person, but an agent 
capable of performing a certain kind of action in relation to the corporation. The 
potential to perform this action among any set of entities (individual peoples, 
other businesses, governments, institutions) is not ascertained primarily through 
some insight of common senses, --- even if this may work in some cases ---, but 
through procedures of market research, advertising, and sales. The term “buyer” 
or “customer,” that has meaning within the system as  
 
If the linguistic turn in philosophy is be more than a mere desiderata, if it is to 
fundamentally change they way we approach the problems of thinking, philology must 
replace philosophy as the unifying theoretical discourse.  
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 it is perhaps only a consequence of the fact that they are unable to agree on a common 
approach to the phenomenon of human language. Because the pragmatic use of language 
A purely scientific approach to language The totality of human languages, as an ideal, 
concrete system  
The theory of physics or chemistry are ideal, abstract system that ultimately describe, and 
thus refer to, aspects of the concrete, real system of nature  
 
